Provision Co. v. . Maxwell, Comr. of Revenue
155 S.E. 557
N.C.
1930
Check Treatment
Bbogden, J.

The facts disclose that the plaintiff operates a cold-storage chamber, warehouse, or refrigerating room in which to preserve fresh meats owned and sold by him. Wholesale grocers or dealers in meat products are not liable for the tax unless they operate in connection with their wholesale business a cold-storage warehouse or refrigerating room of some character or description. Therefore, the sole question of law involved is whether the operation of such cold storage or refrigerating room for handling and preserving fresh meat constitutes such separate, specific and reasonable classification as the law contemplates.

The power of the State to classify for the purpose of taxation is flexible and must of necessity cover a wide range. The predominant *663 limitation imposed by the fundamental law upon the exercise of such power is declared to be that the classification “must be reasonable and not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation so that all persons similarly circumstanced should be treated alike.” Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. Coleman, 48 Supreme Court Reporter, 423; Tea Co. v. Doughton, 196 N. C., 145. Indeed, the foregoing statement of the principle, and words of like import and meaning found in the decisions, have grown into a legal formula as constant and familiar as the formula for the chemical composition of water. The legal formula is made up of two constituent elements, to wit: (a) Reasonable classification; (b) equality of burden upon all in the same class.

The courts have not set a certain and unvarying standard for determining the reasonableness of the classification and have generally been content to apply the law upon the facts as presented in the particular case. This Court in Rosenbaum v. City of New Bern, 118 N. C., 83, has held that a merchant selling new clothing and also second-hand clothing was subject to a separate license tax upon both branches of the business upon the theory that a classification based upon the sale of new clothing and second-hand clothing was reasonable. It is not overlooked that in the case mentioned there was an aspect of exercise of police power and yet there was a separate license tax of one dollar for the privilege of merchandising within the city and another license tax of four dollars per month for the privilege of selling second-hand clothing. The court expressly declared in reference to the four-dollar tax that “the license tax was lawfully imposed, if the municipality was clothed with the power to classify, and did not discriminate in the exercise of its delegated authority.” Furthermore, this Court has held that a person engaged in the business of operating automobiles for the transportation of property for a distance of more than fifty miles was subject to a license tax, although if such automobiles or motor vehicles transported property less than fifty miles, no additional license tax therefor was required. Clark v. Maxwell, 197 N. C., 604. Certainly, if the sale of new clothing and'second-hand clothing can be classified as separate and distinct business enterprises within the purview of license tax laws, or if trucks hauling property more than fifty miles would be subject to such license tax, then it would appear that a wholesale dealer in meat products who also operates a refrigerating room for the care' and preservation of fresh meat would also be subject to classification. S. v. Carter, 129 N. C., 560; Mercantile Co. v. Mt. Olive, 161 N. C., 121; Lacy v. Packing Co., 134 N. C., 567; Armour Packing Co. v. Lacy, 200 U. S., 227, 50 Law Ed., 451.

Aifirmed.