90 Wis. 215 | Wis. | 1895
1. There is, no doubt, a considerable degree of danger attending tbe service in which tbe plaintiff was engaged as one of tbe night repair force in tbe defendant’s yard, where trains were frequently arriving and departing, and cars, singly or in number, were continually being shunted or driven back or forth on tbe various tracks, or switched from one to another; and there can be no doubt but that tbe dangers which are unavoidable, in tbe exercise by tbe company of reasonable care and precaution in guarding its employees against such perils, are assumed by them in con
The evidence tends to show that, by the adoption of reasonable precautions within its power, the company could have given the plaintiff timely warning of the danger to which he was' exposed, and thus guarded him against the
We think, too, that there was sufficient evidence of the defendant’s positive negligence to require the submission of the case to the jury, independent of its alleged neglect of duty. It appears the foreman directed an employee of the-company, when the coach was kicked and cut off, to ride it. down along the track, and it is said that this employee negligently discharged the duty devolved on him, by riding on. the rear instead of the front of the car, and so that the injury may be said to have been the result of the negligence-of a fellow-servant of the plaintiff, for which there can be-no recovery. The act charged as negligent was, as we have-said, the act of Blake, the foreman in the yard at the time,, and acting, it would seem, as engineer; and if he was a fellow-servant of the plaintiff the defendant company would,, notwithstanding, be liable, under the provisions of the statute (S. & B. Ann. Stats, sec. 1816a), for the consequences of his negligence. Evidently the riding of cars in the nighttime by a brakeman or employee on the front end with a lantern, may serve to signal the approach of the car or cars- and regulate or stay their, course by means of the brake, and operates as a precaution calculated to prevent accident, and injury to the workmen in the yard. It may properly
We think it was a question of fact for the jury to determine from the evidence whether working at night by the-plaintiff in the defendant’s yard was attended with danger not fairly incident to his employment, and which could have been foreseen and guarded against by the defendant by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, and whether the plaintiff’s injury was caused by its neglect to adopt such reasonable precautions as were necessary to protect the-plaintiff from such danger.
2. The risk consequent upon the failure of the company to properly discharge its duty to the plaintiff, as its employee, is not one of the ordinary risks incident to his employment, and the plaintiff did not assume the consequences-of it by accepting and entering upon his work. Rut if the-negligence of the company, or element of danger, though not incident to his employment, was open and obvious, or such that the servant, in the exercise of ordinary care, ought to have observed it and comprehended the danger likely to-result, then he assumed the risk if he continued in the employment. There is no evidence tending to show that the plaintiff, by continuing in his employment, assumed the risk
3. The testimony of the plaintiff and his companion, Yan Alstine, is to the effect that they did not see the car nor hear anything indicating its approach, and tends to show that from where they were at the time they could not see up to the switch where it came upon the main track. The testimony on this subject is not entirely clear, but it wholly fails to show that anything was done to warn them or signal the approach of the coach. They started east towards the depot, their backs to the switch, and the plaintiff testifies that he was walking between the two tracks and not between the rails of the main track, and Van Alstine’s evidence tends to the same conclusion. The entire evidence on the' .subject is not so clear and decisive as to. justify the court in withdrawing the question whether the plaintiff’s negligence contributed to his injury from the jury. “ The question of contributory negligence is eminently proper for a jury to determine, and when the evidence does not clearly and indisputably show such negligence or want of care on the part of the plaintiff, so as to leave nothing to submit to the jury on the opposite theory or position, a nonsuit should not be granted.” Houfe v. Fulton, 29 Wis. 296; Bessex v. C. & N. W. R. Co. 46 Wis. 483; Valin v. M. & N. R. Co. 82 Wis. 1, 6, and cases cited.
Eor these reasons the nonsuit was improperly granted.
By the Court.— The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial.