Providence AIOSSA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., AKA Bank of America & Co., John Frazza and Sue Cole, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 12-4162-cv.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Sept. 4, 2013.
Finally, while a district court generally should not dismiss a pro se complaint without granting the plaintiff leave to amend, such leave is not necessary when it would be futile. See Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir.2000). Here, granting Basile leave to amend would be futile, as a review of the record does not suggest that Basile has inadequately or inartfully pleaded any potentially viable claims.
We have considered Basile‘s remaining arguments on appeal and find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.
Deborah Zawadzki, Kaufman Borgeest & Ryan, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Jonathan B. Bruno, Kaufman Borgeest & Ryan LLP; Siobhаn M. Sweeney, Edwards Wildman Palmer LLP, on the brief), for Appellees.
PRESENT: RALPH K. WINTER, RICHARD C. WESLEY and SUSAN L. CARNEY, Circuit Judges.
SUMMARY ORDER
Appellant Providence Aiossa appeals from a September 21, 2012 judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Seybert, J.) granting summary judgment for Defendants on Aiossa‘s claims of retaliation, age discrimination, and aiding and abetting in violation of the New York State Human Rights Lаw,
We rеview an order granting summary judgment de novo, resolving all ambiguities and drawing all permissible factual inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See Mihalik v. Credit Agricole Cheuvreux N. Am., Inc., 715 F.3d 102, 108 (2d Cir.2013). Summary judgment is appropriate only when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
The NYSHRL and NYCHRL makе it unlawful for an employer to, among other things, discriminate on the basis of age,
We analyze discriminаtion and retaliation claims under § 296 of the NYSHRL under the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). See Spiegel v. Schulmann, 604 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir.2010). Under that framework, if a plaintiff puts forth a prima facie case of discrimination and the defendant then provides a nondiscriminatоry reason for its actions, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the defendant‘s proffered reason is pretextual. Id.
We analyze discrimination and retaliation claims under the NYCHRL “separately and independently from any federal and state law claims,” and construe the NYCHRL “broadly in favor of discrimination plaintiffs, to the extent that such a construction is reasonably possible.” Mihalik, 715 F.3d at 109 (internal quotations omitted). An employer “is entitled to summary judgment [under the NYCHRL] only if the record establishes as a matter of law that ‘discrimination play[ ed] no role.‘” Id. at 110 n. 8 (citing Williams v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 61 A.D.3d 62, 872 N.Y.S.2d 27 (1st Dep‘t 2009)).
Appellant argues that the distriсt court erred in failing to separately analyze her NYCHRL and NYSHRL claims. To the extent the district court erred, the error was harmless; even where Appellant may be entitled to the NYCHRL‘s broader protections, there is no genuine issue as tо whether discriminatory or retaliatory intent motivated Defendants’ actions.
Appellant, who was a Bank of America mortgage loan officer when the alleged retaliation and discrimination occurred, identifies two instances оf protected conduct: In January 2007, Appellant complained that a fellow employee was the targеt of racial discrimination, and around April 2008, Appellant complained that a fellow employee and herself were the victim of discrimination. She argues that following these complaints, Appellees retaliated against her by, among other things, stripping her of her Long Island banking centers, initiating a series of baseless investigations, and ultimately terminating hеr.
To support her claims, Appellant fails to present probative facts beyond some measure of temрoral proximity. Yet even where temporal proximity might otherwise have been probative, Appellees rebutted Appellant‘s claims: (1) similarly situated employees who did not complain about discrimination were presented with the same options, i.e. to transfer or to join the Long Island sales team under a new manager; and (2) substantial evidence supported Appellees’ contention that legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons motivated their decision to investigate Aiossa for fraud. Short of speculation, therefore, there is no evidence that retaliation or Aiossa‘s age played even a partial motivating role in any of the allegedly adverse actions.
We hаve reviewed Appellant‘s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.