64 W. Va. 242 | W. Va. | 1908
At the Black Betsey Coal & Mining Company’s coal mining plant from the mouth of the bank to the dump or tipple, where the coal cars filled in the bank are dumped
The only question discussed orally or in brief of counsel of the coal company are on the motion for a
Some doubt might be raised whether Priddy received his injury from that hole in the platform or fell before his feet reached it. He had his left hand on the coal car and had the sprag bar in his right hand seeking to insert it into the wheel to arrest the car. He is indefinite in evidence. In one place he says he fell into the hole. In another, when asked if just one foot went into the hole, his answer was “ My best recollection is that both went through.” He did not go down through the trestle. Nobody says he did. Nobody says his legs were in the hole save himself. Persons were close, and none say he was taken from the hole. At another point of his evidence when asked, “How did you fall into that hole?” he answered, “My hand and arm went into the hole. I fell with this right arm across the rail.” Now, if his left hand and arm went into that hole and his right across the rail, it would seem that his feet stumbled before reaching the hole. On this basis counsel insists that he fell before he reached the hole. But as Priddy swore that his legs went into that hole, and his is the only evidence as to that, and the jury have so found, we cannot find with the defense as to this.
The great question in this case is, Did Priddy have notice or knowledge of the existence of this hole in the platform? The carpenters and numerous other witnesses say that the plank was taken up from seven to eight o’clock in the morning. There is absolutely no question about that fact under the evidence. Priddy and other hands at the opening of labor on the day of the accident were down under the dump on the track of the railroad gathering some coal that was wasted on the ground. After spending a half hour or so at this work they went up the steps at the dump onto the platform. All say this. Priddy and Harmon both say that they went up the steps onto the platform on -their way to the mouth of the coal bank to push coal cars to the dump. Everybody says that in so doing they would pass over this hole necessarily. But this is not by any means all. The accident occurred not earlier than eleven o’clock, Priddy says about dinner. Before it.
But this is by no means all. Worrel, the mine superintendent, says that he had given notice to the hands on the first day the carpenters had taken the plank out. “I had given them notice particularly, and had cautioned them several times. That morning that Mr. Priddy had the accident I told them for all of them to be careful and watch the hole. I told it to the whole tipple crew. They was all together.” He was asked, “Who were they?” His answer was: “Whittington and Hutton and Mr. Priddy and Mr. Iiarmon. And I cautioned them, I don’t know, I reckon a dozen times at least during this work before the accident.” Now, unless we brand this man as a perjurer only because he was an employee of the coal company we must say that Priddy was warned that very morning. There were only four of the crew. We must not think that there was a great body of men. There were only two dumpers and two pushers. Is it not probable that Worrel, the superintendent, would, not only from motives of humanity residing in almost every man’s breast, but also to save his company from loss, give the warning which he says he gave? But Worrel is not the only witness to prove warning. Farror, one of the two carpenters, a witness for the plaintiff, says: “ We notified them when we went to work there, that they would have to be careful about this hole, told them that we was going to take out some boards. I remember distinctly-of notifying them several times’about the hole.” He was asked, “ Who were they?” and answered “Mr. Hutton, Mr. Whittington, Mr.
Let us add to all that has been said above the fact that this unfortunate man told Wilby that he did not blame
sonably establish anything, that Priddy not only could and should have known of this hole in the platform, but in fact did know of it, and therefore we must apply the law in the cases cited by counsel, Seldomridge v. C. & O. Ry. Co., 46 W. Va. 568, holding that, “When an employee willfully encounters danger known to him, or patent and -open to be seen and known, he cannot recover damages from his employer for injury therefrom.” And also the case of Giebell v. The Collins Co., 54 W. Va. 519, holding that, “ Where the servant has equal knowledge with the master of the danger incident to the work, he takes the risk upon himself, if he goes on with it.” There is also cited a case of Choctaw G. R. Co. v. McDay, 191 U. S. 64, holding the same principle. See Knight v. Cooper, 36 W. Va. 232.
Though a master is bound to give his servant a safe
The coal company had rules printed and posted at the platform, telling its employees not to work when there was danger, and giving them leave to refuse to do so, and that it would not be a ground of discharge.
We reconize — -no one more than I — that verdicts of juries on mere evidence should be seldom overruled, especially where evidence is conflicting; but our law allows cases to be brought to this Court upon the overruling of a motion for a new trial, and the Code, chapter .131, section 9, requires us to consider such evidence when certified. Though evidence be conflictive, many cases sustain the duty of this Court to grant new trials in proper cases, though caution .-should be observed. 10 Encyclopedic W. Va. & Va. Digest 459, In Chapman v. Liverpool Salt Co., 57 W. Va. 395, we hold that: “ This Court will set aside the verdict of a jury, although the evidence is conflicting where, upon the whole evi-dence, it appears to be plainly wrong, and clearly against the weight of the testimony; and when, to permit such verdict to stand, would be a plain injustice to the defendant. ” That principle applies in this case very forcibly. This verdict disregards the great weight, preponderance and strength of the evidence, so that we can hardly say that there is any .appreciable conflict of evidence. The jury cannot be permitted to disregard the great weight and preponderance of evidence as was done in this case. The jury seems to have been governed by mere sympathy. I would rather give the verdict that explanation than to attribute it to bias against a corporation. This is somewhat supported by the fact that the verdict is large; the exact amount given is the maximum by our statute where death ensues from wrongful act. The circuit judge so regarded the verdict. We, too, have sympathy for the unfortunate plaintiff; but we •cannot let sympathy drown the evidence and justice of the «case.
For these reasons we must reverse the judgment, set aside the verdict and award a new trial.
Reversed.