Crеasy Conn was injured in the course of her employment. She sued the corporation which was a successor to the manufacturer whose equipment caused her injury. We find no indication that Kentucky law would permit her to prevail on her cause of action, and we thus affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment against her.
I
On July 18, 1983, Creasy Conn was injured in the course of her employment with Continental Air Filter, Inc., in Louisville, Kentucky, while attempting to operate an industrial machine known аs a Fales machine. On July 17, 1984, Conn filed a personal injury action against the Fales Division of Mathewson Corporation (Mathewson).
On August 9, the court granted Mathewsоn’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that the machine was made more than seven years prior to the accident by a different company, and, as a successor corporation to the machine’s manufacturer, Mathewson was not liable under Kentucky’s law of corporate successor liability. Conn now appeals from the court’s grant of summary judgment.
II
Kentucky law recognizes only four exceptions to the general rule that “a purchaser, in the аbsence of a contract obligation, cannot be held for the debts and liabilities of the selling corporation.”
American Railway Express Co. v. Commonwealth,
The present case fits none of these exceptions. Conn provides three alternative reasons why liability should attach to Mathewson. Conn’s first reason is that Mathewson purchased a substantial portion of the assets of the L.F. Fales Corporation, including all the machinery necessary to produce the entire production line of sewing and slitting machines, customer lists, gоod will, and the “Fales” name and logo. Conn argues that this constitutes a continuation of the business and product line of L.F. Fales without any significant change in outward appearances. She contends that this case is on all fours with
Cyr v. B. Offen & Co.,
[I]t is true that the successor, by definition, was not the legal entity which launched the product on the stream of commerce or made an implied reрresentation as to its safety. But in the most real sense it is profiting from ... exploiting all of the accumulated good will which the products have earned, both in its оutward representations of continuity and in its internal adherence to the same line of equipment.
However, the situation facing the Cyr court was significantly different from the case here. “New Hampshire’s law [gave no] specific guidance” to the problem. Id. at 1150-51. In contrast, Kentucky law does provide specific guidance, albeit venerable guidance, in American Railway Express Co.
Further, the Offen company had been а proprietorship, which was run by an executor after the proprietor died, until a group of employees contracted to purchase the entire business. The purchase contract required the purchasers to operate “in accordance with the same business practices аnd policies,” and old service obligations were assumed by the purchaser.
Cyr,
Conn’s second reason why liability should attach to Mathewson is that nearly all of the assets of the original manufacturer were transferred to Mathewson. In support of this argument, she cites
Ray v. Alad Corp.,
the physical plant, the manufacturing equipment, and thе inventories of raw material, work in process, ... finished goods, ... the know-how available through the records of manufacturing designs, the continued employment оf the factory personnel, and the consulting services of [the predecessor corporation’s] general manager.
Conn also cites to, but does not discuss,
Ramirez v. Amsted Industries, Inc.,
Conn’s third reason why liability should attach to Mathewson is that Kentucky’s statutory adoption of strict product liability indicates that it would necessarily adopt the “complete line of production” argument. As a court sitting in diversity and applying Kentucky law, we must determine the likely resolution of such a claim in Kentucky courts, in the absence of some indication from the Kentucky legislature or courts. Conn urges that the adoption of strict liability in Kentucky is a sign that Kentucky state courts would go further and adopt the “complete line of production” rule, as set forth in
Ray v. Alad Corp.,
19
We do not find this argument persuasive. The weakness of the argument is demonstrated by the fact that a number of states have statutorily adopted product liability, but have rejected product line liability.
See Gonzalez v. Rock Wool Engineering and Equipment Co.,
This is yet another unfortunate decision in a line of recent cases from our Court using an unnecessarily harsh аnd overly technical approach to the detriment of the person who has been wronged. This line of cases includes, among others, Reda Pump Co. v. Finck, [Ky.,]713 S.W.2d 818 (1986), Federal Kemper Ins. Co. v. Homback, Ky.,711 S.W.2d 844 (1986), Kirchner v. Riherd, Ky.,702 S.W.2d 33 (1985), and Prudential Life Ins. Co. v. Moody, Ky.,696 S.W.2d 503 (1985). This case, like these others named, harkens back to 19th Century “mechanical jurisprudence,” condemned by Roscoe Pound. See Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 Colum.L. Rev. 605 (1908).
Conn neither demonstrates that the present case is so similar to earlier product line liability cases that we should adopt the reasoning of those cases, nor offers any persuasive indication that Kentucky is likely to adopt “product line liability.” The judgment of the district court is therefore AFFIRMED.