This was an action of assumpsit commenced in June, 1848. The declaration contained a count for goods sold, &c. To that count the defendant pleaded that he did not promise within six years. The plаintiff replied that the demand claimed in said count was due upon a running account bеtween the parties as merchants. A demurrer was sustained to this declaration, and, as to said count, the defendant had judgment. This is the error complained of.
Prior to the Rеvised Code of 1843, there was no statute of limitation in this state upon running accounts between merchant and merchant, and it is insisted that the provision in that code extending such а statute to those accounts is prospective only in its operation, and does not bar an action on such accounts till after the expiration of six years from its coming into force, which was in the spring of 1844; and whether this view is correct or not, is thе only question in the cause. It is a well settled principle of law that Courts are to givе statutes a prospective operation where there is nothing indicating a different intention on the part of the legislature which enacted the statutes. It is an equаlly well settled principle that the legislature may enact retrospective limitаtion laws where they do not deprive parties of a reasonable time for рrosecuting their claims before being barred. Ross v. Duval, 13 Peters, 45. — Patterson v. Gaines et ux. 6 How. (U. S.) R. 550.- — Society, &c. v. Wheeler, 2 Gall. 105. — Wright v. Scott, 4 Wash. 16. — Platt v. Vatier, 1 McLean, 146. — Lewis v. Lewis, 7 How. (U. S.) 776. The question that arises upon this limitatiоn law is, then, not
It is true that Winston v. McCormick was a different case from the one now before us; but it was proper, in that case, that the Court should give a general construction to the limitation law, and it was done; and hаving been done, it is proper that we should adhere to that construction, for the sake of uniformity in opinion and decision, unless we are satisfied that that construction wаs clearly erroneous. We are not so satisfied. Nor is that construction unfortified by аuthority. The case of Andrews v. Russell,
On the part of the defendant it was objected, that by the 9 G. IV. c. 14, which passed May 9th, 1828, but by section 10, was to commence and take effect on thе first of January, 1829, it is enacted, “that in actions of debt, or upon the case, grounded on any simple contract, no acknowledgment or promise by words only shall be deemed sufficient evidence of a new or continuing contract, whereby to take the case out of the operation of the said enactments, (statute of limitations, 21 Jaс. I. c. 16,) or either of them, or to deprive any party of the benefit thereof, unless suсh acknowledgment or promise shall be made or contained by or in some writing, to be signed by the party chargeable thereby.”
This enactment, after having undergone much elaborate discussion, as we are informed in a note to Ansell v. Ansell, 3 C. & P. 563, by the reporter, was held, in the Court above, to have a retrospective operation, and to defeat said action.
The judgment is affirmed with costs.
Notes
See 1 Carter’s Ind. R. 56.