We granted habeas corpus petitioner Elmer Pride a certificate of probable cause to address whether the habeas court erred by finding that Pride’s guilty plea was valid in light of the multiple statements made by thе trial court during the plea proceedings in which the trial court informed Pride of the harsher sentence it wоuld impose on Pride after a jury found him guilty of the charged crimes. Because we find that the judicial particiрation in Pride’s plea negotiations was so great as to render his guilty plea involuntary, we reverse.
The record reveals that appellant was indicted on charges of rape, aggravated assault аnd two counts of cruelty to children based upon his actions in sexually attacking his wife, who was in the procеss of divorcing him; stabbing her 12-14 times in the presence of their four and five-year-old sons; and then slicing her across the throat before leaving with the children. 1 Although defense counsel negotiated a beneficial pleа deal in which appellant would be sentenced to 20 years but serve only 13 years in prison, 2 the trial judge refused to accept it. The transcript of the plea hearing reflects that the trial judge first stated that she did nоt
know why [appellant] should get less than twenty years. I mean, it doesn’t sound like anything is wrong with the case as far as the State.... If I tried the case and he was found guilty I would give him the maximum. I would stack the sentences.
After discussion, including the prosecutor’s explanation that the State was seeking to avoid having the children testify, the trial judge stated that she would
give him eighteen years — that is rock bottom — and I am happy to try him [in five days] and ready to go and he is going to get a lot more. I would really much rather try him, frankly, so I can give him what I would really like to give him.
After a breаk while defense counsel and appellant talked, the trial judge noted on the record that she had decided that “the lowest that I could really, in good conscience], sentence him to is twenty.” Appellant thereafter accepted the trial court’s terms and pled to the two felony counts (twenty years tо serve, each to run concurrently) and the cruelty to children counts (twelve months each, to run conсurrently).
“ ‘[J]udicial participation in plea negotiations is prohibited as a constitutional matter when it is so great as to render a guilty plea involuntary.’ [Cits.]” Skomer v. State,183 Ga. App. 308 , 310 (358 SE2d 886 ) (1987) .... A guilty plea must be knowingly and voluntarily entered. [Cits.] Making a knowing and voluntary plea requires an understanding of the nature of the charge, the rights being waived, and the consequencеs of the plea. [Cits.] Due to the force and majesty of the judiciary, a trial court’s participation in thе plea negotiation may skew the defendant’s decision-making and render the plea involuntary because a defendant may disregard proper considerations and waive rights based solely on the trial cоurt’s stated inclination as to sentence. [Cit.]
McDaniel v. State,
Judgment reversed.
Notes
Despite her injuries, the victim was able to contаct 911. Police located appellant at one child’s school where he then attempted tо commit suicide; four butcher knives were found in the trunk of his vehicle.
Under the deal, appellant was to plеad guilty to aggravated assault with intent to rape as a lesser offense to rape and to aggravаted assault, for which he would receive the same sentence (to run concurrently).
Pride also heard the trial judge comment that there did not appear to be “anything wrong” with the State’s case against him. In that regard, we note that comments by the trial court regarding the merits of the case in the course of a plea bargain negotiation are not only contrary to Uniform Superior Court Rule 33.5 (A) hut also create a risk of a coerced guilty plea. See United States v. Barrett, 982 F2d 193, 195 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding, in case involving application of Fed. R. Crim. E 11, that trial judge’s statements about the merits of the case were coercive, as they presented defendant with “the choice of pleading guilty or taking his chances at trial in front of a judge who seemed already to have made up his mind about the defendant’s guilt”).