774 N.E.2d 273 | Ohio Ct. App. | 2002
[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *483
{¶ 2} Defendant-appellant LGR Trucking, Inc., agreed through its agent to pay plaintiff-appellee Charles Pruitt to repair its boat. But LGR never paid, and Pruitt thus refused to return the boat. Instead, Pruitt elected to attempt to collect the repair bill by suing LGR. Pruitt went to small claims court three times, and attended municipal court at least once before the case was removed to the court of common pleas, where multiple appearances were again required. The case has also been before an arbitration panel. Like so many cases that we review, it is time for this one to end.
{¶ 3} As the case wound through Hamilton County's court system, LGR's debt continued to grow due to compounding interest on the initial cost of the repairs and the continuing storage fees. Eventually, the amount LGR Trucking *484 owed Pruitt exceeded the value of the boat. Under these circumstances, Pruitt's right to possess the boat until he was paid for his work became more of a burden to him than a benefit.
{¶ 4} Eight months into Pruitt's effort to collect the money that he was owed, his landlord told him that the building that he had rented for his business was going to be appropriated, and that he would have to relocate in about thirty days. Pruitt did not want to transport and house the boat during the relocation process. He did not abandon the boat. Instead, Pruitt contacted the Ohio Department of Natural Resources for advice about how to sell it. They responded with a letter outlining the proper procedure whereby, according to the Revised Code, an "owner of any property on which a watercraft * * * valued at less than ten thousand dollars has been left for six months without the owner's permission may sell the watercraft * * * at public auction."1
{¶ 5} Pruitt attempted to comply with the procedures outlined in the letter for the sale of the boat. He properly publicized the auction in the local paper.2 He received a telephone appraisal by a disinterested expert that was based on the 1998 A.B.O.S. Marine Bluebook, which estimated the value of the boat at approximately $9,500.3 He notified LGR Trucking by certified mail of the date and time of the auction.4 But Pruitt did not wait the requisite forty-five days after notifying LGR Trucking to conduct the auction.5 According to the record, LGR had only five days' notice before the boat was sold to a third party for $9,135.67.
{¶ 6} LGR counterclaimed against Pruitt for violation of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act, for the torts of outrage, conversion, and abuse of process, and for the damages authorized by statute6 for Pruitt's reliance on R.C.
{¶ 7} LGR now contests part of the trial court's decision, claiming that the court erred by (1) denying it damages under its conversion claim, (2) denying it damages under R.C.
{¶ 8} Because LGR's first two assignments of error are intertwined on the issue of damages, we address them together. First, LGR does not appear to contest that Pruitt could have lawfully retained the boat until he had been paid, either under a common law artisan's lien7 or by statute.8 Indeed, the record reflects that LGR was curiously uninterested in seeking possession of the boat during the dispute. LGR did not pursue a replevin action to regain possession of the boat. It did not offer to post a bond with the court to guarantee its debt pending the outcome of the litigation. Nor did LGR seek an injunction to halt the sale, though admittedly the record demonstrates that LGR only had five days' notice of the auction.
{¶ 9} While conceding that Pruitt was entitled to retain the boat, LGR insists that Pruitt's sale of the boat was unlawful. It is true that a common-law right to possession of another's personal property until payment is received for services performed does not equate to a right to dispose of the property. For the sale to have been lawful in this case, it would have had to have been authorized by statute. Pruitt maintains that he substantially complied with R.C.
{¶ 10} We agree that Pruitt's sale of the boat was not authorized by statute. An argument could be made that, by failing to pursue available judicial remedies for the return of the boat, LGR had indeed "abandoned" it. But R.C.
{¶ 11} Further, even if R.C.
{¶ 12} "Conversion is the wrongful exercise of dominion over property to the exclusion of the rights of the owner, or withholding it from his possession under a claim inconsistent with his rights."10 Pruitt lawfully withheld the boat from LGR, but then unlawfully sold it to the exclusion of LGR's ownership rights.
{¶ 13} "The measure of damages in a conversion action is the value of the converted property at the time of the conversion."11 Despite LGR's contentions to the contrary, we do not disturb the trial court's finding that the value of the boat was determined by its sale price and Pruitt's attempts to adhere to R.C.
{¶ 14} But that is all that Pruitt owed LGR. LGR was not entitled to compensation for the loss of use of the boat12 because, as noted above, LGR was not entitled to possess and enjoy the boat while its bill remained unpaid. And while punitive damages may be allowed in a conversion action "when the conversion involves elements of fraud, malice, or insult,"13 we hold that such circumstances were not present in this case.
{¶ 15} We thus overrule LGR's first two assignments of error. It received the damages from the trial court to which it was entitled in the form of a credit on its outstanding debt. But, in its final assignment of error, LGR objects to the form the damages took. Specifically, LGR argues that the trial court erred by deducting the proceeds of the sale of the boat from the amount it owed Pruitt and ordering it to pay Pruitt the remaining balance. LGR claims that this constituted a "setoff" of its damages against its outstanding debt, and that the setoff was improper because it was an affirmative defense that Pruitt had failed to plead. We overrule LGR's third assignment of error.
{¶ 16} LGR's reliance on principles of setoff is misplaced. "Setoff, both at law and in equity, is that right which exists between two parties, each of whom under an independent contract owes a definite amount to the other, to set off their respective debts by way of mutual deduction."14 Because the parties' debts to one another in this case were not based on independent contracts, the principle does not apply. Further, we have previously affirmed a trial court's calculation of the amount owed by the respective parties based on similar circumstances15 and believe that it constitutes an acceptable practice founded in judicial economy.
{¶ 17} Thus, we overrule LGR's three assignments of error and affirm the trial court's judgment.
Judgment affirmed. SUNDERMANN and WINKLER, JJ., concur.
Please Note:
The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this Decision.