In 1865 the appellant was indebted to John Proctor for money borrowed of him, and the debt was evidenced by a promissory note. After the note had matured, John Proctor demanded that the appellant should either pay it or else execute a now note, payable in gold coin. The appellant refused to execute a note payable in coin, on the ground that it was still rising in value, and it was uncertain what value it would finally reach. After considerable time spent in negotiation, and after consultation by both parties with attorneys, it was ultimately agreed between them that John Proctor should surrender the note then held by him, ' and that the appellant should execute a new note for “two
The trial court did not err in holding the appellant liable for the full amount of the nine promissory notes executed as the last of a series of renewals of the note due in January, 1865, and with which he had charged himself in the inventory and the reports filed by him.
When the first renewal was made, in 1865, there was a dispute as to the right of the payee of the note then due to exact payment in gold, and this dispute was adjusted by the execution of a new note. This note was several times renewed, and no question was made as to its validity and ef
The dispute in 1879 was not as to the consideration of the-note, hutías to the right of the payee to require the appellant to include in the renewal note the accrued interest. Not only was there no dispute as to the consideration of the note executed in 1865, but by the execution of other notes, and in the inventory and report filed in T 883, the appellant affirmed its validity and sufficiency in the most solemn manner. The dispute as to the accrued interest was, as we have seen, finally settled in 1879 by the payee accepting nine promissory notes,, thus essentially changing the character of the evidences of the indebtedness and the contract between him and his debtor. The first objection heard from the appellant was in November, 1885, more than twenty years after the first adjustment of the matters in dispute. We can perceive no ground upon which a settlement so long and so unequivocally confirmed and acted upon by the parties can be disturbed.
There was, it is to be remembered, a dispute in 1865 as to the right of John Proctor to exact payment of the note due in that year in gold coin, and the parties, after mature deliberation, settled this dispute. We can not say that the claim of John Proctor was wholly without foundation, for there was a legal question not entirely free from doubt involved in the controversy. But if we could so declare, still we could not reverse the judgment, for the settlement has been so long and so fully acquiesced in that the court can not annul the judgment of the parties and substitute its own.
The question here is not simply whether there was an inadequate money consideration, so that the case of Schnell v. Nell, 17 Ind. 29 (79 Am. Dec. 453), is without force. Here there was a dispute as to what the holder of a promissory note was entitled to demand as money, and to settle that dispute the debtor gave a new note and the creditor surrendered the old one. The claim of the creditor was that only coin was money, and that money was due him. To
The parties agreed upon the consideration, and through a long series of years confirmed, by repeated acts, their original judgment that it was valid and adequate. In ordinary cases the rule is, that where a party gets all he bargained for, the courts will not substitute their judgment for his. Wolford v. Powers, 85 Ind. 294 (44 Am. R. 16), and cases cited. With great force that rule applies here.
If the claim of John Proctor, urged in 1865, was utterly groundless, there would. be much more strength in appellant’s position; but even if groundless, we think it clear that, after so long a period of acquiescence, evidenced by such potent and unequivocal acts, the appellant is not in a situation to impeach the consideration agreed upon in the contract of 1865. What he accepted as valid in 1865 he ought not to denounce as insufficient in 1885. In view, however, of the conflicting decisions upon the question whether the holder of a promissory note executed in 1865 was then entitled to demand coin, it can not be said that the claim of John Proctor was wholly without foundation. Bronson v. Rodes, 7 Wall. 229; Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall. 603; Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457 ; Willard v. Tayloe, 8 Wall. 557.
The finding is silent as to when the first note was executed by the appellant; for all that appears is, that, in 1865, a note was_ executed in renewal of a note that had been given at a prior date, and in favor of the trial court it would be presumed, if necessary, that the first note was executed before the adoption of the legal tender act, and this would bring the case fully within the rule as it existed until Hepburn v. Griswold, supra, was overruled.'
The burden was on the appellant to relieve himself from the promise contained in his note, and it was, therefore, in
Judgment affirmed.
Mitchell, C. J., did hot take any part in the decision of this case.