3 Kan. App. 690 | Kan. Ct. App. | 1896
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Arvilla K. Taylor, as plaintiff, instituted this action in the district court of Phillips county to quiet her title, against an adverse claim made by the plaintiff in error, E. A. Prizer, to 160 acres of land in that county. Upon a trial by'the court, judgment was rendered in the plaintiff’s favor. The facts, as they appear from the evidence and the findings of the court, are as follows: March 16, 1891, N. Rosenberg
At the outset, the defendant contends that the plaintiff failed to show in herself any such title or interest as would enable her to maintain this action. This contention is based upon the fact that there were certain irregularities in the proceedings on which the sheriff’s deed was based that were of such a character as to invalidate the plaintiff’s title. It is argued that
At the time N. Rosenberg secured the transfer of the tax-sale certificate, he was the purchaser of the land upon which such certificate was issued, only lacking the sheriff’s deed, as evidence of his title, to be absolute owner thereof. Under such circumstances, he was not in a position to acquire a tax title, and the purchase by him of such certificate will, as against this plaintiff, be held to be a payment of the delinquent taxes, and a Redemption of the land from the tax sale. (Keith v. Keith, 26 Kan, 26 ; Jones v. Comm’rs of Miami Co., 30 id. 278 ; Miller v. Ziegler, 31 id. 417.) The assignee of a tax-sale certificate acquires no better title thereto than that possessed by his assignor; nor does the assignment confer upon the assignee any lien for delinquent taxes superior to that which the assignor could claim. Whatever imperfections and disabilities existed against, such certificate in the hands of the assignor are operative against any subsequent claimant. The statute by express words limits the effect of the transfer to the interest of the assignor. The language of the statute is, “any person’s interest therein may be transferred by written assignment, indorsed upon or attached to
Hence, even though we concede that'an assignment of the certificate could be effected by 'erasing the name of the original assignee and inserting the name of a third person, the legal rights of the parties to this action would remain the same. We are of the-opinion, however, that an assignment cannot be made in that manner. The assignment indorsed upon this certificate was the act of Logan. By alteration or mutilation, neither Rosenberg nor any other person, without Logan’s knowledge and .consent, could transform that into an assignment to a different person. The statute above cited fixes the method by which an assignment may be made. Unless evidenced in that manner, the assignee of such certificate is not entitled to demand or receive a tax deed thereon. (Clippinger v. Tuller, 10 Kan. 377; Horn v. Garry, 49 Wis. 464; Smith v. Todd, 55 id. 459 ; Bird v. Jones, 37 Ark. 195.) As the transfer of the tax-sale certificate to Rosenberg was in legal effect a redemption of the land from the tax sale, the tax deed issued thereon was invalid: (Leitzbach v. Jackman, 28 Kan. 524.)
Complaint is made of various rulings of the court upon the admission of evidence, but we do not deem them of sufficient importance to make special mention of them in this opinion. Among other things, it is ■objected that the court permitted it to be shown that the name “N. Rosenberg” appeared on the record kept by the county treasurer of lands sold for taxes as the name of the assignee of the certificate issued to Logan. This name was written in pencil by the county treasurer. Though he had no- distinct recollection of the transaction itself, as this was a record
The judgment will be affirmed.