after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.
' . This case depends upon the construction to be given to § 452, Rev. Stat. If Prosseris original entry was forbidden by the above statute,-then nothing stood in the way of that entry béing canceled by order of the Secretary of the Interior in a .proceeding that directly involved its validity. On the other hand, if he acquired any right by virtue of his entry, the judgment to the contrary by the Land' Department was an error of law which could be corrected by a decree declaring that the title was held in trust for him by the defendant. The principle . is well settled that “where one party has acquired the legal ' title to property to which another has the better right, a court of equity will convert him into a trustee of the true owner and Compel him to convey the legal title.”
Stark
v.
Starrs,
6 Wall.
*73
402, 419;
Silver v.
Ladd,
• The difficulty in the way of any relief being granted to the plaintiff ■ arises from the statute prohibiting any officer, clerk or employé iii the General Land Office, directly or indirectly, from purchasing or becoming interested in the purchase of any of the public land. That a special agent of the General Land Office is an'employé in that office is, we think, too clear to admit of serious doubt.. Referring to the timber-culture statute, Secretary Smith well said: “When the object of the act -is considered, it will be seen that it applied with special force to such parties as the defendant in the cause at issue. As a special agent of the Commissioner of the General Land Office, he was in a position peculiarly adapted to secure such knowledge/the use of which it was the intention of the act to prevent. It follows from what has herein been set out that the decision of this Department of date July 7, 1893, was in error, and the same is hereby set aside, and the decision of your office is affirmed.”
It is not clear from any document or decision to which our attention has been called, what is the scope of the "duties of a special agent of the Land Office, but the existence- of that office or position has long been recognized. Suffice it to say that they have official connection with the General Land Office and are under its supervision and control with respect to the administration off the public lands.
Wells
v.
Nickles,
In the eye of the law his case, is not advanced by the fact that he acted in conformity with the opinion of the Commissioner of the General Land Office, who stated, in a letter, that § 452, Rev. Stat., did not apply to special ■ agents.' That view, so far from being approved, was reversed, upon formal hearing, by the Secretary of the Interior. Besides, an erroneous interpretation of the statute by the Commissioner would not change the,-statute or confer any legal right upon Prosser in opposition "to the express prohibition against his purchasing or becoming interested in the purchasing of public lands while he was an employé in the General Land Office. The law, as we now recognize it to be, was the law when the plaintiff entered the lands in question, and, being at the time an employé in the Land Office, he could not acquire an interest in the lands that would prevent the Government, by its proper officer or department, from canceling his entry and treating the- lands as public lands which could be patented. to others. It may be well to add that the plaintiff’s continuing in -possession after he ceased' to be special agent was not equivalent *75 to a new entry. His rights must be determined by the validity of the original entry at the .time it was made.
These views dispose of the case adverse^ to the plaintiff, and require an affirmance of the judgment without reference to other questions discussed -by counsel.
Affirmed.'