Professional Building Concepts, Inc. v. City of Central Falls

974 F.2d 1 | 1st Cir. | 1992

USCA1 Opinion









August 26, 1992

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________


No. 92-1313

PROFESSIONAL BUILDING CONCEPTS, INC.,
Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

THE CITY OF CENTRAL FALLS, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
_____________________

No. 92-1314

PROFESSIONAL BUILDING CONCEPTS, INC.,
Plaintiff, Appellee,

v.

THE CITY OF CENTRAL FALLS, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees,
_____

PROMAC, INC.,
Plaintiff-Intervenor, Appellant.
____________________

ERRATA SHEET


Please make the following corrections in the opinion in the above
case released on August 14, 1992:

Page 9, line 13: change "damages" to "damaged".

Page 10, line 3: change "damage" to "damaged".

Page 11, line 19: insert space between "," and "1991".
August 14, 1992
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________


No. 92-1313

PROFESSIONAL BUILDING CONCEPTS, INC.,
Plaintiff, Appellant,














v.

THE CITY OF CENTRAL FALLS, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
_____________________



No. 92-1314

PROFESSIONAL BUILDING CONCEPTS, INC.,
Plaintiff, Appellee,

v.

THE CITY OF CENTRAL FALLS, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees,
_____

PROMAC, INC.,
Plaintiff-Intervenor, Appellant.
____________________

APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

[Hon. Francis J. Boyle, U.S. District Judge]
___________________

____________________

Before

Selya, Circuit Judge,
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Roney,* Senior Circuit Judge,
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and Pieras,** District Judge.
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David M. Campbell with whom Girard R. Visconti and Visconti &
__________________ ___________________ ___________
Petrocelli Ltd. were on brief for Professional Building Concepts, Inc.
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Charles S. Kirwan with whom Lovett, Schefrin, Gallogly, Harnett
__________________ ____________________________________
was on brief for Promac, Inc.
Michael F. Horan, with whom Everett C. Sammartino, Sr., Assistant
________________ __________________________
United States Attorney, was on brief for The City of Central Falls
Housing Authority and U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development.
Albert A. DiFiore with whom Beals & DiFiore was on brief for
___________________ ________________
Maron Construction Company, Inc.


____________________


____________________

_____________________

* Of the Eleventh Circuit, sitting by designation.
** Of the District of Puerto Rico, sitting by designation.



















































PER CURIAM: Two disappointed bidders sought an injunction

against the award by a public housing authority of a construction

contract on two housing projects. The lowest bid was rejected

because no certified check or other guarantee was submitted with

the bid. Contrary to the arguments of that bidder, the district

court held this was not arbitrary, capricious or in violation of

law. The third lowest bidder argues the district court erred in

approving the contract award on a bid that it contends was

unresponsive because it contained an additional line item of cost

not contemplated by the invitation to bid. We affirm.

At dispute is a contract funded by the United States

Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) for general

improvements to two housing projects in Central Falls, Rhode

Island. In February 1991, the City of Central Falls Housing

Authority (the Authority) issued an invitation for bids,

requiring the submission of firm, fixed-price, sealed bids prior

to 2:00 p.m. on March 19, 1991.

PBC's Bid
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The bid invitation required submission of a bid guarantee

with each bid. The bid guarantee was to be either

[a] certified check or bank draft, payable to the
Central Falls Housing Authority, U.S. Government Bonds,
or a satisfactory bid bond executed by the bidder and
acceptable sureties in an amount equal to five percent
of the bid . . .

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Professional Building Concepts, Inc. (PBC) submitted a non-

certified corporate check. At the March 19, 1991 bid opening,

the Authority and HUD officials recognized the deficiency in

PBC's guarantee. After a review of HUD's manual and

specifications, it was determined that the Authority could allow

PBC to submit a proper security within three days. The next day,

PBC substituted a certified check in the required amount for its

company check. Present at the bid opening were the three lowest

bidders, PBC, Maron Construction Company, Inc. (Maron), and

Promac, Inc. (Promac). The minutes of the meeting indicate that

no other variance in the bidding process was observed.

On March 27, the Authority determined that PBC was the low

bidder. On April 4, the three lowest bidders met separately with

the Authority. Following the conferences, Promac asserted that

PBC had improperly contacted its subcontractors and engaged in

"bid shopping." Promac's protest was subsequently rejected in an

informal hearing held by the Authority on April 19.

By letter dated April 4, the Authority's architect

recommended that the Authority award PBC the contract. On April

19, HUD informed the Authority by letter that it could award the

contract to PBC. On April 23, Promac learned that the Authority

had permitted PBC to substitute a certified check for its company

check after the bid opening. Promac filed a new bid protest,

contending that PBC's bid must be rejected as nonresponsive.



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The Authority met on April 23 and unanimously voted to award

the contract to PBC. Although the minutes of the meeting are not

completely clear, it appears that the Authority voted that notice

of award would not be signed until the Authority's legal counsel

further reviewed the situation and issues involved.

The Authority's legal counsel later advised the Authority

that, although the situation was borderline, PBC's failure to

file a qualified bid guarantee was a material defect requiring

rejection of its bid. The Authority rescinded its April 23 vote

and elected to award the contract to Maron.

PBC brought suit challenging the award of the contract to

Maron and seeking an injunction. The district court rejected

PBC's claim for injunctive relief, holding that the Authority's

decision to reject PBC's bid was correct and, therefore, PBC has

no basis for injunctive relief.

The question in PBC's appeal is whether the submission of a

corporate check, rather than a certified check as required by the

invitation of bids, constitutes a material noncompliance in the

bidding process.

The materiality of a bid guarantee requirement is governed

by HUD procurement regulations which must be read in conjunction

with the Federal Acquisition Regulations System. See 48 C.F.R.
___

1.101 (1991). The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) provides

that, in sealed bidding, noncompliance with a solicitation

requirement for a bid guarantee requires rejection of a bid,

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except in certain limited situations which are not applicable to

this case. See RADVA Corp. v. United States, 17 Cl.Ct. 812
___ ______________________________

(1989) (quoting 48 C.F.R. 28.101-4), aff'd, 914 F.2d 271 (Fed.
_____

Cir. 1990).

No controlling cases have been called to our attention, and

we have not located any interpreting FAR or HUD regulations with

respect to the significance of a bid guarantee. Decisions of the

Comptroller General, although not controlling, are instructive on

this issue. See Keco Industries, Inc. v. Laird, 318 F. Supp.
___ ________________________________

1361, 1363 (D.D.C. 1970). Beginning in 1959, the approach of the

Comptroller General has been that "where an invitation for bids

requires a bid to be supported by a bid guarantee and

noncompliance occurs, the bid shall be rejected." To the Heads
_____________

of Departments, Independent Establishments, Agencies, & Others
_________________________________________________________________

Concerned, 38 Comp. Gen. 532 (1959); see In re Castle Floor
_________ ___ ___________________

Covering, 70 Comp. Gen. 530 (1991); In re Hudgins & Co., Inc., 56
________ ________________________

Comp. Gen. 43 (1976). The Comptroller reasons that "the

submission of a binding bid guarantee is a material condition of

responsiveness with which a bid must comply at the time of bid

opening." In re Castle Floor Covering, 70 Comp. Gen. 530 (1991).
___________________________



The Authority could reasonably hold PBC's noncompliance was

not a minor informality which could be sufficiently corrected

after opening. PBC could have chosen not to comply with the bid

guarantee requirement after the bid opening by stopping payment

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on its corporate check. The Authority would have been left then

with no security whatsoever. Allowing PBC to submit a proper bid

guarantee after the bid opening gave it the unfair opportunity to

view the bids of the other competitors before making a firm

commitment to perform the contract. The purpose of a bid

guarantee is to provide assurances in the form of a firm

commitment, that the bidder will, if successful, perform the

contract. PBC's uncertified company check was not such a firm

commitment.

PBC argues that there was no defect in its bid guarantee

since HUD regulations, 24 C.F.R. 85.36(h)(1) (1991), specify

that in addition to a bid bond or a certified check a bid

guarantee may take the form of any other negotiable instrument.

PBC maintains that its company check satisfies the "other

negotiable instrument" requirement. The invitation to bid for

this contract, however, called for submission of, at least, a

certified check as a bid guarantee.

The district court correctly determined that PBC's failure

to comply with the bid guarantee requirement is not an

informality which was waived by the Authority. According to the

FAR, "[a] minor informality or irregularity is one that is merely

a matter of form and not of substance. It also pertains to some

immaterial defect in a bid or variation of a bid from the exact

requirements of the invitation that can be corrected or waived

without being prejudicial to other bidders." 48 C.F.R. 14.405

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(1991). Typically, defects in bid reply documents, such as

failure to sign the bid under some circumstances, failure to

execute certain certificates, and failure to return the required

number of copies, have been classified as minor informalities.

48 C.F.R. 14.405 (1991); see also Excavation Const., Inc. v.
___ ____ ____________________________

United States, 494 F.2d 1289, 1293 (Ct. Cl. 1974). The defect in
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this instance goes beyond a mere informality, so it is of no

consequence here that the Authority delayed several weeks before

rejecting PBC's bid.

PBC argues that the Authority had already accepted its bid

and awarded PBC the contract, thereby precluding the Authority

from later rejecting PBC's bid. PBC contends that the Authority

actually awarded it the contract, due to the vote taken, at the

Authority's April 23, 1991 meeting. HUD regulations specifically

state, however, that a firm, fixed-price contract award will be

made in writing to the lowest "responsive and responsible

bidder." HUD Regulations, 24 C.F.R. 85.36(d)(2)(ii)(D) (1991).

At that meeting the Authority indicated that, before executing

the contract, its legal counsel should review the issues. After

the review, PBC's bid was determined to be nonresponsive. The

contract was never awarded to PBC.

PBC has failed to demonstrate that the challenged

procurement action either had no rational basis or constituted a

clear and prejudicial violation of applicable statutes and

regulations. See Ulstein Maritime, Ltd. v. United States, 833
___ ________________________________________

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F.2d 1052, 1054 (1st Cir. 1987); Smith & Wesson v. United States,
_______________________________

782 F.2d 1074, 1078 (1st Cir. 1986).





Maron's Bid
___________

On May 8, 1991, the Authority voted to award the contract to

the second lowest bidder, Maron Construction Company, Inc.

Promac, the third lowest bidder, informed the Authority that it

would seek judicial review of its decision. Rather than address

the merits of Promac's challenge to the responsiveness of Maron's

bid, the Authority rejected Promac's challenge as being untimely

filed. The district court rejected Promac's challenge on the

merits.

Paragraph 7 of the Authority's form of bid requires unit

prices for "additional or deductive work" required from bidders

with respect to (1) the price per square foot for re-pointing

additional cracks, (2) the price per square foot for repair of

damaged areas of stucco finish, (3) the unit price for the

removal and replacement of individual brick, and (4) the price

per linear foot for the addition of new floor tile. Of the eight

bids received, only Maron's bid included a handwritten fifth line

item in addition to the four. Maron added an extra line item

providing for a unit price of $100 per square foot for concrete

repair work. Promac argues that Maron's modification of the bid

form rendered its bid unresponsive because use of the bid form

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was mandatory and because the modification was a material pricing

term. Promac contends that the additional item rendered Maron's

bid uncertain in price, since Maron did not include the cost of

the concrete repair work in its base bid nor did it provide a

basis for determining this cost.

The Authority and Maron, however, agree that this addition

relates to note 12 of the plans which states:

12. Inspect entire building for damaged stucco areas.
Identify all areas requiring concrete repair. Repair
will be accomplished under square foot unit prices, see
specifications.

Additionally, section 03732 of the specifications, entitled

"Concrete Repair," indicates how a contractor is to accomplish

the required concrete repair work.

The district court, considering item 5 of the bid package

instruction sheet which cautions bidders to pay particular

attention to specifications and the special instructions of note

12 of the plans, held that Maron's bid was responsive since it

complied with these instructions. The Authority's action in

awarding the bid to Maron had a rational basis and was not a

clear violation of applicable statutes and regulations. See
___

Ulstein, 833 F.2d at 1054.
_______

Although not reflected in the district court's decision,

Promac's protest of Maron's bid appears to have been untimely

filed. Apparently neither Promac nor any other party filed an

objection or protest as to Maron's written line item insertion


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until early July 1991, almost four months after the date of the

bid opening and after this court case had already commenced. The

Authority summarily dismissed the protest at that time on the

ground that it was not timely filed. Although the HUD Rules and

Regulations do not set forth any fixed period of time for the

filing of a protest, it would seem that protests should be filed

within a reasonable period of time.

In deciding to address the merits, the district court

pointed out that the Authority has not adopted any formal bid

protest procedures as required by the HUD regulations, nor has it

provided Promac with any guidelines relating to its protest

filing procedures.

The bids were opened March 19, 1991. All parties had the

right to inspect the bids from that day on. In addition, Promac

exercised its rights under the Freedom of Information Act on

April 23, 1991. On that same day, Promac submitted a protest,

based on information learned concerning the bidding process, that

PBC had submitted an uncertified corporate check. Knowledge of

Maron's allegedly unresponsive bid would seem to be attributed to

Promac no later than April 23. There being no set time limit for

protests, the appropriate period would seem to be a reasonable

period of time after the alleged irregularity was known or should

have been known.

Promac should have known of the alleged nonresponsive bid at

the time of the opening of the bids on March 19, 1991, and in no

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event later than April 23, 1991. Nevertheless, Promac did not

act until July 1991. Since bids were binding on bidders for 90

days, then 90 days from the opening of the bids could be deemed

an outside limit for a reasonable time to protest. Thus, the

Authority appears to have been acting properly when it held that

Promac failed to file a timely protest.

Affirmed.
Affirmed
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