82 Ala. 169 | Ala. | 1886
— There .does not appear to be any controversy as to the facts of this case. The witnesses are substantially agreed as to every material question. J. Pollock & Co. were attaching creditors of McCaskey & Eatcliff, who had been partners in merchandise. The amount'and bona fides of their claim are not disputed. It ante-dated the conveyance to Pritchett, after noticed. Pritchett interposed a claim to the property attached, and a trial at law ensued, called in our jurisprudence a “trial of the right of property.” There were verdict and judgment for the plaintiffs in attachment, and Pritchett, the claimant, takes this appeal.
McCaskey & Eatcliff, on January 7, 1886, executed a conveyance, in form a bill of sale, by which they conveyed to Pritchett all their stock of goods, wares and merchandise, of every kind and description, in the stores occupied by them in the town of Camden, and also their iron safe, together with all the notes, accounts, mortgages, claims, and demands of every kind due the said firm of McCaskey & Eatcliff, except such as had theretofore been transferred to
The alleged indebtedness of six thousand six hundred and twenty-five 56-100 dollarssto Pritchett consisted of the following loans of money, with interest computed, and for which notes had been given in the firm name :
Note, October 23, 1884..........................$ 500.00
“ March 18, 1885.......................... 2,000.00
“ December 31, 1885....................... 1,000.00
(These payable to D. S. Pritchett.)
The following notes made by the firm, payable to J. C. Pritchett, but transferred to D. S. Pritchett:
Note, January 17, 1885..........................$ 545.50
“ December 31, 1885........................ 500.00
14,545.50
Interest, about............................ 200.00
$4,745.50
An individual note of Ratcliff to D. S. Pritchett, on which McCaskey was in no way liable, was put in as part consideration........................... 1,510.00
Interest on this about $235.
There was, also, a note given by McCaskey in his individual name, payable to D. S. Pritchett, dated December 3, 1885........................... 400.00
$6,655.50
It will be observed that, taking the items furnished in the testimony, and computing interest on them, the sum of them was then about two hundred and ninety dollars in excess of the six thousand six hundred and twenty-five dollars stated in the bill of sale. The result is, that the recited consideration of the bill of sale, as claimed in virtue of past indebtedness, is about eighteen hundred and eighty dollars in excess of the sum of the debts contracted in the firm name.
No testimony is offered tending to show that the firm was liable for, or in any way had the use of the fifteen hundred
In past due indebtedness..................... $4,715.50
Cash at time of purchase....................... 3,600.00
Total........ $8,345.50
The value of things purchased was—
Stock of merchandise......................... 6,000.00
Solvent claims................................ 4,157.55
Collectible.................................. 432.98
Ten per cent, of bad claims, yet collectible........ 197.17
Total....................................10,787.70
Difference.................................... 2,442.20
We prefer, however, not to place our ruling on the insufficiency of the consideration.
Before, and at the time this sale was made, McCaskey <fc Ratcliff were insolvent, and Pritchett was informed of it. Each of them so testifies. The purchase by Pritchett was
We have shown above that, by the sale made to Pritchett, the two individual debts — one of Batcliff for $1,510, and the other of McCaskey for $400 — were procured to be paid out of the effects of the insolvent partnership of McCaskey & Batcliff. And this was done secretly, under a recital that they were the debts of the partnership. This was a pecuniary benefit to- Batcliff, to the extent of one-half of the debt, paid with the effects of another ; and it was a fraud on the creditors of the insolvent partnership, that by it a very material part of its assets wras misapplied to unauthorized uses. The same is true of the misappropriation to McCaskey’s debt. And this was done knowingly and intentionally by both seller and buyer. The law denounces such act as a benefit reserved to the grantor, and the grantee can not defend on the plea that he did not know it was against the law. All men are presumed to intend the natural consequences of their acts, and all men are presumed to know the law. The following authorities declare such transaction to be a fraud on creditors, and we consider them sound: Bump on Fraud. Con., 399, 254; Wilson v. Robertson, 21 N. Y. 587; Burtus v. Tisdale, 4 Barb. 571; Geortner v. Trustees, 2 Barb. 625; Knauth v. Bassett, 34 Barb. 31; Keith v. Fink, 47 Ill. 272. See, also, Warren. v. Taylor, 60 Ala. 218; 2 Kent’s Com. 65, and note; U. S. v. Hack, 8 Pet. 271; Anderson v. Martly, 2 Ves. Jr., 244; Moog v. Farley, 79 Ala. 246.
All the testimony bearing on the question we have been discussing comes from claimant, and it proves the facts recited above without conflict. The deed of January 7, 1886, from McCaskey & Batcliff, is fraudulent and void as to creditors not provided for. The Circuit Court would not have erred, if the affirmative charge to find for plaintiffs had been given without hypothesis. Such being the status
Lest this case might mislead, we will add that the first charge given at the instance of the plaintiffs does not state the principle correctly. — Hodges v. Coleman, 76 Ala. 103. Other rulings are subject to criticism, but we will not comment on them.
Affirmed.