This appeal is taken from a decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia in a compensation case brought under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Work-, ers’ Compensation Act (44 Stat. 1424, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 901-950 [made applicable to the District of Columbia, 45 Stat. 600, D.C.Code 1929, Tit. 19, c. 2, §§ 11, 12, 33 U.S.C.A. § 901 note]).
The claimant, John A. Proctor, was an employee of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, which was engaged in business in the District of Columbia. During the period bf his employment Proctor sustained an injury in an automobile accident, for which he claimed compensation upon the ground that the accident occurred in the course of and arose out of his employment. The claim was contested by the insurance carrier.
The deputy compensation commissioner found against the claimant upon the ground that the injury sustained by him did not arise out of and occur in the course of his employment.
The facts as found by the deputy commissioner were that the claimant on June 8, 1933, the date of the accident, was attending to his regular duties as an insurance agent employed by the company and was so engaged continuously from 8 o’clock a. m. until the time of his injury, which occurred approximately at 10:15 p. m.; that at about 5 p. m. claimant went to the company’s office to get forms and other papers and partly completed his weekly account; that subsequently he left the office to make a call, and about 6:30 p. m. he returned in order to meet Mr. Raboy, the assistant manager, by appointment, for the purpose of going with him to solicit insurance at an apartment at Seventeenth and Euclid streets; that an application for insurance was written at this place and the premium was collected for it; that Mr. Raboy then took claimant in his automobile as far as Illinois and Georgia avenues, where claimant boarded a northbound street car; that claimant then rode to the District line, where he usually took a bus for his home, but on this occasion, not desiring to use a bus to resume his journey homeward, he started to cross the street to take a taxicab, and while crossing the street he was struck by an automobile, as a result of which he suffered severe injuries, upon which his claim for compensation was founded.
It was held by the deputy commissioner that the claimant was not going on a specific errand in the interests of the employer *556 at the time of the injury; that he was going homeward on the same route which he would take after arriving at the street car line had he been going on a personal errand; that his day’s work was ended, and that the specific route assigned to him by his employer for work was in the District of Columbia, whereas the injury occurred in the state of Maryland; that claimant, although taking the records and forms home which he was required to fill out for his report and return before 8 o’clock the next morning, was doing so as a matter of his own convenience; that at the time of his injury claimant was not making reports or doing anything to further his employer’s interests; that claimant was furnished desk space in the office where reports could be made before thev stated time; that the evidence failed to support an inference that the claimant after leaving his last call, or parting with the assistant manager at Illinois and Georgia avenues, had any intention of performing further services for his employer; that the reports were to be completed by 8 o’clock of the next morning,' but claimant could use his own discretion when and where he filled them out. Upon these findings of fact the deputy commissioner rejected the claim.
The claimant thereupon filed a bill of complaint in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, seeking a reversal of the deputy commissioner’s decision. The court, however, denied the claimant’s prayer, and the ruling of the deputy commissioner was affirmed. From this decision the present appeal was taken.
The issue before us is whether the decision of the deputy commissioner “is without evidence, or ‘contrary to the indisputable character of the evidence.’ ” Crowell v. Benson,
The present record contains all of the testimony heard by the deputy commissioner, and in our opinion its indisputable character discloses that claimant’s injury occurred in the course of and arose out of his employment, and that the order of the deputy commissioner denying compensation should.be set aside.
It appears that at the time of the accident the claimant was employed by the company in the general work of an insurance agent at a fixed. salary and that his duties compelled him to spend most of the day in the field, but that he was required to report to-'the office at 8 o’clock every morning with a written report properly prepared of his proceedings of the preceding day, showing the account of collections, completion of the inspection reports on applications, including all such questions on the application as are not customarily completed in the presence of the applicant, also listing the names of all persons interviewed or solicited for insurance during the day, and showing the balance of his cash account, together with the amount due to the company thereon. After the submission and settlement of such a report at 8 o’clock each morning, and after receiving any special orders then delivered to him, it was the claimant’s duty to leave the office and spend the day in the performance of his general services for the company. On the day in question claimant in the course of his duties met Mr. Raboy at the office by appointment, he being the assistant manager of the company and claimant’s superior officer assigned to direct claimant in the discharge of his duties as an employee; that they went together to secure certain insurance, and when they were through with this call it was late in the evening and Mr. Raboy told the claimant to go home and complete the work necessary to be completed by him before 8 o’clock of the next morning, and get it ready by that time; and that Raboy, when parting with claimant, ordered that he should have the applications completed thoroughly by the next morning because of his desire that his men should be ready by 8 o’clock, and that they should come in with their cash balanced, cash deposit sheet prepared, and their canvassing she.et for that day prepared, and all their details ready, and he insisted that they must do their detail work at home and not in the office, as he wanted them to be the first out of the office in the morning; that on this particular evening Raboy gave claimant specific orders, that he should carry out these instructions to the letter and claimant said he would do so; that Raboy told claimant to have everything ready for the next morning as he (Raboy) was to go out with claimant then, as he had been assigned to claimant for the entire week.
The accident whereby claimant was injured occurred when he was on his way home after promising to obey these instructions and to do such work at home as was necessary to be done before 8 o’clock of the following morning; that the accident occurred about 10:15 p. m., when claima-nt was crossing Georgia avenue to a taxicab *557 stand for the purpose of taking a taxicab home.
This testimony, which is undisputed, shows that the claimant’s day’s work was not ended when he left Mr. Raboy upon the night in question, and that claimant when taking the records and forms home, which he was required to fill out at home for his report which was to be returned before 8 o’clock the next morning, was not doing so as a matter of his own convenience, but in fact he was acting under and by the command of his employer in the discharge of his duties as employee, and that while going home, intending to perform the work which he had been directed by his superior officer to perform at that place, he was engaged in the discharge of his duties as an employee of the company. The claimant’s rights, therefore, are not governed by the general rule relating to injuries sustained by employees while going to and coming from their work for the reason that the claimant’s employment continued while starting on his way home and would have continued at his home while engaged in the work had he not been prevented by his injury.
In Voehl v. Indemnity Ins. Co.,
The special orders given by the claimant’s superior officer that he should immediately return to his home and there continue his work for the company by performing services in their interest which were required prior to 8 o’clock the following morning, and the fact that the claimant, in obedience to these instructions, started for his home with the intention of there performing the services, which the order of his superior required him to perform there, sufficiently sustain the claim that this case comes within the special rules above referred to, and that the claimant, while starting for his home, was acting as employee.
In Haddock v. Edgewater Steel Co.,
In Inglish v. Industrial Commission,
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the lower court and remand the case, with instructions to sustain the bill of complaint filed by claimant in the case.
GRONER, Associate Justice (dissenting).
I think there is substantial evidence in the record which sustains the holding of the deputy commissioner that the injury did not arise out of or occur in the course of the employment.
STEPHENS, Associate Justice (dissenting) .
I am of the view that there is evidence in the record which may be said to support the findings of the deputy commissioner. It is made clear in Crowell v. Benson,
“Apart from cases involving constitutional rights to be appropriately enforced by proceedings in court, there can be no doubt that the Act contemplates that, as to questions of fact arising with respect to injuries to employees within the purview of the Act,
the findings of the deputy commissioner, supported by evidence and within the scope of his authority, shall be final.
To hold otherwise would be to defeat the obvious purpose of the legislation to furnish a prompt, continuous, expert and inexpensive method for dealing with a class of questions of fact which are peculiarly suited to examination and determination by an administrative agency „specially assigned to that task. The object is to secure within the prescribed limits of the employer’s liability an immediate investigation and a sound practical judgment, and
the efficacy of the plan depends upon the finality of the determinations of fact with respect to the circumstances, nature, extent and consequences of the employee’s injuries and the amount of compensation that should be awarded.”
(Italics supplied.) As stated in Voehl v. Indemnity Insurance Company, 288. U.S. 162, 169,
Thus the testimony was self-conflicting. The deputy commissioner heard the witnesses in person, and his judgment as to the accuracy and the meaning of their testimony is entitled to great respect. The deputy commissioner may have believed that portion of the testimony which indicated that it was within the discretion of the claimant as to when and where he did the work, viz., that night or in the morning, at home or at the office.
I do not assume to say that under no circumstances involving a choice by an employee to select the time and place of work would he he entitled to compensation. 1 If, in the instant case, the claimant had been injured while at home doing the work, he might be entitled to recover. But he was not thus injured; he was injured while going home; and he is thus, even if he had an option to select that night and home as the time and place to do the work, put back within the general rule above stated, that injuries sustained when going to or returning from work are not deemed to arise out of and in the course of employment. The testimony that the claimant had a discretion as to when and where to do the work, if believed by the deputy commissioner, negatives any special agreement by virtue of which the service might be said to commence as soon as the claimant started for home, within the purview of the ruling in Voehl v. Indemnity Insurance Company.
ft is further to be noted that, apart from what has been said above, the evidence in the record that by the original contract of employment the claimant’s working district was listed as Washington, D. C, and that a questionnaire signed by the claimant listed his district as Washington, D. C., may be said to support the finding of the deputy commissioner “ * * * that the injury occurred in the State of Maryland, outside of his place of employment.”
Notes
If, for example, a machinist were told by liis employer that he might do certain repair work any day in the week and at any machine shop he might select, and the machinist, selecting a particular day within the week and a particular shop, was injured while doing the repair v'ork at that shop, he might well be entitled to compensation.