123 Mo. App. 710 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1907
Plaintiff was a contractor and engaged in doing certain work in which he had others employed in his service. He obtained from defendant a policy of indemnity insurance in case he incurred liability to such employees by reason of an injury happening to them. One of his employees was injured and obtained judgment against him for near two thousand dol- - lars. The judgment was by default and plaintiff was successful in his effort to have it set aside. The case was afterwards dismissed, but plaintiff was put to an expense on account of it in the sum of $630, for which amount he obtained judgment in the trial court.
The policy contained a provision that if an employee was injured the insurance company, should be notified and that if thereafter suit was instituted by the employee, the summons when served upon the plaintiff would be forwarded by him to the company. The question to be decided is whether the latter provision was complied with and that involves, in some degree, the law of the agency.
It appears that Joseph. Rush was general agent of the Fidelity & Casualty Company at Kansas City and
It is clear that for the transaction of a general business in Kansas City Mastin was the defendant’s agent and that Rush was not, and that this plaintiff knew these facts. If Rush was defendant’s agent so as to bind it by receiving the summons from plaintiff, the agency must have arisen by some special circumstance or con
But there is no reason why one who has acted as broker may not have his ordinary relations to the company from which he procures the insurance enlarged. If there was a custom of business among insurance companies at Kansas City to treat the broker who solicits the insurance as in this case, as the agent of such company beyond the mere delivery of the policy, his act, within the limits of such custom, ought to bind the company. If therefore there was a custom in Kansas City (known to defendant) for the broker who solicited the
But the defendant argues that though the insurer permitted the broker to receive and transmit to it notices of accidents and suits thereon, it did not follow that his agency for that purpose was recognized. We think it does follow. Any other rule would be unjust and deceptive. Permitting such action to be taken is inviting it to be taken, gee in illustration of the foregoing the following authorities cited by plaintiff: Queen Ins. Co. v. Bank, 111 Fed. Rep. 697; Ins. Co. v. Hartwell, 123 Ind. 177; McGraw v. Ins. Co., 54 Mich. 145; Ins. Co. v. Wiard, 59 Neb. 452; May v. Ins. Co., 27 Fed. Rep. 260.
The result is that we consider the trial court’s view
of the law as correct and hence affirm the judgment.