SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Olger Abel Salto-Seico, a native and citizen of Ecuador, seeks review of a March 4, 2015, decision of the BIA affirming a February 5, 2013, decision of the Immigration Judge denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT“), and an August 25, 2015, decision of the BIA denying his motion to reopen. In re Olger Abel Salto-Seico, No. A200 897 646 (B.I.A. Mar. 4, 2015), aff‘g No. A200 897 646 (Immig. Ct. Hartford Feb. 5, 2013); In re Olger Abel Salto-Seico, No. A200 897 646 (B.I.A. Aug. 25, 2015). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

We dismiss the petition for review as to the BIA‘s March 2015 decision ordering Salto-Seico removed to Ecuador and denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief. We lack jurisdiction to review that decision because the September 2015 petition for review is untimely to challenge a March 2015 decision. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) (“A petition for review must be filed not later than 30 days after the date of the final order of removal.“); Luna v. Holder, 637 F.3d 85, 92 (2d Cir. 2011). “[T]he filing of a motion to reopen does not toll the time for filing a petition for review of the BIA‘s final exclusion or deportation orders[.]” Kaur v. BIA, 413 F.3d 232, 233 (2d Cir. 2005).

Salto-Seico‘s brief raises no arguments with respect to the BIA‘s denial of reopening. “Issues not sufficiently argued in the briefs are considered waived and normally will not be addressed on appeal.” Norton v. Sam‘s Club, 145 F.3d 114, 117 (2d Cir. 1998). Accordingly, he has waived review of that determination and we deny the petition as to the August 2015 decision. Id.; see also Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 545 n.7 (2d Cir. 2005).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DISMISSED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).

Robert L. PRITSKER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Theodore A. MCKEE, Defendant-Appellee.

16-2860

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

June 28, 2017

663

PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, PIERRE N. LEVAL, RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., Circuit Judges.

FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Robert L. Pritsker, pro se, Weston, CT.

FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: Sandra Slack Glover, Assistant United States Attorney, for Deirdre M. Daly, United States Attorney for the District of Connecticut, New Haven, CT.

SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Robert L. Pritsker, pro se, sued Judge Theodore A. McKee of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), for violating Pritsker‘s Fifth Amendment right to due process. Pritsker alleged that Judge McKee, as then-chief judge of the Third Circuit, failed to order a motions panel to decide Pritsker‘s motion in an unrelated appeal. He appeals the district court‘s sua sponte dismissal of his complaint for lack of standing. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review de novo a district court‘s determination that a plaintiff lacks standing to sue. Rajamin v. Deutsche Bank Nat‘l Trust Co., 757 F.3d 79, 84-85 (2d Cir. 2014). To have standing, a plaintiff must show that (1) he has an injury in fact, (2) there is a causal connection between the injury and conduct of which the plaintiff complains, and (3) “it must be ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.‘” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (internal citations omitted). To establish causation for purposes of standing, the plaintiff must allege an injury “fairly traceable” to the defendant‘s conduct. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984).

Pritsker alleged that Judge McKee “blocked” a ruling on Pritsker‘s motion or failed to force the assigned motions panel to decide the motion. But Pritsker concedes that Judge McKee lacked the power to do either. Pritsker notes that his complaint also alleged that the motion was delayed because it was never assigned to a motions panel. Pritsker did not allege (let alone allege plausibly) that Judge McKee ordered the Clerk to withhold the motion from a merits panel or maintained policies as chief judge that led to the motion being unassigned. Pritsker‘s complaint and response to the district court‘s order to show cause suggest only that the motion may not have been assigned. This is not sufficient to establish that Pritsker‘s injury is fairly traceable to Judge McKee. Cf. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 169, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 137 L.Ed.2d 281 (1997) (holding that plaintiff‘s injury was fairly traceable to defendant agency because the agency‘s opinions, although technically advisory, held significant sway and caused a third party to cause the injury). Accordingly, Pritsker is unable to establish standing.

We have considered all of Pritsker‘s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.