{¶ 2} On January 12, 1999, appellant delivered twin baby girls at The Ohio State University Medical Center ("Ohio State") by caesarian section. Ten days later, she returned to Ohio State after complaining of a bad odor emanating from her vaginal cavity. Following a physical examination, appellee or a resident working under appellee's supervision removed a sponge from appellant's vaginal cavity. See Prysock v. The Ohio State Univ.Med. Ctr., Franklin App. No. 01AP-1131,
{¶ 3} Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that appellant's fraud claim was actually a medical malpractice claim barred by the statute of limitations, and that even if appellant presented a claim for fraud, he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on that claim. The trial court found that appellant's claim, to the extent it was based on appellee's alleged concealment of facts, was a claim for fraud and was not barred by the statute of limitations. However, the trial court ruled that appellee did not fraudulently conceal facts from appellant and, even if he had, appellant did not suffer any compensable injuries as a result. Accordingly, the trial court granted summary judgment for appellee.
{¶ 4} Appellant appeals, assigning the following error:
The Trial court Erroneously granted Sum-Mary judgment to defendant on November 19, 2003.
{¶ 5} An appellate court's review of summary judgment is conducted under a de novo standard. Coventry Twp. v. Ecker
(1995),
{¶ 6} Appellee does not contest the trial court's finding that appellant stated a claim for fraud. Ohio law recognizes, under some circumstances, a cause of action for fraud independent from a medical malpractice claim. Prysock, supra, at ¶ 17. "A physician's knowing misrepresentation of a material fact concerning a patient's condition, on which the patient justifiably relies to his detriment, may give rise to a cause of action in fraud independent from an action in medical malpractice." Gaines v. Preterm-Cleveland, Inc. (1987),
{¶ 7} In granting summary judgment, the trial court ruled that appellee fulfilled his duty to disclose when he informed appellant that a sponge was removed from her body. Appellant first contends that the trial court erred when it found that appellee had no duty to disclose that: (1) a sponge was negligently left inside her in connection with the delivery of her twin baby girls by caesarian section; (2) the sponge was a foreign object; and, (3) the sponge caused a bacterial infection. However, we agree with the trial court that appellee owed no duty to disclose the information that formed the basis of appellant's fraud claim.
{¶ 8} A physician has a duty to disclose to a patient known material facts about the patient's medical condition. Id. at 56. In this case, the presence of a sponge in appellant's vaginal cavity, and the removal of that sponge, are material facts about her medical condition that appellee had a duty to disclose. Appellee satisfied that duty when he informed appellant that a sponge was removed from her vaginal cavity. Appellee had no duty to disclose that the doctors who delivered appellant's babies may have committed medical malpractice. Such a disclosure would be pure speculation. Nor did appellee have a duty to disclose that a sponge is a foreign object. This fact is obvious. A sponge is not naturally present in the human body.
{¶ 9} Lastly, appellant contends appellee had a duty to disclose that the sponge caused a bacterial infection. We disagree. Appellant did not present any proper evidence to create a genuine issue of fact as to whether she had a bacterial infection or, if she did, what caused it. In support of his motion for summary judgment, appellee testified in his deposition that appellant did not have any signs or symptoms of a bacterial infection and that he prescribed an antibiotic only as a preventative measure. In response, appellant did not present proper evidence to create a genuine issue of fact in this regard. The only evidence appellant submitted was her affidavit in which she stated her belief that she developed a bacterial infection. This statement alone is insufficient to create a genuine issue of fact. Expert medical testimony is necessary to show an injury's cause and effect, unless the issue is so apparent as to be a matter of common knowledge. Darnell v. Eastman (1970),
{¶ 10} Appellant also claims that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment because appellee's credibility was at issue. Although credibility concerns normally arise when there is conflicting evidence for and against summary judgment motions, such concerns may also be present when the party moving for summary judgment presents uncontroverted evidence and credibility is critical to the determination that there is no genuine issue of fact. Killilea v. Sears, Roebuck Co. (1985),
{¶ 11} In the present case, the resolution of whether or not appellant developed a bacterial infection does not manifestly turn on appellee's credibility. Appellee's testimony that appellant did not have the signs or symptoms of a bacterial infection was based upon a report generated by another physician who conducted the physical exam of appellant. More importantly, it was appellant's burden to demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact existed with respect to whether she had a bacterial infection and, if so, what caused it. As previously noted, appellant failed to present any expert medical testimony. Appellee's credibility was not manifestly critical to the resolution of this issue of fact and the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment. Cf. Mitchell v. Woodbridge (May 2, 2001), Mahoning App. No. 98CA-255 (credibility not manifestly critical to determine no genuine issue of material fact).
{¶ 12} Lastly, the trial court also granted summary judgment because appellant could not demonstrate a compensable injury as a result of appellee's conduct. We agree. Appellant did not claim any physical injury resulting from appellee's alleged failure to disclose. Instead, she claimed emotional distress resulting from appellee's failure to inform her of the possible consequences if the sponge had not been removed from her body. A plaintiff may be compensated for emotional distress without a contemporaneous physical injury. Heiner v. Moretuzzo (1995),
{¶ 13} Here, the physical peril was eliminated by the removal of the sponge. Therefore, any emotional distress that appellant may have suffered because appellee failed to inform her about possible consequences if the sponge had not been removed is not compensable. Heiner, supra; Williams v. Warren Gen. Hosp.
(1996),
{¶ 14} Appellant's lone assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 15} In conclusion, appellee fulfilled his duty to disclose material facts about appellant's medical condition and appellant did not sustain any legally compensable damages. Accordingly, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to appellee and the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
Petree and Watson, JJ., concur.