PROTECTIVE LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION,
Plaintiff-Counterclaim-Defendant-Appellee,
v.
LINCOLN NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION,
Defendant-Counterclaim-Plaintiff-Appellant.
No. 88-7255.
United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
May 23, 1989.
Robert G. Tate, F.A. Flowers, Birmingham, Ala., for defendant-counterclaim-plaintiff-appellant.
James L. Priester, Cathy S. Wright, Fournier J. Gale, III, Maynard, Cooper, Frierson & Gale, P.C., Birmingham, Ala., for plaintiff-counterclaim-defendant-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama.
Before VANCE and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges, and ATKINS*, Senior District Judge.
PER CURIAM:
Lincoln National Life Insurance Company ("Lincoln") appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment and its order consolidating the arbitration of Lincoln's dispute with appellee Protective Life Insurance Company ("Protective") and the arbitration of claims between Protective and a third party, Munich American Reassurance Company ("Munich"). The only issue we must decide is whether a district court may consolidate arbitration proceedings if the parties have not provided for consolidation in their arbitration agreements. We conclude that it may not.
We agree with the reasoning of Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Western Seas Shipping Co.,
As the Ninth Circuit observed, this interpretation of section 4 "comports with the statute's underlying premise that arbitration is a creature of contract, and that '[a]n agreement to arbitrate before a special tribunal is, in effect, a specialized kind of forum-selection clause that posits not only the situs of suit but also the procedure to be used in resolving the dispute.' " Id. (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.,
We conclude, therefore, that "the sole question for the district court is whether there is a written agreement among the parties providing for consolidated arbitration." Del E. Webb Construction Co. v. Richardson Hospital Authority,
Notes
Honorable C. Clyde Atkins, Senior U.S. District Judge for the Southern District of Florida, sitting by designation
In holding that the only proper inquiry for the district court is whether the parties have explicitly consented to consolidation in their arbitration agreements, we reject Protective's argument that district courts have the power to consolidate arbitration proceedings under Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. 42(a) and 81(a)(3). See Del E. Webb Constr. Co.,
