Proctor v. CastellettiProctor v. Castelletti
Lead Opinion
OPINION
As a result of an automobile accident in which respondent Attilio Castelletti rear-ended appellant Penny Proctor, Proctor allegedly suffered extensive personal injuries. Proctor sued Castelletti. At trial, Castelletti sought to introduce evidence concerning payments Proctor reсeived from a collateral source: disability insurance. Proctor objected to the introduction of this evidence on the ground that it would prejudice the jury’s calculation of damages. Howеver, the trial court allowed Castelletti to present the collateral source evidenсe on the ground that it was probative of Proctor’s malingering. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Proctor for $7,000. This amount was less than the $150,000 Offer of Judgment that Castelletti presented to Proctor prior to triаl. As a result, the district court awarded Castelletti attorney fees and costs because she failеd to recover more than the Offer of Judgment.
Whether collateral source evidence is relevant to an issue at trial other than damages is one of first impression in Nevada.
We note that the United States Supreme Court adopted a per se rule against the introduction of collateral source evidence because it believed that the prejudicial impact of collateral source evidence inevitably outweighs the probative value of such evidence on thе issue of a plaintiff’s credibility and motives. Eichel v. New York Central Railroad Co.,
[T]he likelihoоd of misuse by the jury clearly outweighs the value of this evidence. Insofar as the evidence bears оn the issue of malingering, there will generally be other evidence having more probative value аnd involving less likelihood of prejudice than the receipt of a disability pension.
Id. at 317 (footnote omitted). Other jurisdictions have applied the same rationale in barring the admission of evidence of collateral source benefits for the purpose of showing that a plaintiff was malingering. See, e.g., Reinan v. Pacific Motor Trucking Company,
Evidence of malingering is arguably probative. However, as the Supreme Court reasoned in Eichel, evidence of payments from a collateral source is unavoidably too prejudicial to be admitted for such a flimsy purpose. There is an ever-present danger that the jury will misuse the evidence to diminish the damage award. In sum, collateral source evidence should not be admitted because of the potential that the jury will misuse the evidence in a manner that is prejudicial to the plaintiff. It should not matter that the stated purpose of introducing the evidence is, arguably, probative. The еxcessive prejudicial nature of the evidence mandates its exclusion. That is, no matter how probative the evidence of a collateral source may be, it will never overcome the substantially prejudicial danger of the evidence.
Castelletti urges that this rule simply does not comport with
We hold that it was error for the district court to admit evidence of Proctor’s receipt of disability insurance payments. We conclude that this error affected the substantial rights of Proctor, hеr right to a fair trial and her right to be fairly compensated for her injuries resulting from Castelletti’s negligence, given that the issue of damages was sharply contested and the damage award was small in light of what Proctor sought to recover and Castelletti was willing to pay. Accordingly, we reverse the $7,000 judgment in favоr of Proctor and the award of attorney fees and costs to Castelletti and remand the case for a new trial.
Notes
The collateral source rule provides “that if an injured party received some compensation for his injuries from a source wholly independent of the tortfeasor, such payment should not be deducted from the damages which the plaintiff would otherwise collect from the tortfeasor.” Hrnjak v. Graymar, Inc.,
Concurrence Opinion
concurring:
I concur in the result only.