26 Del. Ch. 436 | Del. | 1942
delivering the opinion of the court:
We pass by the appellee’s motion to dismiss this appeal based on non-joinder of parties, and proceed at once to the merits. The appeal involves the interrelations of three corporations. Public Service Holding Corporation is in receivership. The voting control of the corporation is in the hands of one Garland and his associates. Cooperative Finance Corporation, a large stockholder of Public Service Holding Corporation, is under Garland’s absolute control. The assets of any value of the receivership estate consist of shares of the common stock of Automatic Signal Corporation.
Public Service Holding Corporation was organized under Delaware law by Garland in 1931. Its capitalization appears to be 2000 shares of cumulative preferred stock of the par value of $50.00, of which 1991 shares are outstanding; 300,000 shares of Class A Common stock of the par value of $1.00, of which 230,891 shares are outstanding; and 30,000 shares of common stock of the par value of $1.00 of which 28,994 shares are outstanding. On May 5, 1939, Curtis H. Veeder, a large stockholder of the corporation, filed a bill of complaint in the court below alleging insolvency of the corporation, and praying for the appointment of a receiver. It was alleged that Garland dominated the company’s activities and manipulated its assets for his per
The appellant’s argument is that the Chancellor had no discretion in the premises; but that it had the absolute right, by means of its offer, to relieve the corporation’s condition of insolvency and to have a restoration to it of its property. Milwaukee & Minnesota R. R. Co., et al., v. Soutter, 2 Wall. 510, 17 L. Ed. 900, is cited as an authority; but the case in no way supports the contention. There Soutter and another had filed a bill to foreclose a mortgage given by LaCrosse and Milwaukee Railroad Company to secure bonds in the amount of one million dollars, and a receiver was appointed for the company. Milwaukee and Minnesota.
The appellant’s offer was not to pay the debts of the corporation. It proposed to purchase authorized but unissued Class A stock. This stock the appellant calls treasury stock and, apparently, it regards the stock as an asset like any other item of property in the hands of the receiver.
In an effort to bolster its contention, the appellant calls its offer a plan of re-organization; but a re-organization of an insolvent corporation always involves changes in the existing legal rights of some, if not all, of those having rights in connection with the property involved. Forms of re-organization are many. Ordinarily, they are accomplished by a readjustment of securities pursuant to an agreement of stockholders and creditors without foreclosure; or by a voluntary transfer of the corporation’s property to a new corporation formed by the stockholders and other persons financially interested in the old corporation, without judicial sale; or in connection with the purchase of the property at a judicial sale and the formation of a new corporation by the purchasers to take over the property and continue the business. Action by stockholders, bondholders and creditors, or corporate action in some form would seem to be required. See 15 Fletcher, supra, Ch. 62; Bull v. International Power Co., 87 N. J. Eq. 1, 99 A. 111. It is unnecessary to consider whether a re-organization may be directed and
The appellant’s proposal ignored the corporation’s board of directors and the stockholders in general. In particular, the proposal was in entire disregard of the wishes of the great majority of preferred stockholders and of the hard fact that the corporation’s only source of income had long since run dry with but little hope of restoration. The effect of granting the application would have been to increase the number of outstanding Class A shares, already having little or no value, in the face of an almost certain recurrence of a condition of insolvency. It is clear, as the proposal was presented to the Chancellor, that he was without power to order its acceptance by the receiver. Moreover, if the matter is at all entitled to be looked on as one within the Chancellor’s discretion—and that is the appellant’s most plausible ground—it is in no better case. In Radio Corporation of America v. Philadelphia Storage Battery Co., 23 Del. Ch. 289, 6 A. 2d 329, we said that the essence of judicial discretion is the exercise of judgment directed by conscience and reason, as opposed to capricious or arbitrary action; and where a court had not exceeded the bounds of reason in view of the circumstances, and has not so ignored recognized rules of law or practice so as to produce injustice, its legal discretion has not been abused; for the question is not whether the reviewing court agrees with the court below, but rather whether it believes that the judicial mind in view of the relevant rules of law and upon due consideration of the facts of the case, could reasonably have reached the conclusion of which complaint is made. Tested by this rule, no abuse of discretion has been shown. On the contrary, the court below would not have been within the protection of the rule had it granted the prayer of the appellant’s petition. In this view of the matter, the order of dismissal is not appealable. 1 Whitehouse, Eq. Pr. § 506;
Finally, it is urged that this court should permit a special meeting of stockholders to obtain the opinion of the real parties in interest, as the present board of directors does not truly represent them. This is plainly an afterthought. The matter was not presented to the court below; was not, of course, considered; and no assignment of error was made in that respect. Assuming, but by no means deciding, that the contention has merit in the circumstances shown, it will not be considered here.
The order of dismissal is sustained.