245 Mass. 52 | Mass. | 1923
This is a writ of entry to recover three parcels of land in Lowell leased by the demandant to the Boston and Lowell Railroad Corporation by three leases dated respectively in 1837, 1840 and 1845. It is the contention of the demandant that the leases have expired by their own limitations. The plea was nul disseisin, with specification of defence that the tenant claims to hold possession by virtue of the leases; that the Boston and Lowell Railroad Corporation was on the first of December, 1919, consolidated with the tenant, the Boston and Maine Railroad, and that since that consolidation, the possession of the tenant is by virtue of its being in part, although under another name, the Boston and Lowell Railroad Corporation, the original lessee.
The demandant is a corporation established by St. 1792, c. 13, and supplementary acts. The tenant is a corporation established by St. 1843, c. 90, and supplementary acts, and by statutes of Maine, New Hampshire and New York. The Boston and Lowell Railroad Corporation was established
The Boston and Lowell Railroad Corporation, together with several other railroad corporations, termed for convenience “subsidiary companies,” were authorized to consolidate with the tenant, the Boston and Maine Railroad, by Spec. St. 1915, c. 380, and acts in amendment thereof, and the acts of other States. Pursuant to that act the several railroad corporations became consolidated and joined with the tenant, the Boston and Maine Railroad, forming one corporation under that name. An agreement to that end was executed by all the corporations including the Boston and Lowell Railroad Corporation. Brown v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 233 Mass. 502, 511.
Each of the leases here in issue contained an habendum clause and a covenant. The covenant clause has no decisive significance upon the issue here depending, but resort may be had to it for light upon the meaning of the habendum clause.
The habendum clause shows that the leases are for an indefinite term. They are to continue until the happening of one of several events and then to cease. The crucial event may happen at any time, or it may never happen. The leases, therefore, may never come to' an end. The effect of the words used was to convey a base fee. It is enough to say without further discussion that the case upon this point is governed by Jamaica Pond Aqueduct Corp. v. Chandler, 9 Allen, 159, First Universalist Society of North Adams v. Boland, 155 Mass. 171, Flynn v. Caplan 234 Mass. 516, Institution far Savings in Roxbury v. Roxbury Home far Aged Women, 244 Mass. 583.
A closer analysis of the leases is necessary to determine exactly their force and effect. The words “To Have and
The object of the consolidation of two or more solvent corporations into one is not usually to wind up the business of the old corporations but to continue as a unit that which theretofore had been separate. Whether the old corporations are merged into the new or are continued in existence under a new name depends upon the terms of the statute and contract under which the consolidation is brought about, and upon the pre-existing relations of the constituent corporations to which the statute and contract relate. The subject matter and the written instruments may give color each to the other. All the circumstances must be* considered in reaching a conclusion as to the nature of the transaction.. A consolidation differs from a sale and from simple succession. " In effecting it, instruments of transfer often are used. When different corporations are consolidated, commonly the franchises, privileges, rights and properties continue their existence, to be enjoyed and exercised by the new or enlarged or reorganized corporate entity.
The statute and the agreement for consolidation of the Boston and Lowell Bailroad Corporation with the Boston and Maine Bailroad contained phrases apt to express the element of succession to all rights and property and con
The Legislature cannot deprive the demandant of its rights under its contracts. The lease was made, however, to a public service corporation. This fact, known to the demandant at the time of the execution of the contracts, carries with it some implications as to the power of the Legislature over such corporations. The tenant performs the same service to the community and to the demandant as did the original lessee. It is bound to do all that can be required of a railroad corporation" operating lines between Lowell and Boston. We are of opinion that the tenant, under the statute and contract in the light of the special circumstances, is in substance and effect the Boston and Lowell Railroad Corporation so far as to enable it to enjoy the rights conveyed to that corporation under the leases
here in question. The case on this point falls under the principle of several decisions. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Worcester, Nashua & Rochester Railroad, 149 Mass. 214. Day v. Worcester, Nashua, & Rochester Railroad, 151 Mass. 302. Central Railroad & Banking Co. v. Georgia, 92 U. S. 665. Green County v. Conness, 109 U. S. 104. Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railway v. Ham, 114 U. S. 587, 595.
Exceptions overruled.