The goings on in Shaw, Mississippi provide the fodder for this appeal. Murry Roark, a county law enforcement officer, arrested R.C. Price, Jr., a salvager of abandoned buildings, charging him with a license tag violation and arson of an abandoned building in Shaw. The tag violation, a sore spot because of Price’s alleged history of tag violations, was admitted by Price; the arson charge was denied by Price and dropped. Price then sued Roark in state court for false arrest and *367 malicious prosecution, claiming a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The casе was removed to federal court where the district judge denied Roark’s claim of qualified immunity from this suit. We reverse and hold that because the arrest itself was valid based on the license tag violation, the alleged Fourth Amendment false arrest claim resting only on the charge of arson fails. Because the malicious prosecution claim, which is based on the arson charge, depends on a Fourth Amendment violation, and because Price suffered no violation of his Fourth Amendment rights as a result of his arrest or otherwise, that claim also fails. Roark is therefore entitled to qualified immunity and to have the claims against him dismissed because Price has failed to show any evidence that would establish the violation of a constitutional right.
I
On August 13, 1998, a fire destroyed three dilapidated buildings slated for demolition in the Town of Shaw, in Bolivar County, Mississippi. The owner of the buildings, R.C. Price, had recently purchased the buildings from the Town of Shaw as part of an oral contract to demolish them and remove the debris. Price was in the salvaging business, and intended to remove the bricks and lumber from the buildings. Based on conversations with Shaw’s mayor and with the fire dеpartment, Price understood that he was permitted to burn the debris from the buildings after he demolished them, although he was not permitted to burn down the buildings.
A business located in the vicinity of the buildings alerted Murry Roark, an investigator for the Bolivar County Sheriffs office, that the buildings were on fire. After the local fire department extinguished the fire, Roark investigated the scene. He allegedly was informed that Price had a contract to demolish the buildings, that Shaw officials had not granted Price permission to burn debris, and that Price had been seen walking over to the area fire had begun аnd leaving shortly before the flames erupted.
After dumping materials from another demolition, Price arrived at the scene of the fire, in a truck without a vehicle tag. Price had previously received several tickets for maintaining or operating vehicles without vehicle tаgs. Roark arrested him for not having a vehicle tag. On the ride to the police station — a ride in which Price was not handcuffed and sat in the front seat of the squad car — Roark informed Price that he was going to charge him with arson, as well as not having vehicle tags.
At the police stаtion, Price was handcuffed and locked up by a jailor. Price called his attorney, who advised him to post a cash bond. Price’s bond was set at $1000 for the tag charge and $20,000 on the arson charge. After being informed of the price of the bond, Price rejected the servicеs of a bondsman at the jail. Price was in jail for approximately four hours, until his wife gathered the money to post $ 2125 in cash for the bond.
Price was charged with both arson and operating a vehicle without vehicle tags, but the arson charges were dismissed without prosecution a few days later. After missing his court date on the no tag charge, Price was found guilty of owning a vehicle without a license tag and found to be in contempt of court, for which he was again arrested. Price subsequently paid a fine for the license tag ticket.
A few days after his initial arrest by Bolivar County, on the same day Price’s bond on the arson charge was refunded by Bolivar County, Price was arrested by the Town of Shaw and charged with arson. *368 This arrest was carried out, pursuant to a warrant and affidavit, by Shaw’s Chief of Police, Don Brown. Price also filed a lawsuit against the Town оf Shaw and Chief Brown pertaining to the second arrest, but the law suit has since settled.
Price filed this suit seeking damages for false arrest for both arrests on arson charges and for malicious prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Roark in Mississippi state court. 1 Roark removed the action tо the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi, based on federal question jurisdiction. After discovery, Roark moved for summary judgment on all claims, including his contention that he was entitled to qualified immunity for all of .Price’s claims arising under federal law. The district court denied the motion, finding that “the plaintiff ha[d] presented a genuine issue of material fact including, but not limited to, the existence of factual disputes concerning [Roark’s] investigation of the incident giving rise to [Price’s] arrest and whether the defendant had probable cause for said arrest.” Roark appeals the district court’s denial of qualified immunity on Price’s federal claims. Price filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, which was denied by a panel of this court on November 8, 2000.
II
Ordinarily there is no appellate jurisdiction to review immediately the denial of a motion for summary judgment. There is an exception, however, when the motion is predicated on qualified immunity.
Mitchell v. Forsyth,
III
Roark argues that the district court erred by not granting him qualified immunity with regard to all of Price’s claims arising under federal law. 2 Specifi *369 cally, Roark asserts that he is entitled to qualified immunity on three § 1983 claims: the claim of false arrest arising out of Roark’s August 13, 1998 arrest of Price, the malicious prosecution claim relating to the arson charge, and the claim of false arrest arising out of the Town of Shaw’s subsequent arrest of Price on arson charges.
Claims of qualified immunity require a two step anаlysis. As a threshold matter, we must consider whether the facts alleged, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, show that the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right.
Saucier v. Katz,
533 U.S. —, at —,
A
Roark challenges the denial of qualified immunity on Price’s § 1983 first false arrest claim — that is, the August 13, 1998 arrest. Because we find that Roark did not violate Price’s constitutional right to be free from arrest without probable cause, Roark is entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.
Claims for false arrest focus on the validity of the arrest, not on the validity оf each individual charge made during the course of the arrest.
Wells v. Bonner,
At the time of the first arrest, Roark arrested Price for both arson and for driving a vehicle without license tags. Price was charged and found guilty of driving a vehicle without license tags. He did not appeal, nor does he now contest, this conviction. Although Price insists that driving a vehicle without license tags was a minor offense that only resulted in a small fine, and was unrelated to the arrest for arson, Roark was entitled to arrest Price for the misdemeanor. Mississippi law expressly authorizes “[a]ny sheriff, deputy sheriff or municipal law enforcement officer ... to arrest, without warrant, any person operаting, or causing to be operated, any motor vehicle contrary to the provisions of this article [requiring license tag and decal], within the limits of their respective jurisdiction.” Miss.Code. Ann. § 27-19-133. The statute allows up to thirty days imprisonment for a violation. Miss.Code Ann. § 27-19-131.
It does not help the plаintiffs argument that the Supreme Court recently found that warrantless arrests for misdemeanor violations committed in the presence of the officer do not violate the Fourth Amend
*370
ment.
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista,
532 U.S. —,
It is undisputed that Roаrk had probable cause to believe that Price was driving a vehicle without license tags. Price admitted that this was one articulated basis for his arrest. Because Roark had probable cause to arrest Price on the misdemeanor charge, Roark did not violate Price’s right to be free from arrest without probable cause during this first arrest. We therefore find that Roark is entitled to qualified immunity on the false arrest claim arising out of Price’s first arrest.
B
Roark also contends that he is entitled to qualified immunity on Price’s § 1983 claim for malicious prosecutiоn. We have recognized that malicious prosecution claims can fall under the umbrella of the Fourth Amendment and may be actionable under § 1983.
Piazza v. Mayne,
When Price was arrested, he was also charged with arson, (in addition to the tag violation) and was detained for approximatеly four hours. The arson charge was dropped a few days later. While we have recognized a § 1983 cause of action for malicious prosecution, “it is fundamental to our federal jurisprudence that state tort claims are not actionable under federal law; a plaintiff under section 1983 must show deprivation of a federal right.”
Nesmith v. Taylor,
C
Roark also asserts that he is entitled to qualified immunity from the false arrest claim arising out of Price’s arrest by Chief Brown on behalf of the Town of Shaw. In his complaint, Price alleged that Roark instructed the Chief of Police for the Town of Shaw to arrest him for arson, again subjecting him to false arrest. Roark contends that, in response to *371 Roark’s motion for summary judgment, Price offered no evidence to support the contention that Roark caused or otherwise had any involvement with Price’s arrest by the Town of Shaw. Price does not contest this assertion. Because Price has demonstrated no facts that, even if disputed, would tend to establish that Roark violated his constitutional rights with regard to this second arrest, Roark is entitled to qualified immunity on this claim as well.
IV
Because we hold that Roark is entitled to qualified immunity on Price’s § 1983 claims of false arrest and malicious prosecution, we REVERSE the district court and REMAND this case fоr proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
Notes
. Price's complaint alleged that Roark "illegally arrested and detained” and "wrongfully held and imprisoned” Price without just cause and without a valid arrest warrant. It further claimed that those actions constituted false imprisonment and abusе of power, and that the actions amounted to an illegal seizure and a violation of due process, in contravention of the United States Constitution. In response to Roark's motion for summary judgment, Price also raised a malicious prosecution claim. The only issue рroperly raised on appeal is the application of qualified immunity to the false arrest and malicious prosecution claims arising under the Fourth Amendment and § 1983.
. Although Roark asserts in his reply brief that this court has jurisdiction to determine whether the district court erred in not affording Rоark sovereign immunity under state law, Roark did not address state sovereign immunity in his opening brief. Consequently, we will not consider this issue on appeal.
See Taita Chemical Co. Ltd. v. Westlake Styrene Corp.,