120 Ind. 102 | Ind. | 1889
This was an action by the appellee to foreclose a mortgage against the appellants. The only questions in the case arise upon exception to the refusal of the court to grant a new trial, and upon exceptions to the conclusions of law upon the special finding of facts.
The following special finding of the facts in the cause was made by the court: '
“ The parties to this cause having requested that the facts proven in the trial thereof be found specially by the court, I find that the following facts were proven on the trial:
“1. On the 31st of January, 1880, the defendant, William Proctor, executed a series of notes, of which the note in suit was the second to come due. This note was for one thousand dollars, due in nine months, payable to Henderson Cole, or order, with six per cent, interest and attorney’s fees, at the St. Joseph Valley Bank, Elkhart, Indiana.
“ 3. On the 23d day of February, 1880, Henderson Cole sold and assigned the note in suit to the plaintiff. The assignment was not endorsed on the note at the time, but a written assignment was made on a separate paper in these words:
“ ‘ Elkhart, Feb’y 23, 18*80.
“ ‘ For value received, I sell, assign, and transfer to Erastus B. Cole three certain notes signed by 'William Proctor, dated January 1,1880. One for one thousand dollars,, due in nine months from date. The second for one thousand dollars, due in eighteen months from date. The third one for one thousand eighty-eight- -j8-^ dollars, due twenty-four months from date, all payable at the St. Joe. Valley Bank.
“‘Henderson Cole.’
“At the same time, Henderson Cole delivered to the plaintiff a written order to his attorney, in whose possession the
“ ‘ Elkhart, Feb’y 23, 1880.
“ ‘ Mr. Mitchell — Sir: Please let my son, E. B. Cole, have those Proctor notes, and oblige. H. Cole.’
“ On this order the plaintiff got the notes on the 26th day of February, and on that day Henderson Cole endorsed them to the plaintiff. That said endorsement was made after the plaintiff had notice of the injunction. The endorsement on the note in suit was in these words:
“ ‘ February 23, 1880.
“ ‘ Pay to E. B. Cole, or order. Henderson Cole.’
“ Prior to this time the plaintiff had advanced to Henderson Cole, in payments, from $600 to $800, which he had agreed to repay whenever he was able, and the note in suit was assigned to the plaintiff in payment of that indebtedness. There is now due on the note in suit $1,506.50, including an attorney’s fee of $100.
“4. On the 15th day of April, 1869, Henderson Cole executed a note for $2,000, payable with ten per cent, interest, and without relief from valuation laws, to one M. E. Cole. This note was afterwards endorsed to one A. S. Cook, and, afterwards, on the 25th day of February, 1880, it was endorsed by A. S. Wells and P. Wells to the defendant, William Proctor, without recourse. At the same time, when this latter endorsement was made, and as a part of the same transaction, an agreement in writing was entered into between the said A. S. Wells and P. Wells, and the said William Proctor, which agreement was in these words :
“ ‘ 5. This memorandum of agreement, made this 25th day of February, 1880, between William Proctor and Alma S. Wells [witnesseth that whereas Alma S. Wells], has endorsed a certain note, dated April 15th, 1869, for $2,000 to William Proctor, executed by Henderson Cole to M. E. Cole, and by said M. E. Cole endorsed to Alma Sophia Cook, since intermarried with P. Wells; now in consideration hereof, said William Proctor has paid one dollar
“*Wm. Proctor.
' ‘“A. S. Wells,
“ ‘ By P. Wells.’
“ 6. On the same day on which this assignment was made, the defendant, William Proctor, brought suit in the Elkhart Circuit Court against Henderson Cole on the note assigned to him by A. S. Wells, and, on the same day, February 25th, 1880, he obtained a restraining order restraining Henderson Cole from disposing of the note here in suit, and this order was duly served on him the same night, and such other steps were taken that, at the February term, 1880, the injunction was made perpetual, and Proctor also recovered judgment on the note against Henderson Cole for $4,198. The plaintiff in this case, Erastus B. Cole, was not a party to that suit, and William Proctor first learned that the note here in suit had been transferred by Henderson Cole to him on the second day after the temporary order restraining him was granted.
“ 7. There is now due on the judgment in favor of William Proctor against Henderson Cole the sum of $5,855.22.
“ 8. On the 13th day of April, 1880, William Proctor brought a suit against Erastus B. Cole, the plaintiff in this action, and in his complaint he alleged that on the 31st day of January, 1880, he executed to one Henderson Cole his three several promissory notes, the note here in suit being one of them, due respectively in nine, eighteen and twenty-four months, drawing interest at six per cent, per annum,
“ 9. To this action, the plaintiff in this case appeared and answered by an answer in two paragraphs, substantially as follows: in the first paragraph he admitted that said Proctor executed his several notes payable to Henderson Cole, as alleged, and that said Proctor, for the nominal consideration of one dollar, procured a note to be assigned to him by one A. S. Wells, under an agreement that said Proctor should make out of said note what he could and pay the said Wells one-half the proceeds, but the defendant Cole, the now plaintiff in this action, averred that said Proctor ought not to have said action, for that before the said note was transferred as above mentioned to said Proctor, this defendant, now the plaintiff, had, for a valuable consideration to the said Henderson Cole paid, become the equitable owner of said notes in said Plaintiff Proctor’s complaint mentioned; that, in consideration of money paid to said Henderson Cole, and for money laid out and expended for his use and benefit, amounting in the aggregate to between eight and nine hundred dollars, which the said Henderson Cole owed him, the said Henderson Cole sold, and by a written agreement undertook to transfer, to said Erastus B. Cole,said note first falling due — 'being the note now here in suit — mentioned in said Proctor’s complaint; and in consideration that said Hender
“ 10. In the second paragraph of his answer, the said Erastus B. Cole answered, substantially, as follows: That the plaintiff herein, William Proctor, ought not to have his action against him, for that said Proctor took, and now has, the legal title to said notes and the judgment thereon rendered against Henderson Cole, upon the following express trust and confidence, expressed in writing in an agreement between himself and A. S. Wells, that he should take the legal title to said note, and whatever sum he could realize therefrom above the cost of litigation, either by bringing suit thereon against said Cole, ór by making the same a set-off against the notes mentioned in plaintiff Proctor’s complaint, should be equally divided between the said Proctor and the said A.
“11. To these answers so filed, the said William Proctor filed a reply in general denial.
“ 12. Thereupon, on the issues so formed, the cause was submitted to this court for trial, and the court, having heard the evidence, found for the defendant therein, the plaintiff in this action, and adjudged that said William Proctor take nothing by his complaint; that Erastus B. Cole became and was the owner of said notes, including the one in suit on the 23d day of February, 1880, and was entitled to the possession of the three notes, including the one in suit, and that said Proctor did not obtain his alleged set-off until after the 23d day of February, 1880. Wilber L. Stonex,
“Special Judge.”
Upon the filing of this special finding of the facts, the appellants filed a motion for a new trial, alleging as a reason therefor that the court erred in permitting the plaintiff to read in evidence the contract of purchase between William Proctor and Alma S. Wells. The court overruled said motion, and the appellants excepted.
The court then stated its conclusions of law upon said facts as follows:
First. The plaintiff is entitled to recover from the defendant, William Proctor, the sum of $1,520.25, and to the foreclosure of his mortgage against all the defendants.
Second. That the defendant is not entitled to have his
Thereupon judgment was rendered against the appellant, William Proctor, and a decree of foreclosure against all the defendants in the action. ,
It is argued at great length, and with much earnestness, that the court erred in its conclusion that the appellants were not entitled to set off the judgment rendered against Henderson Cole against the claim of the plaintiff in this action.
It would seem to be a sufficient answer to that argument to say that that question was settled in the case of Proctor v. Cole, 104 Ind. 373.
In speaking of the claim upon which the judgment against Henderson Cole was rendered, and of the contract under which the appellant William Proctor acquired it, Elliott, J., said : “ The assignment of the note relied on as a set-off did not make the appellant the real party in interest, as to the entire proceeds of the note; the utmost that can be granted is, that he became the owner of one-half of the proceeds, and no more. If Mrs. Wells was entitled to one-half of the proceeds, she is to that extent a real party in interest. Conceding, but by no means deciding, that the appellant has a real interest in one-half of the avails of the note obtained from Mrs. Wells, he is still not in a position to defeat the appellee. This we affirm, because he can not use a note in which another has an interest as a set-off. Our decisions are uniformly to the effect that the claim asserted as a set-off must be held by the party who asserts it, and not by him and another jointly. Mutuality is essential to the validity of a set-off.” To the same effect is the case of Proctor v. Cole, 115 Ind. 15.
We see no reason to change the conclusion reached in each of these cases, and we think they settle, beyond cavil, that appellant William Proctor does not stand in a situation to use the claim acquired from Mrs. Wells as a set-off against the claim in suit.
It is further contended that the judgment in favor of the appellant, William Proctor, against Henderson Cole, is conclusive against the appellee in this case upon the question of the ownership of the Wells note. We do not think so. The suit in that case was commenced and judgment rendered after the appellee acquired an interest in the note in suit. The appellee was not a party to that suit. To hold that the judgment in that case is conclusive against the appellee would be to hold that he might be deprived of one of his defences without the opportunity of being heard. The doctrine is elementary, and is so well known that it needs no citation of authorities, that a person is not bound by a proceeding in court to which he is not a party and in which he had no opportunity of being heard.
We do not think the court erred in admitting in evidence the contract under which the appellant, William Proctor, claimed tó have purchased the Wells note. It was competent for the appellee to show on the trial of the cause that the appellant had no such interest in that note as would enable him to use it as a set-off in this case. The contract under which he claimed to be the owner of it tended to prove that fact.
We find no error in the record for which the judgment should be reversed.
Judgment affirmed.