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Prows v. INDUSTRIAL COM'N OF UTAH
610 P.2d 1362
Utah
1980
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*1 PROWS, Petitioner, Michael UTAH, OF

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION Brunswig

Bergin Associ- Indemnity Company, Respondents.

ated Nielsen, Henriod, J. Bruce Nelson of No. 16456. Peck, City, & Lake for Gottfredsen Salt

Supreme Court of Utah. petitioner. 4, April Hansen, Gen., Frank Atty. Robert B. V.

Nelson, Gen., Atty. L. Poel- Asst. Stuart respondents. man, City, for Lake Salt WILKINS, Justice: Order of appeal from an This is (hereafter Commission “Commis- sion”) for denying application Work- by Compensation men’s benefits Michael “Petitioner”). (hereafter Prows essentially of this case are un- The facts employed Petitioner as disputed. was Bergin by Respondent truck driver Brun- (hereafter “Bergin”). swig Company His loading supplies medical duties included making delivery onto his truck and deliver- doctors, hospitals, ies and clinics. containing supplies The boxes the medical approximately eleven and one- measured inches, twenty-four half each box (also was elastic secured bands described bands”). as Each band “rubber approximately long by twelve inches three- eighths inch wide.

Testimony before the administrative law judge established that the rubber bands Bergin’s employees some of were used fights”. for bands Petitioner and “rubber co-employees one his testified that the daily were an “fights” almost occurrence. Bergin’s supervisors One of testified that he “fights” perhaps two or observed three month, times a and that when observed discouraged one he its continuation. 3,1978, was engaged On March assigned loading in his usual duties and was As he supplies delivery truck. boxes of from unloading supplies a hand truck, delivery truck and onto his he was hit or two which were by one rubber bands *2 discussing In construction of the and flipped by co-employees at him two stand- act thereupon ing nearby. flipped of the this underlying purposes the act rubber at his “attacker”. One of band back in Court on,4 Chandler v. Commissi co-employees ripped approxi- the then stated: mately long piece inch wood off eighteen of that our We are also reminded statute and came toward Petitioner nearby pallet the requires that statutes § [now 68-3-2] like a brandishing the wood sword. Peti- “liberally of this state are to be construed his co-employee, tioner the wood from took objects with a to effect the of the view between placed a rubber band the handles promote justice.” statutes and to attempted of his and to shoot hand truck the the severely had indulged tive law ing type ment of the horseplay represented accident arose his the Motion for In employment.”1 wood into the petitioner air, administrative been flipping piece denying of not condoned activity struck Petitioner injuring him. judge in numerous incidents of of Review, by employee’s compensation wood, had “failed to out of or was in found, Bergin’s employees, had been air in a law the Commission In instead by bands, inter denying judge’s “complete Bergin; duties”; slingshot in discouraged the alia, of and that the prove the Findings “horseplay” sailing administra- Petitioner’s that there right eye, abandon- that and scope fashion. adopted that his includ- that into and the of of damages the juries In this that the out of dependents in case death and expenses of act is in no sense to be considered as ry enterprise, including compensation for in- whole ment. must be of [*] relation employé, right cost and to connection it must [or] Under such compensation provided taxed for the sfe employés Compensation to in the course conducting the business or existing compensation and that to the business. The theo- expense injured employé or # an act the costs and or other between [*] of the Act is be of the employ- conducting arises out of injury remembered [*] supervenes. casualties, for in the employer that arises to his [*] business is added to the cost Fact, as aforesaid Law, of and Conclusions Order. sold, produced that are articles Section 35-1-452 Utah’s Workmen’s hence, run, long such costs and Compensation provides pertinent Act is, expenses public; borne that are part: articles produc- the consumers of the Every employee . . . who is in- act, ed. The of such an there- purpose jured arising ... accident out fore, employé is protect those employment, or in the course of his him, and in case of his dependent upon occurred, injury provid- such wheresoever provide ade- injury serious or death ed was not self-in- purposely the same support quate for the of those means flicted, be entitled to receive and shall view, therefore, In dependent upon him. compensation shall for loss paid, be disability or death of that case of total such injury sustained on account of . be- employé dependents might as is provided.3 herein injured employment, concept “Scope Employment” be is worker 1. The foreign compensa- employment. A one to the law of workmen’s in the course of his definition tion, belonging employment” rather in the law of master and is found in of the term “course Therefore, petitioner way Larson, Compensa- servant. in no can The Law of Workmen's proving place have the (1979), considered to burden of tion 14: “when takes within § scope in the place the accident “was period employment at a where employment.” be, employee reasonably may and while he doing fulfilling engaged in some- is his duties or Ann., 1953, 2. All Utah references are to Code thing thereto.” incidental as amended. 217-218, 1021-1022 P. clearly kept It in mind stat- must be that the requires ute arise that the in the course objects come the public charity, keep such a We must negli- mind that neither calamity by requiring is avoided gence misconduct, busi- wilful even [n]or ness or enterprise provide for such though proximate such were the sole dependents, with right death, cause of his would defeat an er to add the paid amount that is out to award in 1—45], this case. Under Sec. [35— the cost producing and selling the a recovery granted every case where product of enterprise. such business or *3 employee by arising an is killed accident The beneficent purposes of such acts are employment, “provid- in the course of his all, therefore apparent to and for that ed purposely the same is not self-inflict- reason, other, if for no should receive a ed.”7 very liberal construction in favor of the mind, With in principles these basic we injured employé. We are all upon united turn now to analysis an of whether and the proposition that in view pur- injuries under what circumstances sus- poses acts, of such in case there any “horseplay” part tained as a result of on the respecting right doubt compensa- of an employee may compensated not be tion, such doubt should be resolved in under the act. favor of the or of employé dependents his treatise, In his The Law of Workmen’s as the case may be. Compensation (1979), Professor Arthur Lar- Court, This along with the courts of other (hereafter “Larson”) son lists four “actual jurisdictions, recognized has that concepts suggested or problem” treatments of the of negligence, contributory negligence, participants horseplay:8 in fault, and similar tort concepts have no 1. The which re- defense” “aggressor place within the remedial framework of the sults in the denial of compensation any compensation act. In Twin Canning Peaks case where injured employee instigated Commission,5 Co. v. Industrial this Court or participated in the horseplay. It is rea- stated: by instigating soned that the horseplay the Our only statute injuries those exclude[d] employee has voluntarily stepped aside which are “purposely self-inflicted.” As from employment.9 his statute, therefore, we read the it is not

enough employé 2. The New York Rule which merely permits disre- gards rule, regulation, instigator some even an participant or order of or master, horseplay horseplay since such conduct to recover if the may con- was a stitute nothing regular more than ordinary negli- employment incident of the as dis- gence tinguished on the employé, from an isolated act.10 mere negligence does not destroy the 3. The instigator partici- view that an right to compensation. pant should be treated the same as a non- Likewise, in M & K Corporation v. participant Indus- since it is the conditions of the Commission,6 trial we stated: employment that induce the horseplay.11 589, 603, 853, 859, 5. Singleton (W.Va.1961); Younger 196 P. v. 20 A.L.R. 821 Broth (1921). ers, Inc., 872 (La.App.1971); Gurski 247 So.2d 273 Susquehanna Company, 1, v. Coal 262 Pa. 104 488, 504, 132, 189 P.2d 139-140 (Pa.1918); Hartford Accident and In A. 801 (1948). demnity Cardillo, Company (D.C.App.1940), 112 F.2d 11 649, t. denied 310 U.S. 60 S.Ct. cer Equitable 7. See also Maltias v. Life Assurance 1100, 84 L.Ed. 1415 Society States, 237, of United 93 N.H. 40 A.2d (1944); Crilly Ballou, 303, 837 353 Mich. 91 1A 8. Larson 23.20. § (1958); Walsh v. Charles Olson & N.W.2d 493 Sons, Inc., 260, 285 Minn. 172 N.W.2d 745 9. Id. at 5-126. (Minn. 1969); Carvalho v. Decorative Fabrics (R.I.1976); 117 R.I. 366 A.2d 157 Id. Garage, Secor v. Penn Service 19 N.J. (1955); Shapaka Compensa v. State A.2d Commissioner, Id. tion 146 W.Va. 119 S.E.2d premises employer, of his the use by that an proposed

4. The rule Larson if, recover instigator or should participant alleged- deceased was by which elevator stan- ordinary employment” “course of Although employer. ly forbidden dards, does not indulgence horseplay from are employment” the words “deviation to a deviation from amount opinion, found the Twin Peaks nowhere employment.12 wrestling with it is clear the Court a from the approach question of when deviation As the basis for fourth above, proposes four-part test employee suffi- assigned duties of act analyze any particular to take that out of cient consti determine whether the view, In our employment. course jus as to tutes such substantial deviation though lacking the analysis in Twin Peaks tify denying compensation participant ato test proposed formal structure of the participa therein. Whether initiation of or Larson, gen- on supra, is founded the same is a deviation from course tion We Lar- principles.15 adopt eral therefore employment depends (1) the extent four-part *4 son’s test to determine whether deviation, (2) the and seriousness of the such particular horseplay act of constitutes e., (i. completeness of the deviation whether the deviation that it can be said that the of commingled performance it was with arise in the course resulting did not injury duty), or of duty involved an abandonment employment and hence is not com- (3) practice the extent to which of the pensable. accepted part become an had employment, (4) extent (1) the the Extent of the devia- and seriousness may the the employment which nature of tion. horsep expected include some such be Peaks, ob- supra, Twin the Court In lay.13 served: only one This Court has heretofore had the cases reading of decided A careful occasion to examine issue will, however, mere fact that the disclose compensation setting. In in the workmen’s injured at time of employé, that the Canning Peaks v. Industrial Company Twin accident, discharge in the was Commission, compensa- supra, an award of directly not- en- his usual duties or was of a worker who was dependents tion to the with those connected gaged anything as a in which “the killed result of duties, necessarily him prevent does not instigator princi- deceased was the in case of recovering compensation from if not pal, the sole actor”14 was affirmed In that connection injury. accidental analysis The in Twin Peaks this Court. that, human while a must be remembered employee on turned whether the deceased than a ma- more what being do no “in be been while could said to have killed do, can not be classed might he yet chine employment light the course of” his merely.16 using an located as a machine his activities elevator employer and whether of a rule Id. to have death could be considered worker’s Id. at 5-122. Peaks, “purposely Twin been self-inflicted.” 603-604, supra, 196 P. at 858-859. 57 Utah at 601, 196 P. at 858. at 602, 858. See also Leonbru P. at 16.Id. at 196 dissenting opinion in his 15. Mr. Justice Hall Milis, 128 Champlain 229 N.Y. no v. Silk distinguishes at bar Twin Peaks from the case (1920); Plymouth Pro 711 Piatek v. Rock N.E. emphasizes con- there that Court N.Y.S.2d 15 A.D.2d 224 vision focus- dissent sidered case borderline. The Spray (1962); Newark Industrial 634 Diaz v. particularly fact Twin Peaks es on the that (1961); Inc., ing, 478 35 N.J. A.2d boy 14-year here involved old while Petitioner Company, su Fabrics Decorative years Carvalho old at time he was was almost Company ; Indemnity pra Hartford Accident & injured. reading reveals A close of Twin Peaks Cardillo, age supra. concerning were the worker’s dicta analysis an violation of the effect of the Recognizing duty.” points that “a little nonsense an “abandonment of Larson now and then is relished the best of out:

[workers],”17 it is clear that the rea better particular . act of horseplay soned for the decisions make allowances judged according to be is entitled to the fact cannot be expected workers same standards of and duration exten[t] assigned attend their ev strictly to duties accepted of deviation that are in other ery job. on the they minute are That is not fi[e]lds, resting, seeking personal such as to say job that substantial from excursions comfort, per- or indulging incidental assignments need tolerated or if sonal errands. If an momenta- excursions, occurs during compensa rily co-employee walks over to a to en- bar, tion need be In at paid. the case two, in a gage friendly word this Petitioner engaged performance in the nowadays would be called insubstan- of his assigned playful duties when he was accompanies tial If deviation. ly “attacked” flipping co-workers friendly playful jab word with a in the bands. then momentarily Petitioner set ribs, surely it be said cannot that an aside up challenge. his duties and took entirely principles new set of has come minutes, In an lasting a matter exchange remains play. simple into incident injured. points As subject diversion to the same human tests out: departure the employ- extent from playful ment as if the gesture character horse- had been of a

play should omitted. judged by deviation not be consequences seriousness of its extreme, At the other there are cases

light of but hindsight, by the extent of *5 prankster in which the prac- undertakes a the in itself. work-departure This is not joke tical which the complete necessitates do, always easy especially to a tri- when employment abandonment of the and the fling explodes energies incident escalates or into a concentration of all his for a major part tragedy.18 working substantial time on horseplay enterprise. the When this We think principle the converse of this is sufficiently complete abandonment is true; likewise major trage- the fact that a extensive, it can treated the same only be dy has occurred should not dictate an award employment as abandonment of the for compensation of when that tragedy resulted personal any purpose, other such as an from a so deviation extensive and serious personal or extended errand an intention- that the can employment be said have (footnotes nap.19 omitted) al four-hour been However, opinion abandoned. it is our (3) Extent horseplay which has be- that the deviation involved in case the at of the part employment. come a bar was short in duration and when disasso- ciated from consequences the serious which hearing the The evidence adduced at be- resulted, trivial. relatively judge fore the administrative law was con- on the of flicting frequency “rubber band

(2) Completeness of the deviation. fights,” clearly “fights” but had be- was, at the time he was “at- part come a of the employment, whether tacked” in co-employees,engaged the “daily” “fights” the occurred or “two or discharge of his duties. Had he not been three times a month.” injured, he presumably complet- would have As points out: ed loading the truck and carried on with his deliveries. engaged The in controlling issue is whether the cus- was clearly “commingled perform- part with the tom had in fact a of become the ance of duty” and hence did not constitute employment; employer’s knowledge the 17. Ognibene Manufacturing Rochester Com (Des 1A Larson at 5-152. pany, (1948) N.Y. N.E.2d 749 mond, J., dissenting, 751). 80 N.E.2d at 5-142 to Id. at 5-143. adoption ap- nor of a test

of it make it neither more less a which mechanical can involving horseplay most part employment plication of the it will cases —at incorporation practice the ap- of of “correct Indeed this evidence dictate a result”. (italics in employment.20 origi- susceptible into of proach ap- is not mechanical nal) as a plication but rather is intended method of to assist the Industrial Commis- analysis appar- We consider fact that do not coming cases sion in consideration of future Bergin of had ever at- ently no It involving horseplay. before is this flip of with tempted piece before a wood underlying poli- that when the Court’s view that indicating a band as such a cy compensation act is effectuated part be practice could not considered herein, analysis suggested light of the prac- employment. elements expected. can be rational result tice, be to have which must conceded been were not part employment, signifi- of the propo- to the While we remain committed as cantly enlarged or so modified so to no will examine the evi- sition this Court that part employment. longer constitute only case to as- compensation dence in a any certain whether there is substantial (4) to which nature of Extent findings support evidence expected to include some such may ment the Commission Commission and whether horseplay. juris- has without in excess its acted approach This focus- element Larson’s diction,23under the facts of this case we on foreseeability any es believe as a matter of law there given employment environment it can not a deviation such that particular act of involved. Con- resulting did not be said that analy- which enter into siderations employment course of arise in the point sis of whether the work include compensible. The record here- hence is not activity lulls in or is employment involves support- evidence in reveals no substantial continuous,21 essentially and the existence ing finding of the Commission which are instrumentalities Petitioner “com- engaging horseplay, readily which are work environment and his duties and hence pletely abandoned” *6 list is usable in situations.22 This injured employ- in the course was not not but intended to exhaustive rather of the Commis- ment. Therefore Order possibilities. of the In the illustrative to Petitioner and sion reversed. Costs elements which present case all against Bergin. joined injury to result Petitioner’s —the bands, truck, hand the rubber and the piece STEWART, JJ., and concur. MAUGHAN parcel the work wood—were It is not difficult environment. therefore HALL, (dissenting): Justice of the en- type to foresee that I dissent. gaged expected. respectfully was to be Commission, In of the suggested by reversing the order By adopting approach “as a Larson, opinion rules matter majority this Court does not intend 80, Plym (1922); 103 204 P. 151 Piatek v. Or. 20. Id. at 5-133. supra; outh Rock Provision Carval Company Canning v. 21. Peaks Industrial Twin Company, supra; ho Decorative Fabrics Commission, supra, 57 at 196 P. at Utah Inc., Spraying, su Diaz v. Newark Industrial 858. pra. Inc., See, g., 7 e. Johnson v. Loew's A.D.2d Canning Company v. Industrial 23.Twin Peaks (involv- (App.Div.1958) 180 N.Y.S.2d Commission, supra, at at 196 P. pa- ing employee a situation where an shot a band); perclip eye into his own with a rubber Commission, Stark State Accident law ter, that there was anot substantial devia- that of substantial peti- deviation from tion” from petitioner’s employ- employment. course of tioner’s course of (emphasis added). ment My primary con- case, petition In the instant admitted cern with such ruling a is that a decision as that at the time of the accident was not injured by whether one is accident aris- performing assigned duty. an He also ad- ing out of the course of his mitted that injury resulted from his own matter, ment is not a law but a factual one. “aggressor” act and that he was the facts, Once the Commission has found the wood, e., flipping piece i. that his this Court has traditionally flipping refrained from was wood reaction of disturbing having been hit with an elastic findings whenever band but there is was rather independent, playful gesture. support evidence to them.1 Testimony indicated that the employees had majority The upon relies the case of Twin flipping been warned about elastic bands at Canning Company Peaks v. Industrial Com- apparently each other and that no being mission as consistent with its hold- company had ever attempted before ing. On the in Twin contrary, Peaks the flip projectile with an elastic band Court findings affirmed the of the Commis- job. while on the Based on the evidence sion acknowledged the standard of re- presented, judge the administrative law view supra. Furthermore, referred to found as follows: facts in Twin readily distinguish- Peaks are The horseplay any was not related in able in particulars. several example, For way performance to the applicant’s Peaks, Twin the fatal injury occurred dur- job represents duties but rather a com- ing work, a lull in the at a time when there plete employee’s abandonment of the was no perform; work to in the instant duties. At the time of the accident nei- case, petitioner was actively engaged in his applicant ther the any nor of the other work when he purpose abandoned it for the employees involved in the were Also, of “horseplay.” at the time of the carrying assigned out their tasks. injured accident in Twin Peaks the party applicant has failed to prove that (14 years a minor age) whereas in his accident arose out of or was in the case, petitioner instant 22 years scope of his employment. age. The specifically Court acknowledged In recognition prerogative it is of that Twin Peaks was a borderline case the fact-finder judge the evidence and (which suggests further the importance of inferences that reasonably be determination) factual and that “if therefrom, drawn I am of the opinion that deceased had been a years man of mature the evidence is such that there is a reasona- experience, might we have reached upon ble basis which the Commission could different conclusion.” unpersuaded remain petitioner’s approach suggested by Professor *7 “arose out of or in the course may determining well assist ment”; and, conversely, that the evidence whether the accident arises out of or in the requires does not rise to the level that re- However, course one’s employment. versal of the Commission’sorder and thus even if this four-step analysis applied, compels an award of benefits. In order to (not is the Court) fact-finder which so, do the evidence must be uncontradicted weigh must evaluate and each element indi- overwhelming or so that all reasonable vidually collectively. This includes the minds would necessarily so find. Such is element majority treats as a here, law mat- not the case consequently and I see it Sugar 1. Utah-Idaho light Co. v. Industrial Commis- must construe evidence most sion, (1928). Specifi- sustaining findings 263 P. 746 favorable to and order cally, Village weigh contradictory we Commission. Wiseman Part- evi- ners, Utah, (1978). 589 P.2d 754 purpose interposing dence for the our own judgment are; rather, as to what the facts we 196 P. 853 to affirm the Commission’s duty as our

order.3

I would affirm.

CROCKETT, J., concurs in the dissent C. HALL, J. COMPANY, FINANCE

SUGARHOUSE Appellant,

Plaintiff and

Eugene L. and Colleen W. ANDERSON

Anderson, Defendants and

Respondents.

No. 16462.

Supreme of Utah. Court

April *8 (1936), Commission, v. Industrial Com- and Kavalinakis 724 mission, 17 Utah 3. See Va use v. Industrial (1965), citing 246 P. 698 67 Utah Kent v. 2d 407 P.2d 1006 Commission, 381, 57 P.2d

Case Details

Case Name: Prows v. INDUSTRIAL COM'N OF UTAH
Court Name: Utah Supreme Court
Date Published: Apr 4, 1980
Citation: 610 P.2d 1362
Docket Number: 16456
Court Abbreviation: Utah
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