64 Colo. 400 | Colo. | 1918
Opinion by
This is an action wherein The Provident Loan Society, a corporation, is charged with a violation of section 1890, article I, chapter 35, of the Municipal Code of 1906, of the City and County of Denver, which section reads as follows:
“Sec. 1390. License Required. It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to establish or conduct the business of pawnbroker unless such person, firm or corporation shall have first procured a license to conduct such business, in manner and form as in this ordinance provided. Every person or corporation engaged in the business of receiving property in pledge> or as security for money or other thing advanced to the pawner or pledger, shall be held and is hereby declared and defined to be a pawnbroker.”
It is conceded that the Loan Society, above named, is and was a pawnbroker as defined by the ordinance, and that, as charged, it violated the ordinance by conducting the business of a pawnbroker, without having first procured a license from the city.
This action was instituted in the Municipal Court, where the defendant Loan Society was tried and found guilty as charged. An appeal was taken to the County Court, where, upon trial, a like result was reached, and a judgment was
It is contended by the Loan Society, the plaintiff in error, that the ordinance is in conflict with the statute on pawnbrokers (Chapter 66, p. 250, Session Laws 1897). This is the principal question presented for our determination.
The first section of the statute provides that
“* * * it shall be unlawful for any corporation, company or person to establish or conduct the business of pawnbroker within the State of Colorado, unless such corporation, company or person shall have first procured a license from the proper authorities of the town or city in which they are engaged in such business,” and shall furnish a bond. (Sec. 4804, E. S. 1908; Sec. 5393 Mills Ann. Sts. 1912.)
The eighth section of the act provides, in substance, that no pawnbroker shall charge a greater rate of interest upon money advanced than that of 3% per month.
(Sec. 4811 E. S. 1908; Sec. 5400 Mills Ann. Sts. 1912.)
Section 16 of the pawnbroker statute provides that,
“Any person or persons loaning money on personal property and charging as much as the maximum rate of interest herein provided, shall be deemed a pawnbroker, and such person doing business without a license shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. * * *”
(Sec. 4819 E. S. 1908; Sec. 5408 Mills Ann. Sts. 1912.)
The plaintiff in error refers to numerous sections of the statute and of the ordinance, and contends that there is “a sharp conflict” between the provisions of the statute and those of the ordinance. The section of the ordinance under which the plaintiff in error was prosecuted, is complete within itself even when the other sections of the ordinance which relate to the rate of interest to be charged by a pawn
The plaintiff in error claims that this section of the Municipal Code is in conflict with the statute because “the statute ■ defines a pawnbroker as one making loans * * * who charges as much as 3% per month interest,” while “the ordinance declares every one who engages in the business of receiving property in pledge or as security for money or other thing advanced * * * a pawnbroker, regardless of the rate of interest charged.”
It is apparent from a comparison of the ordinance with the statute, that a person, firm, or corporation may be a “pawnbroker,” within the definition given by the ordinance, and yet, because not “charging as much as the maximum rate of interest,” not be a pawnbroker within the meaning of the statute. The plaintiff in error, according to the evidence, charges interest on its loans at a rate not exceeding ■2% per month of the amount of money actually loaned or advanced. Since the Loan Society did not charge as much as the maximum rate of interest, or 3% per month, it was not a “pawnbroker” within the meaning of the statute, but was a pawnbroker as defined by the ordinance. The statute, however, did not prevent the Loan Society from being deemed, or being in fact, a pawnbroker.
When the statute designates who “shall be deemed to be a pawnbroker” it merely refers to the class of pawnbrokers who are affected by the statute, or to the class of persons • who are to be dealt with by the statute as pawnbrokers. Other pawnbrokers are in no way affected by the statute. The definition given by the statute is not made a general
If the statute had provided that no license should be imposed on pawnbrokers except those charging the maximum of 3% per month interest, then there might have been a conflict between the statute and the ordinance, but no such provision appears in the statute^ nor can it be implied from the language thereof.
It is well settled that the mere fact that the state, in the exercise of the police power, has made certain regulations does not, however, prohibit a municipality from exacting additional requirements. So long as there is no conflict between the two, and the requirements of the municipal by-law are not in themselves pernicious, as being unreasonable or discriminatory, both will stand. 19 R. C. L. 804, Sec. 110.
The city has the power to legislate upon local and municipal matters. If, as contended by plaintiff in error, the business of pawnbroking is a matter of state-wide interest, this fact does not prevent such business from being also a matter of municipal interest. The preservation of the health, safety, welfare and comfort of dwellers in urban centers of population requires the enforcement of very different and usually much more stringent police regulations in such districts than are necessary in a state taken as a whole.
19 R. C. L. 798, Sec. 106. In Sec. 163, p. 861 of the volume just cited, it is said:
“The business of pawnbrokers, because of the facility it furnishes for the commission of crime and for its conceal*406 ment, is one which belongs to a class where the strictest police regulation may be imposed.”
And in Sec. 258 of the same work is the following:
“Among the occupations which have been held to affect the public interest so far that a municipal corporation may lawfully require a license as a condition of engaging therein are * * * keeping a * * * pawnbrokers shop.”
In Sec. 1023 McQuillen Munic. Corp., it is said:
“The law recognizes that the business of a pawnbroker is of such a character as to justify and imperatively require rigid police supervision, and as a means to this end a permit or license to conduct such business may be demanded.”
For the reasons hereinbefore stated, we- hold that section 1390 of the Municipal Code of 1906, of the City and County of Denver, being the section of the ordinance involved in this case, is valid, and that no error was committed by the County Court in finding and determining that plaintiff in error was a pawnbroker under the ordinance and subject to the penalties provided for the violation of the section of the ordinance in question. The application for a supersedeas will therefore be denied, and the judgment affirmed.
Affirmed.
Mr. Chief Justice Hill and Mr. Justice Bailey concur.