47 Conn. Supp. 476 | Conn. Super. Ct. | 2002
Between January 18, 2001, and January 28, 2001, the defendant maintained a regular and systematic course of almost daily communications with the plaintiff. The defendant admits to initiating the contact with the plaintiff, and admits that calls to the plaintiff were made from both his business and residence address. CT Page 7987
At some point after retaining the plaintiffs services, the defendant independently arranged to purchase tour or five (the defendant avers five, the plaintiff alleges four) Super Bowl tickets from a third party located in Florida. The plaintiff and the defendant reached an agreement pursuant to which the plaintiff would pick up those tickets, pay for them on behalf of the defendant with its own funds, and then deliver those tickets to the defendant prior to the game. In a slightly different rendition, the defendant avers that after informing the plaintiff that he wanted to upgrade the third party tickets, and obtain more tickets, the plaintiffs representative told the defendant that he would arrange to obtain the third party tickets and sell them only if he could get the premium tickets the defendant preferred.
On January 27, 2001,1 the defendant met with the plaintiffs representative at a hotel in Florida, received a total of eight tickets from the plaintiff, and signed a purchase agreement to pay the plaintiff $42,200. The plaintiff alleges that this sum is in return for its services relative to the picking up and financing of the four tickets from the third party, its own sale and delivery of four tickets to the defendant, and other related services such as locating and supplying a hotel room for three days, and supplying passes to a Super Bowl party. The defendant does not dispute that he accepted the above-mentioned goods and services from the plaintiff and despite due demands has not paid the agreed upon sum of $42,200.
The plaintiff asserts causes of action for breach of contract, intentional, wilful and malicious breach of contract, fraud, unfair trade practice act violations and unjust enrichment. The defendant moves to dismiss the complaint claiming that the court lacks personal jurisdiction over him because he is a resident of Maryland and has not had contacts with Connecticut that would subject him to personal jurisdiction.
Practice Book
"A ruling on a motion to dismiss is neither a ruling on the merits of the action . . . nor a test of whether the complaint states a cause of action . . . Motions to dismiss are granted solely on jurisdictional grounds." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) VillagerPond, Inc. v. Darien,
"When a defendant files a motion to dismiss challenging the court's [personal] jurisdiction, a two part inquiry is required. The trial court must first decide whether the applicable state long-arm statute authorizes the assertion of jurisdiction over the [defendant]. If the statutory requirements [are] met, its second obligation [is] then to decide whether the exercise of jurisdiction over the [defendant] would violate constitutional principles of due process." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Knipple v. Viking Communications, supra,
The plaintiff contends that the defendant meets the "transacted any business within the state" requirement pursuant to §
The plaintiff submits an affidavit in which Scott Klansky, the plaintiffs principal, states that he received the initial telephone call from the defendant in the plaintiffs Connecticut office and that the additional conversations he had with the defendant also took place while Klansky was in Connecticut. In his affidavit, Klansky also avers that while the defendant signed a written agreement and promissary note in Florida, the plaintiff prepared the written agreement in its Connecticut office and all of the other services the plaintiff performed for the defendant that related to obtaining the tickets were performed in Connecticut. In further support of its argument that the defendant's contacts fall within the "transacts any business" requirement, the plaintiff maintains and the defendant admits that he had indicated that he wanted the superbowl tickets for several important clients, and in fact now claims that he was forced into the written agreement because he had already made arrangements for several of his clients and associates to attend the game.
The cases the defendant relies on are not supportive of his position.2 Unlike the defendants in those cases, this defendant's purposeful conduct of securing the Connecticut based services of the plaintiff constitutes "transacting any business" within the meaning of §
Accordingly, the court in MS/C Communications, Inc. v. Hamilton, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. 266263 (August 8, 1990, Spear, J.) (
Similar to the facts alleged in MS/C Communications, Inc., in this case, the plaintiff avers that the defendant called its office in Connecticut, and although the parties differ on whether they entered into oral agreements, the defendant does not dispute that the daily telephone communications between the parties totaling at least forty to fifty calls, occurred over a twelve day period and arose out of the defendant's desire to obtain the plaintiffs services from its office in Connecticut. The defendant also does not dispute that the plaintiff provided services to the defendant for which he promised to pay. The court finds that it has personal jurisdiction over the defendant pursuant to §
In order to find jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, only one of the provisions of §
General Statutes §
"In Knipple v. Viking Communications, supra,
In the present case, the defendant admits engaging in telephone communications with the plaintiff for the purpose of obtaining superbowl tickets. The plaintiff alleges that in order to procure its services, the defendant made promises to pay for such services. The defendant signed a written contract which provides in relevant part: "This contract will serve as a promissary note between Pro Performance Corp. Services and Frank Goldman. I, Frank Goldman agree and accept full responsibility for the receipt of the above mentioned goods. I, Frank Goldman . . . hereby promise to pay Pro Performance Corp. Services a certified check by Wed. 01/31/01 for the full amount of $42,000." The plaintiff alleges that it relied upon the defendant's misrepresentations in good faith and as a direct result, has sustained damages. The defendant has not denied that he told the plaintiff that he would pay for its services. The defendant admits receiving the tickets and has not denied that he has not paid for them.
Consistent with the authorities that have found fraudulent communications by wire or mail tortious conduct for the purposes of §
The "second obligation [is] then to decide whether the exercise of jurisdiction over the [defendant] would violate constitutional principles of due process." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Knipple v. VikingCommunications, supra,
In the present case, the constitutional requirement is satisfied under specific jurisdiction. "A state court will have specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant whenever the defendant has purposefully directed [its] activities at residents of the forum . . . and the litigation [has] result[ed] from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to those activities." Knipple v. Viking Communications, supra,
The court finds that it has personal jurisdiction over the defendant under both General Statutes §§
So Ordered.
___________________ D'ANDREA, J.T.R.