241 Mass. 100 | Mass. | 1922
These two actions, to recover for the deaths of John Kashinski and Leo Nawrocki, the plaintiff’s intestates, who were drowned on September 13,1919, were tried together. In each case the first count alleges that while the plaintiff’s intestate in the exercise of due care was in the basin of the Connecticut River below the dam of the defendant, the defendant wantonly and recklessly opened the gates to the dam and allowed the same to remain open and its water to rush down and caused the plaintiff’s intestate to be drowned; the second count alleges negligence of the defendant in suffering the waters above its dam to be carried down so as to cause and causing the death of the intestate; the third count is for conscious suffering.
The right to recover for death is under St. 1907, c. 375 (see now G. L. c. 229, § 5), and as the statute creates a right of action for death caused by negligence and upon no other ground, it was held that the plaintiff could not recover upon the first counts. Thereafter the plaintiff in each case was allowed to amend her declaration by substituting a new first count, and at the last trial the presiding judge directed a verdict for the defendant subject to the plaintiff’s exception; the court also refused to permit the second count to be read to the jury by the plaintiff or to permit her to make any claim or offer any evidence in support of these counts, to which refusal she duly excepted.
A careful examination of the first counts, as substituted and amended, plainly shows that like the originals they are based upon wanton and reckless conduct of the defendant; and, while not phrased in precisely the same language as they originally were drawn, yet in legal intendment and effect they do not differ. The substituted counts in substance allege that the deaths of the plaintiff’s intestates were caused by the defendant’s wanton and reckless acts. The sole remedy under the statute is based upon negligence. It has been repeatedly held by this court that ordinary and gross negligence differ in kind from wanton and reckless conduct. Prondecka v. Turners Falls Power & Electric Co. supra. Hafey v. Dwight Manuf. Co. 239 Mass. 155, and cases cited. It follows that the plaintiff’s exceptions to the direction of verdicts upon the substituted first counts must be overruled.
At the close of the evidence at the first trial, although the plaintiff excepted in each case to the direction of a verdict for the defendant upon the second count, which was for negligence, she filed no bill of exceptions; but as no judgment has been entered on
It follows that the exceptions of the plaintiff to the direction of verdicts on the amended first counts, and to the refusal of the trial judge to allow the plaintiff to read the second counts or to offer any evidence thereunder, cannot be sustained.
Exceptions overruled.