Pritchard v. MabreyPritchard v. Mabrey
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- Before:
- Quirico
This is an action in tort to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff when he fell upon a patch of ice on the sidewalk of a public way in front of the defendants’ premises. The plaintiff’s amended declaration contained two counts. Count 1 is grounded on the defendants’ alleged negligence in causing an unnatural accumulation of snow and ice to form on the sidewalk. Count 2 is grounded on the defendants’ alleged collecting of water upon their premises and the discharging of it upon the sidewalk where it froze and created a nuisance. The case was tried to a jury who returned a verdict for the defendants on count 1 and a verdict for the plaintiff in the amount of $7,000 on count 2. The sole exception before us is that taken by the defendants to the denial of their single motion that the court “direct verdicts in their favor on all counts of the plaintiff’s declaration.” The defendants did not move before the trial court to set aside the verdict on count 2. They now contend that since the jury found no liability on count 1 for negligence, no liability can be found on count 2 for nuisance.
The jury could find the following facts from the evidence. In the early morning of December 17, 1960, the plaintiff was walking up hill on Anderson Street on Beacon Hill in Boston with one Miss Mona Smith, now the plaintiff‘s wife, toward her apartment at 32 Anderson Street. At a point on the
The plaintiff seasonably notified the defendants of the time, place and cause of his injury as required by
The defendants’ building at 28 Anderson Street is five stories high. At the second through fifth floors it has a three-sided bay window structure overhanging the public sidewalk by about three and one-half to four feet. The bottom of the bay windows is about fourteen feet above the sidewalk. At the top of the building there is a wide cornice which overhangs the sidewalk by about three and one-half feet beyond the exterior wall; and it follows the contour of the bay windows. The main roof slopes away from the street to a drain at the interior of the building. The sidewalk on Anderson Street is of concrete and is about five feet wide in front of the building.
There is nothing in the bill of exceptions or in the briefs of the parties on the circumstances under which the bay windows were built over the public sidewalk. Neither is there any reference to ordinances, regulations or permits governing or otherwise relating to the private use of such
It has long been recognized by the law of this Commonwealth that the owner of land abutting a public way has the duty to refrain from using his land or maintaining conditions or structures thereon in a manner which will interfere with the safety and convenience of travelers on the public way. It is not necessary for the purposes of this case to discuss or to attempt to decide all that is included within that duty. It is sufficient for our present purpose that included therein is the duty of the owner (a) not to maintain on his land “a building so near the street and so constructed that, in the ordinary course of things, snow or ice . . . ps] liable to fall from the roof upon travellers on the adjoining highway” (Shepard v. Creamer, 160 Mass. 496, 498), and (b) not to maintain on his land or on or above any part of the public way any structure or other physical condition which will “collect water into a definite channel by a spout or otherwise and pour it upon a public way” (Field v. Gowdy, 199 Mass. 568, 570). If the violation of that duty by the owner is the proximate cause of injuries to a traveler on the public way, the owner is held liable for such injuries. It will be sufficient to cite a few of the many cases in which this rule has been applied to permit recovery by an injured traveler. Many cases have held that owners of buildings with bay windows, cornices or other parts of the buildings projecting over public sidewalks were hable to travelers who were injured in falls on ice formed from water flowing or dripping of water from the projecting structure to the sidewalk. Shipley v. Fifty Associates, 101 Mass. 251; S. C. 106 Mass. 194. Smethurst v. Barton Square Independent Congregational Church, 148 Mass. 261. Marston v. Phipps, 209 Mass. 552. Solomon v. Weissman, 265 Mass. 423. Bullard v. Mattoon, 297 Mass. 182. Tomasunas v. Khoury, 314 Mass. 754. Ferreira v. Gross, 323 Mass. 175. Laskowski v. Manning, 325 Mass. 393.
The words “public nuisance” have been used with increasing frequency in connection with unlawful excavations in, or unlawful occupations or obstructions of public ways, and in such cases there is language to the effect that “negligence on the part of the defendant need not be shown to support the action so far as it is based on nuisance.”
Jones
v. Hayden, 310 Mass. 90, 95. See
McKenna
v.
Andreassi,
292 Mass. 213, 216. In time, cases of this type were cited as precedents in decisions involving the collection and discharge of water from private property to sidewalks with resulting injuries to pedestrians. Finally, in
Lamereaux
v.
Seventeen years after the
Lamereaux
decision we were asked to apply its rule of liability for nuisance without proof of negligence to a case of injuries sustained on private property. We declined to do so. In commenting on the rule we cited the
Shipley, Leahan, Lamereaux, Bullard
and
Smethurst
cases and said: “The rule of liability in such cases is often described as resting on the creation of a public ‘nuisance.’ Despite language in our cases suggesting that such liability for creating a dangerous condition in a public way may arise apart from negligence, such statements may be too broad. . . . These cases we need not now review, beyond noting that the liability, even in such cases, may rest on negligence
Count 2 alleges that on December 17, 1960, water was so collected upon the defendants’ premises as to discharge upon the public sidewalk and there freeze, “creating a nuisance in the nature of an icy sidewalk, slippery and dangerous,” as the result of which the plaintiff was injured. We hold that a plaintiff is not entitled to recover on these allegations unless he proves by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the condition which he alleges to be a nuisance was caused by the wrongful conduct, either negligent or intentional, of the defendants. However, that does not require proof of any specific negligence. It is sufficient if the plain-1 tiff proves that the defendants maintained a building which! was so constructed that it caused snow, ice or water to be collected thereon and then discharged or caused or permitted it to fall, flow or drip to a public sidewalk, thereby creating j a dangerous area upon the street which caused injury to the/
At this juncture it is inappropriate for us to second guess the judge in considering the defendants’ motion for a directed verdict on count 1 for negligence. The motion was denied at the close of the evidence before the case was sent to the jury. At that time the evidence was sufficient to permit a finding for the plaintiff on count 2 as we have indicated. The record is devoid of information concerning the proceedings after the denial of the motion. In contrast to the situation in Saldi v. Brighton Stock Yard Co., supra, we do not have before us the judge’s instructions to the jury. Thus we have no way of ascertaining what the jury were told the plaintiff was required to prove to prevail on either of the two counts, nor whether there is any inconsistency in the two verdicts. And, unlike the Delano case, supra, which was heard by a judge without a jury, we do not have the benefit of any findings of facts and rulings of law such as were made by the judge in that case. In any event, the bill of exceptions shows no exception by the defendant to the recording of the verdicts, and no motion to set aside the verdict on count 2 as inconsistent with that on count 1. The proper time to make such objections or motions, or to take such exceptions was when the verdicts were returned and recorded. The question is not now open. Low Supply Co. v. Pappacostopou lous, 283 Mass. 633, 635. Belkus v. Murdoch, 315 Mass. 86, 88. Phillips v. Larson, 323 Mass. 87, 91. Appleby v. Wallins, 336 Mass. 35, 37.
Exceptions overruled.