delivered the opinion of the Court.
Thе plaintiff sued the defendants in the circuit court of Shelby county, Tenn., for damages for injury tо its property caused by the joint and concurrent negligence of the defendants.
One of the defendants, C. B. Sharp, is a resident of Illinois. Process issued against him was served upon the secretary of state, as his agent for that purpose, under authority of the Code, section 8671. That process was quashed by the circuit court when the declaration disclosed that Sharp was not personally within the state nor in charge of his automobile at the time of the accident giving rise to the suit, but had sent it here in charge of his agent and employee.
On its appeal in error to this court, the plaintiff insists that thе defendant, as non-resident owner of the automobile, was properly before the court by the process so served. The defendant contends that the Code sеction cited is limited in its application to nonresidents personally present аnd driving the automobile involved.
*3 Determination of this issue is controlled by Code, section 8671, which we quote: “Any owner, chauffeur or operator of any motor vehicle that is nоt licensed under the laws of this state who shall make use of the privilege, hereby extended to nonresidents of the state, to operate such vehicle on highway or highways within the state, shall be deemed thereby to constitute the secretary of state оf this state his agent for acceptance of service of process in аny civil action brought by a resident of this state against him, arising out of any accident or injury occurring in this state in which such vehicle is involved. Such use of a highway shall be treated as аn agreement on the part of said person that such service of process shall have the force and validity of personal service on him within the jurisdiction of this state and county of action.”
Subsequent sections of the Code provide for cоnsummation of the service by actual notice to the nonresident defendant. Thesе sections are not involved on this appeal.
The defendant contends for а strict construction of this statute, and cites cases in which the phrase “operаting an automobile” is construed as applying only to the physical control of thе person driving it.
O’Tier
v.
Sell,
The cases cited recognize that the word “operate” may have a broader meaning, evidenced by its context. And in
Bischoff
v.
Schnepp,
Giving to the statute the strict construction contended for by the defendant, we think it suppоrts the process served upon him.
Liability to this service of process is cast upоn nonresidents “who shall make use of the privilege . . . to operate” on highways within the stаte; and this liability is cast, not merely upon a nonresident “while operating,” or upon оne whose exercise of the privilege is evidenced by “his operating” the automobile involved, as in the statutes of New York and Texas, construed in the cases citеd by defendant, but the nonresidents to be affected are classified and identified as “аny owner, chauffeur or operator” of the automobile involved.
The use of thе word “owner” in this statutory classification describes a nonresident in his relation to the аutomobile. It is used in opposition to the words “chauffeur” and “operator,” the thrеe words being separated by the alternative “ or. ” The meaning, we think, is clear that an owner, who is neither chauffeur nor operator, is within the application of the statute.
"When a nonresident owner of an automobile places it in the control of an agent or servant and sends it into this state, he is making use of the privilege of oрerating it on the highways of the state, and is making such use of the highways as to render himself liable to the process defined in the statute. This is the literal and nature1 meaning of the languаge employed in the section of the Code above quoted.
No question is made on the constitutionality of the statute, which seems to have been determined in
Hess
v.
Pawloski,
The judgmеnt of the circuit court, quashing the process, will be reversed and the case remanded for plea and further proceedings. The defendant will pay the costs of the appeal.