*1 117 date for the creation of a unified court Such altera- system. tion or extension of the court is present system, clearly Inc., unconstitutional. Cort Industries Swirl, C., v. Corp. S. 213 S. E. al., 445. McLeod v. (2d) C., et Knight, S. 216 S. E. 190 (2d) (1975).

Act No. 246 of the 1973 Acts of the General Assembly is, accordingly, hereby declared unconstitutional and the further exercise of the duties of officethereunder is enjoined.

20059 PRIVETTE, Levine L. Respondent, v. SOUTH CAROLINA STATE COMMISSION, FORESTRY State Workmen’s Fund, Appellants.

(217 25) E. (2d) S. *2 Kale, McLeod, Gen.y B. R. Messrs. Daniel Richard Atty. Stuart, Jr., Gen., A Jr., Asst. Colum- ttys. Harwich bia, Appellants, for Pusser, Jr., Chesterfield, Respond- Rouse Esq.,

C. ent,

July 1975.

Moss, Chief Justice:

This case arose under the South Carolina Workmen’s Act, Compensation Section 72-1 et of the Code. There seq., is here involved an the State appeal by Commis- Forestry sion and the State Workmen’s Fund from the order of the circuit award of the judge S. C. affirming Industrial Commission in favor of Privette, Levine L. respondent herein.

The S. C. State Forestry Commission has under its con- 90,000 trol some acres of land known as Sand Hills State Forest, located in Chesterfield and counties. Its Darlington *3 operation involves the timber, of growing wildlife manage- ment, recreation and various other forestry of practices, all which is to pursuant Section 29-1 et of the seq., Code. One of the primary of purposes the Sand Hills State Forest is trees, to plant and this necessarily involves the of clearing land and site preparation. Some this work is done by Forestry Commission with its own but equipment, major site is done preparation by contract with third parties.

After advertisement, due the director of Sand Hills State Forest accepted low bid of one Burris who Taylor, to furnish a tractor and an at operator hour for per $22.00 a minimum of hours of work in fifty land clearance. There- after, Burris Taylor brother, subcontracted this work to his Keith Taylor, who had the to do the work. There equipment is some that the director of the Sand Hills testimony State Forest understood that Burris Keith Taylor and Taylor were and it is in the record that at one partners, undisputed time were but such was terminated in the they partners, of 1971. Keith testified his early that he owned part Taylor him or it either and that was operated own equipment it. else he never hired to anyone operate his son and that owned tractor certain It that Levine L. Privette appears In it was contract work. so doing and did equipment private site from one job for him to move his necessary equipment occasions, do this Keith would to another. on Taylor, Privette, him, mile for such service. per charging $1.00’ n Keith would him by op- when repay requested and this at per day, erating Taylor’s equipment $30.00 be Privette owed would what Taylor. credited upon is clear worked at the Sand that Privette testimony own on We his Hills State Forest occasions. quote two testimony thereabout: What was the first date worked

“Q. you at the Sand Hills Forest? State 21st,

“A. in the Somewhere 20 or neighborhood July remember, I don’t it was somewhere there. Was that before were

“Q. you injured? Yes,

“A. sir. Now, how did 20th to work the*e on the “Q. you happen and 21st?

“A. Keith called me and said he wanted to1the to up go doctor if I run the next and asked would down and day go his so he could off to doctor.” equipment get go 1971, It is Privette was July admitted that injured while to Taylor. Keith operating equipment belonging We from his quote again testimony following: did be his How

“Q. you happen operating equipment on the of the accident? date *4 he

“A. on of the 29th and said He called me the night and doctor, it had been raining had to back to the and go him and I over for he asked me if could down and take go I him his that and told I could.” work day, equipment a filed claim for workmen’s The respondent compensation statutory he benefits was a of the alleging employee Carolina, State of South because he was for Keith working a of Taylor, subcontractor the S. C. State Com- Forestry mission. He further asserted that at the time of his acci- ankle, dental to his he was in injury engaged land clearing and that this inwas the course and of his activity scope an and of employment 'the business of the S. integral part C. Forestry Commission. State

The denied appellants the that: liability grounds (1) The was an not of Keith be- respondent Taylor employee cause he was off a debt and received no actual working pay- ment from Taylor, thereby any eliminating employer-em- The an ployee relationship; if of (2) respondent, employee Taylor, was at most a casual and The re- employee; (3) was an spondent contractor. independent A was held before a Commissioner on hearing Single commissioner, October 16, 1973, 1972. This on March filed his decision that -the sustained an holding respondent injury by accident to his left ankle out of and the arising course of his with Keith who was a employment Taylor, subcontractor of Burris who was a subcontractor of fact, the Based appellants. this upon finding compensa- tion was awarded.

The an Full appellants Commis prosecuted appeal sion and by the correct appropriate. exceptions challenged Commissioner, ness of the of the findings Single asserting that there was no between employer-employee relationship1 further, and Keith that if such respondent Taylor; exist, a was was found to then the claimant relationship a casual of Keith findings Taylor. of the majority Commissioner were affirmed a Single by Thereafter, Full taken duly Commission. appeal Pleas for Chesterfield to the Court of Common appellant A. Spruill, and was heard the Honorable County, James who his order Jr., affirming issued Presiding Judge, to this Court decision of the commission. Timely appeal followed.

122 alia, contend, inter that the respondent

The appellants such, as is not entitled to any casual and was a employee Workmen’s Act. benefits under the Compensation in It is settled that Workmen’s Compensation well commission is the fact body cases the and finding in our review of the facts to a we are limited appeal any or not there is evi- competent of whether determination below. is where only the factual It findings dence to support reasonable inference that rise to but one the evidence gives to decide. for the court one of law becomes question 433, Co., 192 259 S. C. v. Davis Manufacturing McAfee E. 328. S. (2d)

We have reviewed the in case entire record this and find be that the reasonable conclusion can determined from the evidence is that the respondent not a casual and as such is entitled to bene- employee, Act. fits under the Workmen’s Compensation and Code exclude casual Sections 72-11 72-107 of the from under the Workmen’s Com- any employees coverage Act. pensation is a

In of whether one casual considering question have it must be mind that courts gen- employee, kept a defini- it attempt considered inadvisable to erally give be decided and each case must tion “casual employee”, its own facts. largely upon 77, Service, 263 S. Smith Tire & Auto C.

In v. Coastal 810, E. we said: S. (2d) is unpredict- is when it irregular, ‘casual’

“Employment Larson, able, 1A Workmen’s brief in nature.” and sporadic Law, 51.00, employ- 909. Casual Section p. Ed., 4th p. Law Rev. Dictionary, is defined in Black’s ment in- times or 275, irregular at uncertain as “(e)mployment ** * fixed time and for no chance, fortuitously, tervals * * * or trade, business, occupation not course of in usual

123 **(cid:127) ‡ occasional, short .-fo.r employérs time profession, *” * * , or incidental irregular, employments decisions a casual is excluded from Under our the work done is in the course of coverage although being his or v. Atlantic Jolly business employer’s occupation. 1, 42, Ben Greyhound 207 35 E. Corp., S. C. (2d) S. School, bow v. Edmunds E. S. C. 67 S. High (2d) *6 term, 680. The of the “casual” be more may clearly meaning understood to its which are by referring antonyms, “regu lar”, and “certain”. It has been “systematic”, “periodic”, held as that where cannot be characterized employment chance, or occurs or but periodically regular, permanent with the intention of both and on the understanding part continuous, is and that it shall not it employer be employee casual. 99 C. S. Workmen’s 287. p. § J. stated, his own As is heretofore owned respondent It was his and did contract work. equipment prac- private tice to do work submit bids for and if to jobs accepted, himself. for a brief

The by Taylor respondent’s employment em- time, of chance strictly of two was period days portions Had his doctor. in order to allow to visit ployment Taylor doctor, not been to a Taylor respondent required go would not been employ- have employed. respondent’s or ment was not Taylor certainly permanent periodically and understanding but occurred with the intention regular, on the of both was merely “filling that part respondent had had work in”. If further that if the appears respondent own, of his not have been able to substitute he would con- and facts revealed record by'this The evidence Taylor. is that the tem- vince us that the reasonable conclusion only of the fortuitous and employment unanticipated porary, was, best, at casual employment. respondent a casual employee conclude that respondent We entitled to benefits under the Workmen’s such is not and as in in not so Act. The lower court was error Compens'afion holding. reversed, this court is and of the lower

The judgment of the of favor thereto-for entry judgment case remanded appellants. and remanded.

Reversed JJ., Littlejohn Ness, concur. and dissent. JJ., Lewis and Bussey, : (dissenting) Bussey, Justice claimant was as fact that the The commission found a hence a statutory employee of Keith Taylor and entitled to of his injury at the time of the appellant had fact, in my opinion, Such finding compensation. bind- and is accordingly in the evidence abundant support the testimony It is true that portions this Court. upon ing in the light considered when of Keith particularly the conclu- would support most favorable to the appellant, but his a casual employee, was only sion the claimant moreover evidence and is not the relevant testimony free of such is not entirely ambiguity. *7 the support of the evidence

To show sufficiency Keith the claimant was finding one, to note only a casual it is sufficient merely and not himself. of the claimant testimony following for P-rivette, been working Mr. how had you “Q. long Mr. Taylor? him a at that year

“A. I had for at right been working time. work- a week did you average About how many days

“Q. for him the year? ing during hours or thirty I would about twenty-five “A. average I solid week week, a a lot of times was a working because I work for him. and then week wouldn’t maybe a jobs a rate of day? And he at the you “Q. paid $40.00 Yes, sir, I and then unless worked my equipment “A. me so much for it.” he would pay

125 of fact findings commissioner hearing and the full commission being clearly supported evidence, be, judgment should

Affirmed.

Lewis, J., concurs. HOFFMAN, Bobby Respondent, DIXON, Graylon v. Appellant

(217 (2d) 29) E.S. James M. Corish, Smith, Herring, Esq., Remler & Moore, Hilton Island, Head Appellant,

Messrs. & Floyd Hartsville, Craig, Respondent,