¶ 1 Aрpellant, Prudential Property and Casualty Company, appeals from a decree nisi entered pursuant to an action for a declaratory judgment in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. We affirm.
¶ 2 Appellee, Ronald Gisler, was injured in an automobile accident while operating a patrol car in his employ as a police officer. After receiving partial compensation from the tortfeasor, Appellee made a claim under his personal policy with Appellant for underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits. Appellant denied Appellee’s claim based upon the “regularly used non-owned car” exclusion contained in the UIM policy covеring Appellee. Appellant then initiated a declaratory judgment action to determine the parties’ rights under the policy-
¶ 3 The case was submitted to the trial court on stipulated facts and briefed by the parties. The trial court issued a decree nisi in which it found Appellant responsible for providing UIM benefits to Appellee on the grounds that the exclusion was contrary to public policy. Appellant did not file post trial motions, but appealed directly to this Court.
¶ 4 Initially, we find that this case is properly befоre us. Rule 341 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure provides, in part:
(a) General Rule.... an appeal may be taken as of right from any final order of ... [a] lower court.
(b) Definition of Final Order. A final order is any order that:
*1113 (2) [any order that] is expressly defined as a final order by statute;
Pa.R.A.P. 341.
¶ 5 In a declaratory judgment action, a trial court has the “power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7532. The declaration made by the trial court “may be either affirmative or negative in form and effect, and such declarations shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree.”
Id.; see also Warner v. Continental/CNA Insurance Cos.,
¶ 6 In the instant case, Appellant sought a declaratory judgment from the triаl court. After submission of the facts and legal arguments, the trial court, in issuing the decree nisi, effectively made a declaration in the negative in its decree. Because the statute gives such a declaration the force and effect of a final judgment or decree, we will treat it as such under Pa.R.A.P. 341(b) and consider the trial court’s decree аppealable, despite its description as a decree nisi.
¶ 7 When assessing the determination of the trial court in a declaratory judgment action, our scope of review is narrow.
O’Brien v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company,
¶ 8 The issue presented in the instant case is whether a “regularly used non-owned vehicle” exclusion in an insured’s UIM рolicy prevents coverage of an insured who is injured by an underinsured motorist while the insured is operating an employer’s vehicle, which the insured uses regularly. Because we find thе reasoning of the plurality opinion in
Bur-stein v. Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Co.,
¶ 9 In Burstein, the insured, Mrs. Burn-stein, was injured while riding in a vehicle provided by her employer for regular use. Id. at 685-86. The employer did not notify Mrs. Burnstein that no UIM coverage was purchased for the company vehicle, nor did Mrs. Burnstein have an option to change such coverage. Id. at 685. After receiving inadequate compensation from the tortfeaser, Mrs. Burnstein filed a claim for UIM benefits under her personal policy, which provided liability and UIM coverage for her three vehicles. Id. at 685-86. The insurer denied coverage based upon a policy exclusion for a “regularly used non-owned car” not insured under the policy. Id. at 686. Both the trial court and a divided panel of this Court ruled that the еxclusion, as applied to Mrs. Burnstein, violated public policy. Id. In a plurality opinion, an en banc panel of this Court agreed. Id.
¶ 10 The plurality sets forth three broad public policies related to UIM coverage upon which the exсlusion could be voided: (1) the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL) was enacted in order to establish a liberal compensation scheme of UIM protection; (2) it is in the public’s best interest for insurance companies to provide UIM coverage; and (3) UIM coverage is first party coverage and therefore necessarily fоllows the person, not the vehicle. Id. at 687-88. The opinion also recognized that Mrs. Burnstein was not trying to avoid her responsibility to purchase adequate insurance, but rather “аcted in full accordance with the MVFRL, obtaining both liability and underinsured motorist coverage on all three vehicles [she] owned.” Id. at 690. For these reasons, the Court concludеd that “where an *1114 insured has complied with both the letter and spirit of the MVFRL and was not notified that the vehicle he or she was regularly using was not covered by under-insured motorist coverage — the policy provision denying underinsured motorist coverage for a ‘regularly used non-owned car’ is void as against public policy.” Id. at 691.
¶ 11 The concurrence also found that the exclusion, as it applied to Mrs. Burnstein, should be voided as against public policy, but differed as to the reasoning.
Id.
at 691 (McEwen, P.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The concurring opinion did not agree that UIM coverage necessarily followed the insured and not the vehicle; rather, it explained that the purpose of the exclusiоn was to prevent “abuse by precluding the insured and his family from regularly driving two or more cars for the price of one policy.”
Id.
at 693 (quoting
Crum and Forster Personal Insurance Co. v. Travelers Corp.,
¶ 12 The material facts in the instant case are akin to those in Burstein. Initially, the exclusions relied upon by Appellant here and the insurer in Burstein are nearly identical. 2 The policy reads, in pertinent part:
Regularly Used Non-Owned Motor Vehicles
We will not pay for bodily injury to you or a housеhold resident using a non-owned car not insured under this part, regularly used by you or a household resident.
Secondly, Appellee was injured by an un-derinsured motorist while operating a vеhicle provided to him by his employer. Also, Appellee purchased an insurance policy that provided UIM coverage on the vehicle that he owned, thereby complying with the letter and the spirit of the MVFRL. Although the stipulated facts of the instant case do not reveal whether Appellee was aware that the employer’s vehicle had no UIM coverage, such knowledge would be irrelevant in the instant case. Unlike Mrs. Burnstein, who could have chosen to use her personal vehicle if she had known that her employer did not provide UIM coverage, it is doubtful that Appellee, as a police officer, had the option to use his personal vehicle while on patrol. See Burstein, supra at 690 n. 1. Therefore, we rule that the exclusion, as it applies to the Appellee in the instant case, is void as against public policy.
¶ 13 Appellants argue that
Burstein
is limited by this Court’s holding in
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Brnardic,
¶ 14 That reasoning is not applicable to the instant case. In
Bmardic,
we were concerned with liability insurance,
i.e.,
covering the insurеd for his own negligence while operating an automobile. Here, we are concerned with UIM coverage, the
*1115
purpose of which is to protect the insured from the risk that a negligent driver of another vehicle will cause injury, and will have inadequate liability coverage to compensate for the damages caused by his negligencе.
See Wolgemuth v. Harleysville Mutual Insurance Co.,
¶ 15 Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s declaratory judgment in favor of Appellee.
¶ 16 Judgment affirmed.
¶ 17 McEWEN, President Judge, notes his dissent.