34 Wis. 34 | Wis. | 1874
In this case the court below found as facts established by the evidence, that the deed mentioned in the pleadings was executed by Metcalf and wife to the plaintiff, and, after being duly witnessed and acknowledged, was delivered to him as the grantee therein; that the plaintiff retained the deed for sevéral -weeks, and then surrendered it to his grantor for the purpose of having a new conveyance of the property executed to his wife, the defendant Pamela Price. And the court furthermore found that no new conveyance was in fact made, otherwise than by erasing the name “ Harrison ” from the deed
Now if this finding of the county court were Warranted by the evidence, it would raise the interesting question as to how far the plaintiff might claim and assert title under that deed, after having voluntarily consented to its alteration or destruction, and what aid a court of equity would afford on his application to set aside a conveyance which he had thus directed to be made to his wife. From the view which we have taken of the case, it is not necessary to consider and decide this question. (But see Parker v. Kane, 4 Wis., 1, and Wilke v. Wilke, 28 id., 296; also Hilmert v. Christian, 29 id., 104) We are clearly of the opinion that the conclusion reached by the county court is against the decided weight of testimony, and can not be adopted. We shall not go into any discussion of the evidence, but will content ourselves with the remark, that while there is a direct conflict in the statements of the witnesses upon the subject, yet we have no doubt that Colby and Judge Small state the facts in regard to the execution and delivery of the deed substantially as they occurred. The former drew the deed, and the latter took the acknowledgment, and they therefore had the best means of information about the matter concerning which they were called upon to testify. And according to their history of the transaction, a deed was first drawn in which the plaintiff was named as the grantee, but, before its execution, the grantee’s name was changed from “Harrison Price ” to “ Pamela Price,” at the request or by the direction of the plaintiff; and after the deed was so changed, it was executed, acknowledged and delivered, and was subsequently taken by Judge Small and placed upon record at the plaintiff’s request, who paid for recording the same. And the statements of Judge Small as to the facts attending the record of the deed
It follows from these views that the judgment of the county court must be reversed, and the cause remanded with directions to dismiss the complaint.
By the Court. — It is so ordered.