285 P. 312 | Cal. | 1930
Petitioners seek to prohibit the Justice's Court of the City of Berkeley from proceeding with the trial of an action wherein the petitioners are charged with having maintained a common nuisance in the town of Emeryville, county of Alameda, in violation of the state liquor law. The specific issue in the proceeding is whether or not the Justice's Court of the City of Berkeley has jurisdiction over the offense of maintaining a place in the town of Emeryville where intoxicating liquor was unlawfully sold and kept, in violation of the provisions of the Wright Act (Stats. 1921, p. 79), the alleged violation occurring since the most recent amendment of section 1425 of the Penal Code. (Stats. 1929, p. 861.)
Prior to its amendment, section 1425, in part, and so far as is material here, read as follows: "The justices' courts have jurisdiction of the following public offenses committed withinthe respective counties in which such courts are established: . . ." (Italics added.) Then follows an enumeration of certain misdemeanor offenses. As amended, the section reads:
"1425. The justices' courts have jurisdiction as follows:
"1. In cities, cities and counties, towns and judicial townships, having a population of thirty thousand or more, said courts shall have jurisdiction in all criminal cases amounting to misdemeanor only, except those of which the juvenile court is given original jurisdiction.
"2. In those having a population of less than thirty thousand said courts shall have jurisdiction in all criminal cases amounting to misdemeanors only, punishable by fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, or imprisonment not exceeding six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment."
It is petitioners' contention that the omission from the section, as amended, of the words "committed within the respective counties," etc., was deliberate and intentional, and intended by the legislature to restrict the criminal jurisdiction *41 of justices' courts to such misdemeanors only as may be committed within the territorial limits of the respective cities, cities and counties and judicial townships in which such justices' courts are situated. The respondent contends that section 1425 has reference solely to the kind of offenses over which the justices' courts are given jurisdiction, as differentiated from territorial jurisdiction, and that notwithstanding the amendment of the section the jurisdiction of the justices' courts in criminal cases remains the same as it was before the amendment. So far as the present proceeding is concerned, we think that is so.
[1] The Constitution of this state has, from the beginning, provided that the legislature shall determine the number of justices of the peace, and fix by law their powers, duties and responsibilities. (Const. 1849, art. VI, sec. 14; Const. 1879, art. VI, sec. 11 [sec. 11a as adopted Nov. 6, 1928].) [2]
Justices of the peace are, therefore, neither city nor county officers, but are part of the constitutional judicial system of the state (People v. Cobb,
We are of the view that it may be said with assurance that the legislature has always regarded township Justices' Courts and city Justices' Courts in the same class in providing generally for their jurisdiction. In the early days, the three large cities of the state, including San Francisco, were excepted from the general jurisdictional features of Justices' Courts throughout the state. By the Consolidation Act of San Francisco, and the Act of March, 1866, special provision was made for Justices' Courts and justices in cities and counties of more than one hundred thousand population, with jurisdiction extending to the limits of the city and county. (See, also, Code Civ. Proc., secs. 85-98.)
[3] There is a well-recognized rule of statutory construction that the codes blend into each other, and are to be regarded as constituting but a single statute. (Pol. Code, sec. 4480;People v. Dobbins,
[4] With this historical background of the legislation relating to the subject to support the contention of the respondent justice of the peace and Justice's Court, we are of the view that, in the absence of some positive prohibitory legislation depriving the Justice's Court of the City of Berkeley of jurisdiction of the public offense with which petitioners are charged, we need not indulge in speculation as to whether the omission of certain words from section 1425 of the Penal Code,supra, was intentional or not. Senate Bill No. 64, amending section 112 of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to the civil causes over which the Justices' Courts shall have jurisdiction, and Senate Bill No. 734, amending section 1425 of the Penal Code relating to the public offenses within the jurisdictional cognizance of Justices' Courts, were each part of the legislative program for increasing the jurisdiction of Justices' Courts throughout the state, particularly in the more populous townships and cities, to more nearly approach the jurisdiction of the more recently created municipal courts. The language of each of the sections, as amended, is the same in providing that "The justices' courts shall have jurisdiction as follows": of certain civil causes (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 112); and "The justices' courts have jurisdiction as follows": of certain criminal causes (Pen. Code, sec. 1425). Section 103 of the Code of Civil Procedure, supra, was not touched by the legislature. By reason of the provisions of that section, the jurisdiction of a Justice's Court sitting in a city of the second and one-half class is made the same as, and coextensive with, that of a township Justice's Court. Berkeley is a city of the second and one-half class, and both it and the town of Emeryville are within the confines of Oakland township. It cannot be denied that the Justice's Court of Oakland township and the justice of the peace thereof — that township having a population in excess of thirty thousand — would have jurisdiction over the criminal offense of which these petitioners were accused.
It follows that the respondent court and justice thereof may legally proceed in the matter here complained of. The alternative writ of prohibition heretofore granted is, therefore, *45 discharged, and the application for a peremptory writ is denied.
Richards, J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Seawell, J., Langdon, J., and Preston, J., concurred.