Prudential Securities, Inc. v. KatzPrudential Securities, Inc. v. Katz
Employer Prudential Sеcurities, Inc. appeals an order denying its Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Stay Litigation. We reverse.
In February of 1996, pursuant to аn employment agreement that outlined the parties’ rights with regard to employment duties, performance, term, compensation, customer records, and remedies, Michael Katz was hired by Prudential as a financial advisor. In that agreement Katz promised that he would submit to arbitration “any claim or controversy ... relating to his employment or termination of [his] employment.” A second document Katz executed expressly stated that he agreed to arbitratе “any dispute, claim or controversy.” On September 30, 1999, Katz sent a letter to Prudential, expressing concerns about what he perceived as his employer‘s illegal conduct. October 22, 1999, Prudential rеsponded, denying the allegations. Less than a week later, Katz‘s еmployment was terminated. Thereafter, Katz sought statutory relief undеr the Florida Whistle Blower Act,
Katz was an at will employee whose employment could be terminated at any time. The agreemеnt he signed promised that he would submit to arbitration any claim or controversy relating to his employment or termination. The U.S. Supreme сourt enforced such an agreement in a case claiming age discrimination in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 111 S.Ct. 1647, 114 L.Ed.2d 26 (1991). Both Florida and Federal courts have consistеntly read arbitration clauses as applicable to a broad range of actions. The Florida Supreme Court has held that “аrbitration is a favored means of dispute resolution and courts indulge every reasonable presumption to uphold proceedings resulting in an award.” Roe v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 533 So.2d 279, 281 (Fla. 1988). That principle was applied in Ronbeck Const. Co. v. Savanna Club Corp., 592 So.2d 344, 346 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992), where the court held that Florida courts, like Fеderal courts, should resolve all doubts in favor of arbitration rather than against it.1 See Sabates v. International Medical Centers, Inc., 450 So.2d 514 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). As set out in Pierce v. J.W. Charles-Bush Securities, Inc., 603 So.2d 625, 627-28 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992):
In a steady drumbeat of cases since Keating, [Southland Corporation v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 104 S.Ct. 852, 79 L.Ed.2d 1 (1984)], the Court has reversed a number of decisions precluding arbitration for various statutory claims. In Mitsubishi Motors Corporation v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 105 S.Ct. 3346, 87 L.Ed.2d 444 (1985), the Court rejected a long line of cases whiсh had held that arbitration was inappropriate, and thus could nоt be compelled even if agreed, for antitrust and RICO claims. Similarly, in Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 107 S.Ct. 2332, 96 L.Ed.2d 185 (1987), the Court ended the long held belief that securities fraud claims, as herе, under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and rule 10b-5 cannot be ordеred to agreed arbitration. And, in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation, 500 U.S. 20, 111 S.Ct. 1647, 114 L.Ed.2d 26 (1991), the Court found no exemption evеn for civil rights claims, in that case under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. If civil rights, antitrust and securities fraud claims are not inappropriаte for arbitration, it is very difficult to imagine a civil claim in which an agreement to arbitrate would not be enforced. See also Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 105 S.Ct. 1238, 84 L.Ed.2d 158 (1985); and Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 94 S.Ct. 2449, 41 L.Ed.2d 270 (1974)
The arbitration clause at issue expressly covers Katz‘s claim and clearly controls as to the instant controversy. We see no reason fоr a claim under the Florida Whistle Blower Act to employ an analysis different than that employed in the cases outlined above. Accordingly, the order under review is reversed.