Plaintiff appeals as of right from the trial court’s order granting defendant Premier Manufacturing Support Services, Inc.’s, motion for summary disposition. 1 We affirm the order granting defendant’s *320 motion but on a different ground than that utilized by the trial court.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff is a temporary employment agency. In May 1996, James Hogle was employed by plaintiff as a temporary employee. Plaintiff contracted out Hogle’s services to defendant, who assigned Hogle to work at a facility owned and operated by Venture and Vemco. While cleaning a pit hole used to collect hazardous industrial waste at the facility, Hogle was injured in an explosion. Plaintiff’s worker’s compensation insurance carrier paid Hogle’s medical expenses, lost wages, and cost of rehabilitation.
Thereafter, plaintiff filed this action against defendant, alleging breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and negligence. Specifically, count I of the complaint alleged that defendant breached the terms and conditions of the contract that precluded plaintiff’s employees from working in an area of hazardous materials.* 2 In count n, plaintiff alleged that defendant breached its oral promise not to require any of plaintiff’s employees to work in an area of hazardous materials, which plaintiff relied on to its detriment, establishing promissory estoppel. Last, plaintiff alleged in count ill that defendant was negligent in the inspection, supervision, and training of its employees, *321 and in providing a safe work site. In its complaint, plaintiff sought damages for payment of Hogle’s worker’s compensation claim, increases in its worker’s compensation insurance premiums, and lost profits due to the increase in worker’s compensation premiums.
Defendant moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (C)(10). Specifically, defendant argued that summary disposition was warranted on the basis of MCR 2.116(C)(8) because plaintiff’s claims were barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act (wdca), MCL 418.131, and by the economic loss doctrine and because damages for increases in worker’s compensation premiums are not recoverable from a third-party. In response to defendant’s motion, plaintiff argued that the exclusive remedy provision of the wdca did not bar its claims because its claims arose out of the breach of contract, which plaintiff argued was a separate and independent cause of action. The trial court granted defendant’s motion, finding that plaintiff’s claims were barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the wdca. 3 The trial court thereafter denied plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. This appeal followed.
H. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s decision regarding a motion for summary disposition.
Spiek v Dep’t of Transportation,
IE. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion for summary disposition because the exclusive remedy provision of the wdca does not bar its claims for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and negligence. We agree. However, we hold that the trial court’s grant of summary disposition in favor of defendant was proper on other grounds. We therefore affirm the trial court’s decision granting defendant’s motion for summary disposition because the right result was reached. See
Ireland v Edwards,
We hold that the trial court erred in concluding, as a matter of law, that plaintiff’s claims were barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the wdca. MCL 418.131, which contains the exclusive remedy provision, states in pertinent part:
*323 (1) The right to the recovery of benefits as provided in this act shall be the employee’s exclusive remedy against the employer for a personal injury or occupational disease.
(2) As used in this section and section 827, “employee” includes the person injured, his or her personal representatives, and any other person to whom a claim accrues by reason of the injury to, or death of, the employee ....
Even assuming that plaintiff was an “employee” for purposes of the wdca, plaintiff fails to satisfy the conditions of liability under the exclusive remedy provision, MCL 418.131(1). “Under the wdca, employers provide compensation to employees for injuries suffered in the course of employment . . . .”
Herbolsheimer v SMS Holding Co, Inc,
Nonetheless, plaintiffs claims for increased worker’s compensation premiums and any lost profits that arose therefrom are not recoverable from a third-party tortfeasor.
4
Although this argument was raised by defendant in its motion for summary disposition, the trial court granted defendant’s motion without addressing the issue. Nonetheless, we will review the issue because it is a question of law and the facts necessary for resolution of the issue have been presented. See
In re Worker’s Compensation Lien (Ramsey v Kohl),
The issue raised by defendant is whether an employer whose employee is injured by a third-party tortfeasor may sue the third-party tortfeasor for damages in the form of increased worker’s compensation premiums and lost profits. We hold that such damages are not recoverable under the statutory scheme established by the Legislature. A review of the subro-gation provision of the wdca clearly shows that the Legislature has not provided such a statutory remedy for an employer. The subrogation provision of the wdca, MCL 418.827, states in pertinent part:
(1) Where the injury for which compensation is payable under this act was caused under circumstances creating a legal liability in some person other than a natural person in the same employ or the employer to pay damages in respect thereof, the acceptance of compensation benefits or *325 the taking of proceedings to enforce compensation payments shall not act as an election of remedies but the injured employee or his or her dependents or personal representatives may also proceed to enforce the liability of the third party for damages in accordance with this section. If the injured employee or his or her dependents or personal representative does not commence the action within 1 year after the occurrence of the personal injury, then the employer or carrier, within the period of time for the commencement of actions prescribed by statute, may enforce the liability of such other person in the name of that person. . . . Any party in interest shall have a right to join in the action.
This section essentially provides that where an employee who has received worker’s compensation benefits recovers damages in a third-party tort action, the payor, whether the insurance carrier or the employer, of the worker’s compensation benefits may seek reimbursement for the amount of compensation paid to the injured employee from any recovery obtained by the employee against the third-party tortfeasor, regardless of the type of damages recovered.
5
In re Worker’s Compensation Lien, supra
at 558-559;
Beaudrie v Anchor Packing Co,
*326
This statutory provision contains the exclusive remedies that an employer may seek in an action against a third-party tortfeasor in which the employer seeks to recover the costs associated with the payment of worker’s compensation benefits. “Generally, where a statute creates a right or a duty not found in common law, the remedies provided in the statute are exclusive.”
General Aviation, Inc v Capital Region Airport Authority (On Remand),
In the present case, the right of an employer or insurance carrier to seek damages against a third-party tortfeasor for the payment of worker’s compensation benefits to an injured employee is, and always has been, a creature of statute.
Bay State Milling Co v Izak,
We also hold that because § 827 provides a detailed procedure that, if utilized by the employer or carrier, will result in full reimbursement of the benefits paid to the injured employee, no additional remedies can be inferred.
General Aviation, supra.
Indeed, if the employer or insurance carrier avails itself of the statutory procedure set forth in § 827 it should not suffer any increased worker’s compensation premiums, because the payor of the benefits will recoup the monies paid to the employee. Thus, because the Legislature has created a remedy for employers and carriers to recoup the worker’s compensation benefits paid to injured employees, and because we do not find this remedy to be “plainly inadequate,” the remedy provided in the subrogation provision of MCL 418.827 is exclusive. See
id.
Had the Legislature intended for employers to recover damages in the form of increased premiums and lost profits, it would have enumerated such a remedy within the wdca, and in particular MCL 418.827. Less appropriate common-law remedies cannot supplement those remedies placed into the statute by the Legislature.
Shriver, supra-, Pompey, supra.
Because the Legislature has failed to place such remedies in the statute, this Court cannot write such a provision into the law by judicial fiat.
6
Ray v Transamerica Ins Co,
*328
Plaintiff also argues on appeal that the parties’ written contract contained an indemnification agreement and that it is seeking indemnification for damages caused by defendant’s breach of contract. Plaintiff argues that under the terms and conditions of the contract, the parties agreed that plaintiff would be indemnified for defendant’s negligence. However, plaintiff failed to plead a cause of action involving “indemnification” in its complaint. MCR 2.111(B)(1). Just as importantly, plaintiff did not base its breach of contract claim on an indemnification agreement in the contract and thereby did not properly raise it in its pleading.
Id.) Iron Co v Sundberg, Carolson & Associates, Inc,
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we hold an employer does not have a cause of action against a third party to recover damages for increased worker’s compensation premiums and lost profits incurred as a result of an injury to its employee. As such, defendant’s motion for summary disposition in this case was properly granted.
Affirmed.
Notes
Defendants Venture Industries Corporation and Vemco, Inc., are non-parties to this appeal and, therefore, will be referred to as Venture and Vemco, respectively, in the remainder of this opinion. As such, the term *320 “defendant” refers only to defendant-appellant Premier Manufacturing Support Services, Inc.
Although count I makes this allegation, the contract between the parties contains no such promise. Instead, the parties simply agreed in paragraph five of the contract that defendant would comply with Occupational Safety and Health Act (osha) and Michigan Occupational Safety and Health Act (MIOSHA) standards in utilizing the services of plaintiff’s employees.
The trial court also granted defendant’s motion based on the economic loss doctrine, finding that plaintiff could not “recover on a tort theory when it [was] suing for economic loss.”
During oral argument before this Court, plaintiff asserted that it was not seeking any damages for benefits paid to Hogle by its insurer. Therefore, our review of this issue is limited to plaintiffs remaining claims for damages for increased worker’s compensation premiums and lost profits.
In fact, the statute provides the employer or insurance carrier the right to join in the employee’s action against the third-party tortfeasor and, if the employee has not initiated proceedings against the third-party tortfeasor, the payor of the employee’s worker’s compensation benefits may initiate proceedings to recover from the negligent party. Further, the statute grants the employer or insurance carrier priority over the injured employee in recovering any damages awarded, leaving the balance to be paid to the employee. MCL 418.827(1) and (5);
Pettaway v McConaghy,
Although the statutory remedial bar provides a complete defense to plaintiff’s claims, we note our agreement with decisions from our sister
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states that have been presented with this precise issue and have refused to grant damages in the form of increased worker’s compensation premiums and lost profits when a defendant injures a plaintiff’s employee, finding such damages too tenuous and remote to impose liability. See, e.g.,
RK Constructors, Inc v Fusco Corp,
However, even if plaintiff had properly raised this issue in its pleadings before the trial court, we would find that there is no indemnification agreement contained in the language of the instant contract. “If contract language is clear, its construction is a question of law for the court.”
G&A Inc v Nahra,