161 Mich. 28 | Mich. | 1910
The testimony for proponent tended to prove that Charles A. Provin, who then resided in the village of Rockford, in Kent county, and who was about 73 years of age, arranged by mail with Major E. T. Watkins, a lawyer having an office in Grand Rapids and another in Rockford, to meet him at Rockford on February
Charles A. Provin had no children. His wife had one' son, Frank Fisher by name, by a former marriage. His-relatives, other than his wife, are nephews and nieces and the contestants, his brothers. It is claimed that he was. not mentally competent to make a will and that he was unduly influenced in his disposition of his property by his wife, the proponent.
The affidavit which the court excluded contains among others declarations the substance of which is here set out: That affiant was 73 years old, owner of 240 acres of land, worth #11,000 or #12,000 and free from incumbrances. During the past few years, especially the last year or two, affiant’s wife had insistently pursued him with a demand that he “fix ” his property so she would have control of it or some part of it, threatening to apply for a divorce if he did not, and to apply to the county for a division of the property. She had threatened to have a guardian appointed. For a year or more affiant had been in poor health, suffering from Bright’s disease, and the importunities of his wife had greatly annoyed and disturbed him. To all of her demands he had turned a deaf ear, knowing that if she survived him she would get her legal proportion of the estate in her own right, and her demands were believed to be made in the interest of her son. Along about April, 1907, affiant consented to give his wife a life lease of the 40 acres on which the house was situated. They went together to Grand Rapids to have the necessary document prepared. He was told by the scrivener that the paper would have to be made to a third party. It was made to Mrs. Fisher, affiant supposing he was giving his wife a life use of the 40 acres. Affiant learned later on that what occurred was that a warranty deed had been executed by himself and wife to Mrs. Fisher, reserving to the grantors a life estate in the land, and that' Mrs. Fisher had conveyed the premises to his wife, Margaret. Affiant never intended to make such a deed or any deed of any real estate to Mrs. Fisher or to any other person. Ho was in poor health and weary
We are not prepared to hold that the writing itself was rightly excluded as a privileged communication from client to attorney. See O’Toole v. Insurance Co., 159 Mich. 187 (123 N. W. 795). Was it for any other reason reversible error to exclude it ? It is not disputed that in February, 1908, Margaret Provin reconveyed to her husband, and that, as has been stated, he, in that month, deeded to her an undivided half of the 80 acres (including the same 40 acres) and deeded to her daughter-in-law, Hattie Fisher, the other undivided half on the day Ms will was executed. Margaret Provin had worked with her husband on the farm. When married, he had 120 acres, incumbered. The other 120 acres was acquired after the marriage. New buildings were erected. She admits that she and her husband talked over the matter of the devolution of this property upon his death. She wanted, however, and claimed the right, to have a portion of it in her own right so that if her husband survived her it might go to her heirs. Whatever contention they had —she denies that there was contention — was about this, both understanding that she would be provided for, if she survived her husband, if he made no will. We have found in the record no testimony tending to prove that she exercised any influence upon her husband concerning the will he should make, or did make. Clearly, his declarations could not be received for such a purpose. Zibble v. Zibble, 131 Mich. 655 (92 N. W. 348); In re Kennedy’s Estate, 159 Mich. 548 (124 N. W. 516). Indeed, the particular declaration is in affirmance of the idea that her influence was negative rather than controlling. The particular declaration is therefore material only as it tended to prove the mental condition of testator
“I had a talk one time during the last couple of years with Mr. John Berry, a farmer up in Cannon, about the probate proceedings.
“Q. Did you not say at that time and say in probate court that you stated to him the property might all go to hell rather than have any of it go to Mr. Fisher ?
“A. I don’t know that I used just exactly that language.
“Q. Well, in substance that?
“A. I did say I would rather see it go to the lawyers than to go to Mr. Fisher, and I say so now.
“Q. Did you not say you had rather see it go to hell?
“A. That would be going to the same place.”
But with respect to what the declaration may be said to tend, to prove in favor of contestants, the jury had the substance of it before them, and the testimony of contestants that this declaration and similar ones were made is undisputed. The witness Fred J. Provin testified:
“ Q. I ask you now whether the affidavit contained in substance the talk Charlie had with you in your office ?
“A. I say it did; yes, sir.”
The effect of this undisputed testimony is that testator made and repeated, in substance, the declaration that he was imposed upon when he made the conveyance, that his wife profited by it, that he had without success sought to have her reconvey the land, that he consulted counsel, stated the facts to him, and had prepared and verified a bill o’f complaint which set out the reasons for compelling her to reconvey. We are of opinion that, while it would
Tt would profit no one to notice in detail the numerous objections made to the charge of the court. The court did not always use the language ©f the requests, and the charge is not less judicial in tone because of the omission of some of the language suggested by counsel. On the whole, the jury was fairly advised of the applicable rules of law.
The judgment is affirmed, with costs to the proponent.