Proko v. StateProko v. State
Appellant, Michael Proko, appeals his convictions of false imprisonment and solicitation to commit lewdness or prostitution. Two of appellant‘s arguments merit discussion. Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying a motion for judgment of acquittal on false imprisonment because the evidence did not establish a prima facie case of forcible restraint and because the state failed to allege or prove intent. The state contends that the conflicting evidence on the issue of forcible restraint created a factual question for the jury to resolve. They also contend that they are not required to allege or prove specific intent or purpose to establish the crime of false imprisonment. We find that the evidence of forcible restraint was sufficient to present a jury question on that issue and that the state was not required to allege or prove that the unlawful restraint was committed with specific intent.
Appellant was convicted of violating
The term “false imprisonment” means forcibly, by threat, or secretly confining, abducting, imprisoning, or restraining another person without lawful authority and against his will with any purpose other than those referred to in
s. 787.01 [the kidnapping statute].
The state filed an information that tracked the language of this statute. Appellant never moved to dismiss the information. At trial, the state presented evidence that appellant solicited sexual favors from the 15-year-old victim in return for money, and after she refused, appellant grabbed the victim‘s arm and pulled it toward the window of his truck. When the victim tried to “jerk” her arm away, he “jerked” it back. Finally, with what she described as a “big old jerk,” she “jerked” away from him. In response to the question, “What you described, was it kind of like a tug-of-war,” the victim responded, “Yes.” She then demonstrated this jerking motion for the jury. On cross-examination, appellant‘s defense attorney was able to minimize the tugging by getting the victim to
A motion for judgment of acquittal admits not only the facts in evidence, but every reasonable inference from the evidence favorable to the state. The court should not grant the motion unless, when viewed in the light most favorable to the state, the evidence does not establish a prima facie case of guilt. Lynch v. State, 293 So.2d 44 (Fla. 1974); Herman v. State, 472 So.2d 770 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985), rev. denied, 482 So.2d 348 (Fla. 1986). If there is sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude that appellant unlawfully and forcibly restrained the victim against her will, the motion must be denied.
Appellant argues that the restraint must be substantial to be unlawful but cites no authority in support of that proposition. Unlike some states, the Florida statute does not require that the force or the restraint be substantial. Compare
The essence of false imprisonment is the act of depriving the victim of personal liberty or freedom of movement for any length of time. In this case, the victim was briefly deprived of her ability to leave. For this reason, there was sufficient evidence to submit the case to the jury. See State v. Horton, 442 So.2d 408 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) (disputed facts on whether restraint or confinement occurred should have been presented to the jury); Jane v. State, 362 So.2d 1005 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978) (holding victim in a bear hug was sufficient evidence of false imprisonment).
On the issue of intent, there are conflicting interpretations of
HARRIS and PETERSON, JJ., concur.