*1 lect as to Falcon’s debt. Not did U.S. 56(e)).
HETA (quoting not resuscitate otherwise time- Fed.R.Civ.P. case, barred claims but Falcon AFFIRMED. would not have had a defense under the prior six-year statute.1 And even if he
had, congressional repeal of a statute of process
limitations does not violate the due Lewis,
clause. See In re 506 F.3d (9th Cir.2007) (rejecting pro-
932-33 due challenge to retroactive
cess amendment of Bankruptcy discharge- Code as loans).
ability of certain student Because Falcon’s constitutional chal- ALLIANCE, PUBLIC INTEGRITY fails, lenge summary judgment we must INC., nonprofit an Arizona member genuine consider whether issues of materi- ship corporation; Ash, Bruce an indi al fact regarding exist the loan amounts vidual; Gonzales, Fernando an indi alleged complaint and Falcon’s de- vidual; Holden, individual; Ann an fault. The pri- established a Oien, individual; Lori an Ken Smal ma facie through case certificates of in- ley, individual, Plaintiffs-Appel debtedness, signed which were under the lants,
penalty perjury, showing that Falcon promissory loans, executed notes to secure loans, defaulted on the and owed the Unit- TUCSON,, CITY OF a chartered ed States certain amounts after offsets Arizona; the State of Jonathan Roths from various sources. See United States child, capacity Mayor his as the v. Petroff-Kline, 557 F.3d (6th Tucson; Regina Romero, Cir.2009). Falcon, hand, on the other capacity in her as a member of the present testimony failed to for consider- City Council; Tucson Cunning Paul summary ation on judgment to refute the ham, capacity in his as a member of government’s showing that it was entitled City Council; the Tucson Karin Uh to a judgment sought. the amount As lich, capacity in her as a member of held, the district court Falcon “failed to City Council; Shirley Tucson present evidentiary sufficient facts to raise Scott, capacity in her as a member of genuine issue of material fact or a ques- City Council; the Tucson Richard liability tion as to for the indebtedness Fimbres, capacity in his as a member alleged in Counts I and II of the Com- City Council; of the Tucson Steve Ko Catrett, Corp. See Celotex plaint.” zachik, capacity in his as a member of HETA, Congress statute, HETA, Before enacted superseded the statute by Pub.L. No. 102- limitations for actions to recover on de- recognized 105 Stat. in United years, faulted student loans was six commenc- Phillips, States v. 20 F.3d ing from the date on which the loan was Cir.1994). law, prior govern- Under the assigned Higher to DOE. See Act of Education ment's action would have accrued when Fal- 1965 as amended the Consolidated Omni- assigned con's loans were to DOE. This oc- Budget bus Reconciliation Act of Pub.L. years curred in 2005—less than six before the (1986); No. 99-272 see also United States v. government filed suit. Menatos, (9th Cir.1991), *2 Council; Roger Ran the Tucson capacity the Clerk
dolph, in his Defendants-Appel Tucson, City of
lees.
No. 15-16142. Appeals,
United States
Ninth Circuit. 11, 2015. Aug.
Argued and Submitted 10, 2015.
Filed Nov. Thomas J. (argued),
Kory Langhofer A. Jr., Herrera, Brownstein Roy Basile AZ, Phoenix, Schreck, LLP, Hyatt Farber Plaintiffs-Appellants. City Attorney, “hybrid Michael G. Rankin’ Den- has used a system” that com- McLaughlin (argued), Principal at-large bines ward-based nis Assis- with City Attorney, elections. tant Office Tucson Tucson, AZ, City Attorney, and Richard step hybrid system first is a Rollman, PC, Gabroy Rollman' & Bosse partisan primary. Each ward holds its Tucson, AZ, Defendants-Appellees. own limited to residents of that
ward. The primaries winners of the ward general advance to the where they compete against the other candidates nominated from that general ward. In the election, all Tucson residents can vote for one council member from each ward that ALEX Before: KOZINSKI and held a primary during the same election TALLMAN, Judges, RICHARD C. Circuit cycle. XVI, Thus, § See Charter ch. a PIERSOL,* L. LAWRENCE Senior resident of in Ward can’t vote the Ward Judge. District 2 primary, but can vote for one of the Ward candidates in the election. KOZINSKI; by Opinion Judge Dissent that, elected, parties agree once coun by Judge TALLMAN. cil represent city, members the entire just they the ward from which were nomi OPINION State, City nated. See Tucson v. KOZINSKI, Judge: Circuit (2012) (“Tuc Ariz. 273 P.3d members, son council although nominated constitutionality We consider the of Tuc- by ward, represent just city, the entire electing son’s unusual for members do council large members elected at city of its council. cities.”); other Cty. also Dallas Reese, 477, 480, FACTS (1975) (“[E]lected L.Ed.2d 312 officials ordinary many Tucson’s elections are represent all of those who elect them. ways. city is divided into six wards of . . .”); Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. approximately equal population, and each 438, ward is allotted one seat city on the coun- (similar). A city cil. candidate for council must run Council seats staggered are filled in for the seat in the ward where he resides. elections, with three council members Ill, § See Tucson ch. Charter ch. every year. elected, elected other Once XVI, there, §§ things 9. From take an council four-year member serves a term. odd turn. XVI, §§ See Charter ch. 3-4. The coun- cities, In some American council seats cil members from Wards and will be large, are filled at city with the entire elected in and the council members voting for each seat in from Wards 5 and 6 will be elected in cities, elections. other council 2017. only Because half of the council members are by nominated and elected up seats are for election in given year, particular the residents of districts. Tuc- only half of Tucsonans can vote in a pri- splits son the difference: mary Since cycle. each election approxi- And * Piersol, Dakota, The Honorable Lawrence L. sitting by Senior the District of South desig- Judge District U.S. District Court for nation. simple case. and this would become rate the electorate percent mately 83 would be no mis- This is so because there council seat any given votes voting constituency and match between the say selecting has no in the two constituency represented for that seat. competing nominees two It’s we view the elections. if five Tucson voters Plaintiffs constitutional as one serious elections In- called the Public corporation non-profit arise. doubts “PIA”). PIA (collectively Alliance tegrity could use ward- city concedes Unfortunately, easy solution and ward-based primaries based clear perfectly it is not available because offending the Constitu- without elections independent. that the two contests are at-large could use Similarly, tion. Instead, compo complementary general elections. at-large Although election. single nents of a two combining these argues PIA But ten time separated contests are two violates the hybrid system into a options weeks, entirely co-dependent. they are *4 by de- and Arizona Constitutions1 federal could be no primary, the there Without to vote of their Tucson voters priving general elec compete in the candidate who for individuals elections primary in election, pri the tion; general without the at-large rep- ultimately their serve as hands. sit on their mary winners would city seeking to PIA sued the resentatives. in primary a a candidate must win Because a system and secure the enjoin compete general in the order to is unconstitu- that the scheme declaration inis representative choose a “right the in favor of ruled The district court tional. by primary.” the United fact controlled 28 jurisdiction under city. We Classic, 299, 319, 61 313 U.S. v. States § 1291. (1941). Thus, U.S.C. 1031, L.Ed. 1368 85 S.Ct. pri that the held Court has “single
DISCUSSION
are a
general elections
mary and
of officers.”
instrumentality for choice
dispute
between
by resolving
startWe
660,
321 U.S.
Allwright,
v.
Smith
bearing
that has
substantial
parties
(1944);
New
L.Ed.
S.Ct.
and, ultimately, on the
analysis
our
on
States,
284-
berry v. United
primary
reach: Are
result we
(Pit
L.Ed. 913
con-
separate
two
general elections
that the.
J.,
(noting
concurring
part)
ney,
tests,
by rules that must be
governed
each
are “essen
general
elections
primary
one another —as
independently of
judged
single process”).
tially
parts of
but
parts
two
Or are
city
contends?
general elec-
primary and
Because the
must be
which
single
cycle,
election
of a
“unitary” process,
of a
parts
are two
determining
tions
when
in tandem
considered
660-61, 64 S.Ct.
Allwright, 321 U.S.
PIA claims?
constitutionality
—as
deal.,
general
If
a citizen’s
vote
great
matters a
difference
he is
meaningless unless
may
election
PIA’s con-
separate,
were
two elections
If a
primary.
also
evapo-
objections
largely
would
stitutional
did not
Because PIA
Constitution.
federal
hybrid system violates
alleges
PIA
appel
arguments in its
Equal
develop
Clause
state-law
Elections
the Free
Const,
II,
art.
claims
briefing,
Ariz.
the state-law
Arizona Constitution.
we consider
late
F.A.A.,
authority indi-
cited no
§ 21. We have been
See Greenwood
abandoned.
by that doc-
rights guaranteed
cating
1994).
that the
(9th Cir.
guaranteed
differ from those
ument
2013),
candidate is defeated in a
preferred
voter’s
available at https://goo.gl/oMkOxi.
excluded,
the voter
primary
cases, then,
from which
In most
the Democratic ward
never have the chance to
matters;
voter would
primary
is the
election that
for his candidate of choice.
cast a ballot
general
formality.
election is a mere
Va.,
Party
Republican
Morse
electing
Even if
the Democratic nominee is
Cf.
186, 205,
134 L.Ed.2d
automatic,
dispute
there is no
that the
(1996) (invalidating registration
fee for Democratic nominee
enters the
Virginia
nominating
senatorial
convention election
advantage.
with
enormous
because the fée limited voters’ “influence
Thus the vote in the
particu-
—and
the field
candidates whose names
larly the Democratic primary
a com-
—has
appear on the ballot” and thus
[would]
manding influence on the outcome of the
the ‘effectiveness’ of their
“weakened]
general election. Yet five-sixths of Tuc-
itself’);
votes cast
son’s voters have not even a theoretical
Carter,
Bullock v.
92 possibility
participating
in the primary
(1972) (“[T]he
will,
for all practical purposes, deter-
may
be more crucial than
represent
mine who will
them the
”); Classic,
election....
313 council.
(observing
U.S. at
“the influence of the choice of that, unit “[o]nce candidates at the primary great be so representative which a is to be chosen is profoundly as to affect the choice at the election”); designated, all participate who the elec Ayers-Schaffner v. Di *5 (1st Stefano, equal tion are to have an n. vote” no matter Cir. 1994) (noting ability may that “the to in where “their home geo vote that Sanders, general graphical the election a satisfactory Gray [is not] unit.” alternative for those voters not allowed to U.S. 83 S.Ct. (1963).
vote in primary, the as the candidate of Gray “geographical defines the their choice been excluded in the unit” constituency reference to the of preliminary election from which were representative “the to be chosen.” Id. at barred”). see id. at (“Within (Stewart, J., concurring) point.
This case illustrates
the
. Al-
given constituency, there can be room for
though Arizona
generally
as a whole
votes
but a single
voter,
constitutional rule —one
Republican,
generally
Tucson
votes Demo-
added)).
one vote.” (emphasis
All parties
cratic. This means that
the Democratic
before
agree
constituency
us
that the
of
likely
nominee from each ward will
win the
each Tucson council
member is the entire
regardless
election
of whether the
Thus,
city.
the relevant geographical
ward from which he
unit
was nominated is
city
is the
principally
large.
or
at
Republican Democratic.- In-
Because the constitu
deed,
city’s
ency
the
of
mayor
representative
current
and all
the
to
six
be elected
council members are Democrats.
throughout
See Tuc-
remains static
pro
the election
cess,
son
Council Democratic Incumbents
the geographical unit must also re
Re-Elected,
(Nov. 6,
Arizona Public Media
throughout
main static
process.2
that
persuaded by
city's
2. We are
viding
not
judges
reliance
that
would be nominated from
opinions
on two decades-old district court
their districts but elected statewide in the
hybrid systems
cases,
judicial
that dealt with
for
three-judge
election.
In both
elections. Holshouser v. Scott and
principle
Stokes v.
district courts ruled that the
of one
challenges
Fortson involved
pro-
person,
to state laws
applicable
judicial
one vote is not
to
effect of the Tucson
practical
change the
true.
to
city were
If the
representa
some of
give
is to
system
the primary
between
unit
in his home
constituents —those
tive’s
elections,
decouple
it could
weight.
disproportionate
vote of
his con- ward —a
be elected
to
representative
Supreme
very result
is
could de- That
example, Tucson
For
stituency.
jurisprudence
one vote
one
on Main Street Court’s
living
only voters
cree
Reynolds v.
foreclose. See
meant
thereby
primaries,
eligible
Sims,
among
to choose
city
the entire
forcing
en
cannot
We
L.Ed.2d 506
minority of 12
tiny
aby
selected
nominees
encourages
system that
York,
an
election
New
dorse
the State
Or
residents.
kiss
prioritize
at-large representatives
city-slicker
its number of
to cap
an effort
in their
currying favor
ing
babies and
senators,
limit the
could
of their
the interests
wards over
home
to Manhattanites
senator
junior
in other
happen to live
who
to the rest
constituents
senator
its senior
As the
city.
of the
such parts
not believe
do
of the state. We
noted,
at-large representative
an
itself
at different
between
mismatches
the interests of
to serve
vigilant
“must be
consti-
cycle are
single
of a
stages
merely
[city]; and not
people
all
tutionally permissible.
in his home
people
[ward].” Fort
those
city’s concession
Given the
son,
of Tuc
all
represents
member
each council
eligi
every
hold that
otherwise
We
representational
son,
it’s clear
a constituent
who
voter
city
the coun ble
runs between
nexus
must have
of the general
winner
member,
ward
between
cil
in each
participate
equal opportunity
But
member.
council
that candi
through which
cycle
at-large council election
each
makes the tenure
could not
Just as
is selected.
prefer
on the
date
dependent
largely
member
voting
1 from
Ward
ward;
resident
without
exclude
his home
of voters
ences
his council mem
election for
member could
council
support, a
may not
*6
2,
city
re-nominated)
so
from Ward
(or
in the first
ber
nominated
be
elec
that resident
reality,
council exclude
that
each
place. Given
Alhmight,
official. See
the same
respon
disproportionately
member will be
(“[T]he
664,
same
757
ward,
64 S.Ct.
U.S.
espe
321
his home
voters from
sive to
character of dis
to determine
The
tests
party.
own
cially those of his
ap
be
abridgement should
or
of
crimination
redeeming benefit
is a
claims
this
to the
applied
primary as
to the
is
opposite
plied
The exact
hybrid system.
its
obligatory appel
Supreme Court’s
within
to observe
went
courts
elections. Both
case,
precedential
very little
that,
hybrid
jurisdiction
were not the
late
even if that
Kramer,
Dillenburg
one
violate one
significance.”
schemes would
Cir.1972).
dilution or an
they
1222,
involve
en
didn’t
does not
vote because
It
1225
Holshouser,
counting
unequal
of votes.
every
precedent
Supreme Court
as
shrine
930,
928,
(M.D.N.C.1971);
F.Supp.
933
335
opin
court's
pen in the district
stroke
(N.D.Ga.1964).
Stokes,
F.Supp.
577
disposition Holshouser
summary
ion. The
Supreme Court’s
city argues proposition
to affirm the
likely
was
intended
Holshouser, 409 U.S.
summary affirmance
apply to
does not
person, one vote
that one
(1972),
is a
L.Ed.2d 68
93 S.Ct.
elections,
eventually held
as the
judicial
up-
requires us to
ruling on the merits
Roemer,
U.S.
Chisom v.
system. But a “sum-
hold Tucson’s
L.Ed.2d 348
111 S.Ct.
a case
opinion in
without
mary affirmance
election.”); Classic,
precisely
U.S. at
the same interests in
pri-
those
(“[The]
318, 61
right
partic-
maries as do the ward residents who are
ipation
nominating process]
pro-
[in the
participate.
The nominees
just
tected
as is
to vote at
selected
the ward
will advance
”).
election....
election;
there,
to the
if elected
represent
city.
the entire
Be-
city’s
argument
final
is that
cause all
equal
have an
Tucsonans
interest
hybrid system
is a reasonable “resi
in determining
be,
who the nominees will
dency
restriction” on the
to vote.
city may
not exclude out-of-ward vot-
But when two groups of citizens share
from primaries.
ers
identical interests in an
the city
may
residency
not use a
requirement
Dakota,
Little Thunder v. South
group
exclude one
including
while
the oth
(8th Cir.1975),
F.2d 1253
is instructive.
er.
Lockport
See Town
v. Citizens
for That case
challenge
involved
South
Level, Inc.,
Comm. Action at the Local
430 Dakota’s scheme
governing
its unorga
nized counties. The residents of the unor
(1977) (residency
requirements must
ganized
governed by
counties were
elected
premised
“genuine
be
on a
difference in
officials
organized
nearest
county,
the relevant
groups
interests of the
but
organized
residents
the state electoral classification has creat
county were allowed to vote for those offi
(excluded
ed”); id.
group must
permit
cials. The state defended this scheme as a
if
ted to vote
it has “substantially identical
reasonable residency requirement.
Id. at
interests” as
group);
included
Evans v.
view,
In its
the residents of the
Comman,
419, 422-26,
(who
unorganized counties
were mainly
(1970) (residents
883
holding
for Senators
Manner of
Elections
is the
This
voting purposes.
ently for
I,
4,
1,
§
cl.
F.2d at
Art.
Representatives,’
518
Little
teaching of
Thunder.
Town
Educ.
control
1256;
v. Bd.
English
power
see
is matched
which
of
of
(3d
77,
Boonton,
Cir.
79
301 F.3d
process for state offices.”
the election
over
of
Dakota, 636
2002);
South
States v.
United
Beaver,
581, 586, 125
U.S.
Clingman v.
544
(8th Cir.1980);
also Holt
F.2d
(2005).
161 L.Ed.2d
S.Ct.
81, 86,
Club,
Amendment. A
REVERSED. majori from the Conspicuously absent appropri mention ty’s opinion TALLMAN, dissenting: Judge, Circuit In Burdick v. ate standard review. federal when a are certain times There Takushi to run its municipality how may tell court (1992), of them. This is not one elections. local for evaluat Court announced standard system does hybrid election vote. Al right to respecting laws ing against invidiously discriminate scrutiny strict typically invoke though we race, ethnicity, gender, or on their based funda implicate state laws that to evaluate Rather, plaintiffs argue wealth. —and courts requires Burdick rights, mental Tucson unconstitu- agrees —that scrutiny level of a more deferential apply its citizens tionally denies abridge election laws to most state units for by setting different 433, 112 right to Id. fundamental vote. couneilmanic Arntz, Dudum that the Consti- I tions. Because conclude Cir.2011) (recognizing to draw its require Tucson tution does not sliding scale standard creates Burdick way for particular borders district review). appropri determine Courts elections, dis- respectfully I local different a state scrutiny to evaluate ate level sent. *8 examining the burden by law election I then rights and on voters’ imposes law the state’s against that burden weighing broad grants States “The Constitution the law. maintaining interest ‘Times, legitimate Places prescribe the power to 884
Burdick,
434,
504
at
U.S.
stitutional scrutiny,
“repeatedly
we have
B
upheld as ‘not severe’ restrictions that are
generally applicable, even-handed, politi
Court has been reticent to
neutral,
cally
protect
the reliability
apply
scrutiny
strict
to state election laws:
integrity
process.”
Du
It
has done so
to evaluate discrimina
dum,
(citation omitted).
and compelling
reason” for imposing dura- 821
According
majority,
to the
Tuc
residency
But,
tional
requirements).
son’s
violates equal protection
Supreme Court
applied
a lesser bur
principles by designating
geo
different
den
evaluating
when
the constitutionality
graphical units for its primary
literacy tests,
felon disenfranchisement
elections. The practical effect of the ma
laws, and voter identification laws.
jority’s
today
decision
is the
eradi
total
v. Northampton
Lassiter
Cty. Bd. Elec
cation of
voting system,
which
tions,
3 has
place
been in
since 1930. Tucson is
L.Ed.2d
(upholding
stat-
now
forced
choose between an entirely
*9
1004, 1004-05
Cir.
ward-only
primary.”
or a
of election
at-large method
1995).
in federal
sued
state
Ziskis
that a
the fact
despite
of election
method
alleging that the law violated
court
district
have
be-
twice
Tucson citizens
majority
vote.
right to
Amendment
his Fourteenth
adopting these
against
fore voted
we ruled in favor
appeal,
Id. at 1005. On
not re-
does
The Constitution
systems.
the law
held that
did
the state. We
of of
highjacking
judicial
sort
this
quire
to vote be
right
Ziskis’s
overly
burden
I conclude
Accordingly,
power.
state
could access the ballot
cause Ziskis
system is consti-
hybrid election
and if
party,
a
associating
political
with
inform
principles
Several
tutional.
to
register,
right
“his
not to
Ziskis chose
conclusion.
general
in the
unaffected.”
vote
recently
The Third Circuit
A
Id. at 1006.
Amendment
a similar Fourteenth
resolved
must
satis
standards
Constitutional
primary
Jersey’s closed
to New
challenge
general
in
elec
as well as
primary
fied
N.J., 607
Sec’y
v.
See Balsam
system.
Allwright,
v.
tions. Smith
Cir.2015).
(3d
177, 180-81
Fed.Appx.
L.Ed. 987
S.Ct.
a
not “have
that voters do
court reasoned
have an abso
However,
do not
individuals
partic
unqualified
constitutional
primary
in a
election.
to vote
lute
elections,” and
bur
primary
ipation
“closed” or
host a
example,
for
may,
States
placed on
primary
closed
den the
only people
in which
primary,
“semielosed”
compared to
was minor
rights
plaintiffs
major
aof
registered members
who
at 181-83.
state’s interests.
Id.
Clingman,
See
may vote.
party
political
not resolve
and Balsam do
2029;
Ziskis
v. While
Nader
544 U.S. at
presented
(D.Conn.1976),
question
constitutional
the exact
F.Supp.
Schaffer,
primary and
here,
they do counsel
mem.,
aff
'd
con-
the same
elections
Party
Am.
see also
50 L.Ed.2d
Am.
Elec-
footing.
Jur.2d
White,
stitutional
Texas
(“A
is one
primary election
§ 223
tions
(holding
than
rather
in nominations
that results
before
waiting periods
establish
may
states
Thus,
a
to office.
final elections
change
a
function from
a
election serves
different
par
in another
participate
registration
competition
a
it is
words,
In
Consti
other
ty’s primary).
more,
nomination,
no
no
party’s
prohibit qualified
states to
permits
tution
office
less,
person
a
does not elect
registered Indepen
who are
individuals
who
the candidate
merely determines
but
(or
register
not to
chose
dents
who
office
member)
will run
voting
party
are,
tion.”).
in Tucson
Primary elections
election.
means
short,
than the
nothing
more
Arizona’s
fact,
upheld
we
In
the standard
choose
groups use to
political
the face of
system in
primary”
“closed
off in the
who
face
bearers
challenge similar
Amendment
Fourteenth
election.
challenge
Ziskis
here.
to Plaintiffs’
“could
independent voter
Symington,
B
primary elec-
the Arizona
not vote in
“perfectly
it to be
finds
denies
law]
...
[Arizona
because
and general
Tucson’s primary
clear” that
party
political
with a
affiliated
voter not
“must
independent
are not
elections
party’s
in that
opportunity
*10
be considered in tandem when
junior
for its
determining
senator to Manhattanites and
Yet,
constitutionality.”
primary
eases the
for its senior senator to the
majority cites do
establish that pri-
rest of the state.
mary
always
elections must
But,
application
an
sliding
of Burdick’s
instance,
together.
considered
For
United
scale of
scrutiny
constitutional
reveals that
Classic,
States v.
an
was
election fraud
majority’s
neither of the
fictional state
case where the federal
prose-
systems
election
pass
would
constitutional
cuted certain state election commissioners
First,
muster.
hypotheticals
both of these
allegedly
falsifying ballots in a Demo-
large
eliminate
swaths of
residents
299, 307-08,
cratic primary. 313 U.S.
voting
primary, which would
right to have one’s “vote counted in both
second,
under Burdick. And
the states
and in
election
the primary would have an extremely difficult time ar-
election.” Id. at
ticulating any
legitimate
sort of
state inter-
Smith,
664-65,
also
est in defense of
systems.
these election
(holding
that a
party may
political
not Unlike the majority’s hypothetical state
only”
create a
primary).
“whites
Howev-
laws,
hybrid system
gives
er,
explained
Classic
that the
it rec-
each citizen the right to vote in her respec-
ognized only applied to voters who were
tive
primary,
ward
and Tucson has articu-
“qualified” to cast votes in the state’s
“important
lated an
regulatory interest” to
primary.
Democratic
interest. sively assert: Ill through primary nominations Having A ward, using separate in each elections party allows party, for each ballots that Tucson’s this it From follows those wards in each of electorates “severely bur- system does nominee, and of a own choice make .their During Plaintiffs’ to vote. den” guarantee as a simultaneously acts law ensures that each as a whole City electorate the relevant eligible voter within that each support actually has ward’s nominee equal ward —has unit —the within party members among true for the holds to vote. same tion). Moreover, short, since com- ward. nominees permits Constitution pete against Tucson to set different geographical .in units other candidates nominated in the same for its primary and elections. ¶ ward, Compl. ward nominations I respectfully dissent. help also assure that each ward has a council, representative local on the
conversely, Mayor the full
Council has members who are aware of issues, problems,
each ward’s principal adequate
views.... The providing
reason for for the election of
one from each borough councilman is to
assure that there will be members of the INDUSTRIES, In re ADAM AIRCRAFT with some Council knowl- INC., Debtor. edge of rural problems the end that Jeffrey Weinman, Chapter Trustee, A. heterogeneous city will be able to Plaintiff-Appellant, give some due questions consideration to presented throughout the entire area. important regulatory
This interest is suffi- Walker, Joseph K. Defendant-Appellee. justify any cient to hybrid sys- burden the 14-1236. places tem No.. Plaintiffs’ to vote. United Appeals, States Court of IV Tenth Circuit. hybrid system constitutional,
and the in holding errs otherwise. Oct. precedent teaches us that municipality authority has broad to es-
tablish the relevant units for Holt, 68-69,
its elections. See 439 U.S. at Furthermore, the majority
points to no case that requires municipal-
ity to use the same geographical unit for elections,
both its cf. Gray, 372 U.S. at majority’s holding contrary to the
stretches the “one one prin- vote”
ciple beyond its traditional application.
Finally, because primary
tions are not constitutionally equal, see
Balsam, Fed.Appx.
laws narrow the pri- franchise
mary election without running afoul of the Amendment, Ziskis,
Fourteenth
F.3d at 1005-06. See also N.Y. State Bd. Torres, Elections v. Lopez
(permitting by party nomination conven-