{¶ 2} On February 12, 1999, appellant's vehicle was struck by a tortfeasor. Appellant was 32 weeks pregnant at the time and suffered physical injuries resulting in the loss of her unborn child, Zachary. Appellant was insured under an automobile insurance policy issued by Progressive Preferred Insurance Company ("Progressive"), and the tortfeasor was insured under an automobile insurance policy issued by West American Insurance Company ("West American"). Appellant hired appellees to represent her in a personal injury action relating to the accident. Appellant settled her claims against Progressive and West American.
{¶ 3} At the time of the accident, Gary Price was divorced from appellant's biological mother, Elizabeth, who is now deceased. Gary was appellant's stepfather, and appellant lived with him and his current wife, Paula Price, at the time of the accident. Gary and Paula were insured under a policy issued by Safeco Insurance. Paula was employed at Grady Memorial Hospital ("GMH"). GMH was insured by American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Company ("AMMIC"). At the time of the accident, appellant was also a member of St. Paul's Lutheran Church ("St. Paul's"), which was insured under a Cincinnati Insurance Company ("CIC") policy. Appellant was also a member of the Correctional Education Association.
{¶ 4} On July 24, 2001, appellant filed a complaint for legal malpractice against appellees. Within her complaint, appellant delineated three separate counts under the general heading "complaint for legal malpractice." The first count alleged appellees committed malpractice by failing to assert appellant's potential claims against various uninsured/underinsured ("UM/UIM") insurance providers, including the insurance providers for Paula and Gary, GMH, St. Paul's, and the Correctional Education Association. The second count alleged appellees committed malpractice by failing to make a claim for medical payments for Zachary under the Progressive policy. The third count alleged appellees committed malpractice by charging an excessive fee and failing to account properly for settlement funds.
{¶ 5} On April 19, 2002, appellees filed a motion for summary judgment. While the motion was pending, on July 25, 2002, AMMIC brought a declaratory judgment action against appellant in Union County. In that action, the trial court found that appellant was not a relative of Paula and, as such, would not be entitled to the coverage afforded by AMMIC. The decision was affirmed on appeal.
{¶ 6} On June 23, 2003, the trial court in the present case granted summary judgment to appellees, finding that, even if Nancy Jillisky never considered potential UM/UIM claims against other insurance carriers, there was no proximate cause of any damages because there were no UM/UIM benefits available to appellant from any insurance carrier. Appellant appeals the trial court's judgment, asserting the following assignment of error:
The trial court erred to the prejudice of Plaintiff-Appellant in granting Defendants-Appellees' motion for summary judgment.
{¶ 7} Appellant argues in her assignment of error that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment. Although not raised by the parties, we must first address whether the trial court's judgment is a final appealable order. See Kouns v.Pemberton (1992),
{¶ 8} Ohio law provides that appellate courts have jurisdiction to review only the final orders or judgments of inferior courts in their district. See, generally, Section
{¶ 9} As it applies to the present case, R.C.
{¶ 10} Civ.R. 54(B) provides:
Judgment upon multiple claims or involving multiple parties
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and whether arising out of the same or separate transactions, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may enter final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay. In the absence of a determination that there is no just reason for delay, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties, shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.
{¶ 11} In analyzing whether the judgment in the present case comports with R.C.
{¶ 12} If we were to construe the three counts as independent claims for legal malpractice that require proof of different facts, involve separate legal issues, and allow for differing recoveries, the trial court's order granting summary judgment as to the first independent claim would necessarily "prevent a judgment" on that claim, and the order would be final as to that claim, pursuant to R.C.
{¶ 13} However, even if the counts were independent and separate claims, and the order granting summary judgment on the first count was final, pursuant to R.C.
{¶ 14} If we were to construe the three counts in the complaint as merely separate theories of recovery within a single claim for legal malpractice, the trial court's order disposing of only the first count (or theory) would not "prevent a judgment" as to the entire single claim, and the order would not be final under R.C.
{¶ 15} Consequently, no matter which way this court interprets the counts in the complaint, the trial court's order does not comply with R.C.
{¶ 16} Accordingly, appellant's appeal is dismissed for lack of a final, appealable order.
Appeal dismissed.
Bryant and Watson, JJ., concur.