Pruitt v. StatePruitt v. State
Lead Opinion
Mark Allen Pruitt petitions for a writ of certiorari to review a decision of the circuit court sitting in its appellate capacity. We grant the petition.
After jury trial in county court, defendant Pruitt was found guilty of reckless driving, and not guilty of battery, in a traffic altercation. Although defendant is a reserve police officer with no criminal record and no traffic violations in the previous ten years, and although the reckless driving involved no accident, no injuries, and no driving under the influence, the county court sentenced the defendant to ninety days incarceration. On appeal to the circuit court, a circuit court panel affirmed by two-one vote. Defendant
A defendant is entitled to a new sentencing hearing if it appears that the trial court’s sentencing decision was influenced by an impermissible consideration. Cavallaro v. State,
We think it is generally accepted that for first offenders, non-ineareerative sanctions should be imposed unless the severity of the offense dictates otherwise. If there is a reason for treating this defendant differently, it is not apparent from the record.
“[A] trial court may not impose a greater sentence on a defendant because such defendant avails himself of his constitutional right to a trial by jury.” Gallucci v. State,
Accordingly the petition for writ of certio-rari is granted. The circuit court order of affirmance is quashed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.
Certiorari granted.
GODERICH, J., concurs.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. I would deny cer-tiorari because the trial court properly exercised its discretion in sentencing the defendant to ninety days incarceration. Absent a departure from the essential requirements of law, there are no grounds, other than second guessing a trial court, to grant certiorari.
Certiorari is an extraordinary remedy and a petition should only be granted where there is a clear violation of an established principle of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice. Combs v. State,
In sentencing the defendant, the trial court weighed the same evidence that the jury heard. The jury convicted the defendant of reckless driving based upon testimony of a Metro-Dade police sergeant and a D.E.A. agent who observed the defendant weaving across four lanes of traffic on the Palmetto Expressway at a high rate of speed. Concerned that the defendant would cause a serious accident, the sergeant called in the defendant’s license plate number and requested that a uniformed officer pull the defendant over. The D.E.A. agent observed these events unfold and, believing that' the defendant was endangering human life, activated his emergency equipment thus commencing pursuit of the defendant. The defendant continued to race down the expressway, ignoring the whirling lights darting out from the agent’s vehicle.
This snippet of testimony alone, clearly supports the sentence imposed by the trial court and, more importantly, demonstrates no departure from the essential requirements of law sufficient to grant certiorari review. See Valenzuela v. Valenzuela,
Although the majority characterizes the trial judge as having “expressed some unhappiness” when the defendant requested a jury trial, this characterization is misplaced. The majority overlooks the fact that the State pushed for the jury trial while the defendant’s counsel willingly agreed to a bench trial.
The majority also suggests that the trial court’s bias is evidenced by the fact that no accident, injury or alcohol related arrest resulted from the incident. This line of reasoning appears to assume that a hierarchy of mitigating factors controls sentencing in this case. No such factors are contained in the language of the statute and should not be considered in the sentencing process.
In conclusion, I find nothing vindictive in merely questioning a decision to proceed with a jury trial and then rendering a sentence within legislative statutory parameters. Just because the majority “would rule differently does not justify in itself the exercise of certiorari jurisdiction.” State v. Shaw,