75 U.S. 153 | SCOTUS | 1869
PROPELLER MOHAWK.
Supreme Court of United States.
*157 Mr. S.W. Fuller, with whom was Mr. Roe, for the appellant.
Mr. Beckwith, contra.
*159 Mr. Justice NELSON delivered the opinion of the court.
The insurance company, having accepted the abandonment *160 of the wheat by the owner, after the disaster to the vessel, became subrogated to all the rights of the shipper, and might have left the responsibility upon the master to refit his vessel, or procure another, and forward the wheat to its port of delivery, according to the contract in the bill of lading. The vessel could have been refitted within a short time; and this port was but a few days' navigation from the place of the disaster. Besides, it occurred in the track of vessels from Chicago, and other ports on the upper lakes, and there could have been but little difficulty in procuring the shipment in another vessel.
But no choice was left to the master, whether to refit his vessel or send on the cargo in another, or to communicate with his owners, who were in Buffalo, as to the proper course to be pursued. The second day after the disaster, the agent of the insurance company appeared with instructions to take possession of the damaged wheat, and sell it as it lay in the vessel. Possession was given up accordingly, and the wheat sold on the same day, the sale perfected, and a delivery into lighters commenced to the purchaser. After this, the company fearing that the master would charge freight upon this damaged wheat, countermanded the original order to sell, unless the master would relinquish it. This he declined to do, but suggested to the agent the sale was a favorable one, and that the question of freight might remain for after-consideration; which was agreed to.
We think it quite clear that the counter order, not to sell, came too late. The wheat had been turned over into the possession of the agent, who had sold it, and a portion had been delivered from the vessel to the purchaser. The agent had received complete possession and control of the wheat, and thereby rescinded the contract in the bill of lading for further shipment; and it required the assent of both parties to revive it. This counter order, however, and the action under it, are significant of the intent of the insurance company in accepting the delivery of the wheat. It was to receive the possession in discharge of any further responsibility of the vessel. The only thing in controversy was the claim *161 of freight, and, undoubtedly, if the counter order had not been too late, unless the master had consented to give up the freight, he could have been compelled to forward the wheat as per bill of lading, or be answerable for the refusal or neglect.
In cases where the disaster happens in consequence of one of the perils within the exception in the bill of lading, or charter-party, the only responsibility of the vessel is to refit, and forward the cargo, or the portion saved, or if that is impracticable, to forward it in another vessel, and the owner is then entitled to freight. If part of the cargo is so far damaged as to be unfit to be carried on, the master may sell it at the intermediate port, as the agent of the shipper, for whom it may concern, and carry on the remainder. In this class of cases the vessel is only responsible for carrying on the cargo, being exempt from any damage by the exception in the contract of affreightment. And it is perfectly settled, that if the shipper voluntarily accepts the goods at the place of the disaster, or at any intermediate port, such acceptance terminates the voyage and all responsibility of the carrier, and the master is entitled to freight pro rata itineris.[*]
The same rule, as it respects the effect of the voluntary acceptance of the goods at the place of the disaster, or intermediate port, applies in case the ship is disabled or prevented from forwarding them to the port of destination by a peril or accident not within the exception in the bill of lading.[]
The only difference between the cases is, that inasmuch as, in the latter, the vessel is responsible for all the damages that have resulted from the misfortune to the cargo, the proofs of the acceptance of the goods at the intermediate port, in order to operate as a discharge of the vessel, should be clear and satisfactory. The mere acceptance in such *162 cases, and nothing else passing between the parties, ought not to preclude the shipper of his remedy. It should appear from the evidence and circumstances attending the transaction that the acceptance was intended as a discharge of the vessel and owner from any further responsibility what would be equivalent to a mutual arrangement, express or implied, by which the original contract in the bill of lading was rescinded. The ground of the exemption from responsibility of the vessel, in both cases, is the voluntary acceptance of the goods at the intermediate port. Applying these principles to the present case, we think the court can come to but one result. It falls within the second class of cases above referred to, as the explosion of the boiler was not a peril within the exception in the bill of lading.[*]
The acceptance, as we have already seen, was the voluntary act of the insurance company, without any solicitation or interference on the part of the master; and what would seem conclusive of the intent of the company in the transaction is, that they refused to bring a suit against the carrier to recover for the damaged wheat, although urged to it by the parties who afterwards took an assignment of the subject of litigation. Some $2300 was paid for a claim which, if real and substantial, amounted to $20,000.
What is still further evidence of the understanding of the insurance company of the effect of the acceptance and sale is, that they brought a suit to recover the value of the one thousand one hundred bushels of sound wheat, in the Superior Court of Buffalo alone; but even this was subsequently discontinued. The suit in the present case has been instituted by a volunteer, on a speculation; and we are not sorry that, upon the application of the principles of law governing it, the experiment must fail.
As to the freight, the cases we have above referred to establish that the master is entitled to freight pro rata itineris in all cases where there has been a voluntary acceptance of *163 the goods at the port of disaster. The rate is to be ascertained by comparing the portion of the voyage performed with the entire length of it.[*]
In the present case the goods were carried something more than half the distance; and, upon the facts as admitted in the record, the freight would exceed the value of the one thousand and one hundred bushels of wheat at the port of delivery at the time it arrived.
No balance is shown to be due to the libellant on the wheat. The libel, therefore, was properly dismissed by the court below.
DECREE AFFIRMED.
NOTES
[*] Welsh v. Hicks, 6 Cowen, 504; Abbott on Shipping, 554-5, and note; 1 Parsons on Shipping, 239, n. 2; Ib. 273; Maude & Pollock, Law of Shipping, 239, 221.
[] Osgood v. Groning, 2 Campbell, 471; Liddard v. Lopes, 10 East, 526; The Newport, Swabia, 335, 342; Abbott on Shipping, 452, 453-5; Hadley v. Clarke, 8 Term, 259; Spence v. Chodwick, 10 Queen's Bench, 517.
[*] Bulkley v. Naumkeag Steam Cotton Company, 24 Howard, 386; S.C. 1 Clifford, 322-324; 1 Sprague, 477.
[*] 1 Kent's Commentaries, 230.
