39 Vt. 292 | Vt. | 1866
The opinion of the court was delivered by
It appears from the pleadings in this case, in connection with the record of the judgment on svhich the plaintiff declares, set out on oyer in the defendant’s pleas, which are demurred to, that the judgment was recovered in the superior court in Massachusetts, without any process served upon the defendant in Massachusetts, or any notice given him in that state ; that he was never a citizen or resident of that state, but at the time of the commencement of the suit in which the judgment was rendered, and during the whole pro-
The question is whether a judgment thus rendered is personally binding on the judgment debtor when sued in a state or country other than that in which it was rendered, so as to be enforced by action. Assuming that the judgment is regular and in conformity with the laws of Massachusetts, and that by the laws of that state it would be enforced personally against the defendant by an action founded upon it in that state, the question still remains whether it is valid when sought to be thus enforced here.
It is competent for every country, in pursuance of its" own laws, to seize the property, real and personal, of an absent debtor, whether citizen or foreigner, or debts due from persons residing within its jurisdiction to such absent debtor, and through the medium of a
There are some authorities that make a distinction between a judgment against a,Citizen of the country where it is rendered, and who is temporarily abs'(|nt;'pr has left the country with debts unpaid, and a .judgment against ohe who has never resided in the country ; holding the former valid.- In Douglas v. Forrest, 4 Bing. 686, an
Upon general principles of the common law and of international jurisprudence, or inter-state law, the court rendering the judgment in question had no jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, and the judgment can not be enforced by action out of the state whore it was rendered, whatever force it may have in that state. One state or nation has no right to thus give such extra territorial effect to its laws and judicial proceedings, and require another state to enforce them by action.
But the first section of the fourth article of the constitution of the United States provides that: “ Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records and judicial proceedings of every other state ; and the congress may by general laws prescriba the manner in which such acts, records and judicial proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof.” The act of congress of May 26th, 1790, provides for the mode of authenticating the acts, records and judicial proceedings of the states, and then declares that, “the said records and judicial proceedings, authenticated as aforesaid, shall have such faith and credit given to them in every court within the United States, as they have by law or usage in the courts of the state from whence the said records are or shall be taken.” It is insisted on the part of the plaintiff that by force of these provisions, the judgment in question is personally binding and conclusive on the defendant. In some of the early decisions on this subject, it seems to have been the opinion of some of the judges of state courts, that these provisions have reference only to the proof of the existence of such judgment as the record indicates ; that is, that the reeord dply authenticated according to the act of congress is only made conclusive of the fact that such judgment was rendered, leaving the judgment in other respects as a foreign judgment. This construction is strongly intimated in Bartlett v. Knight, 1 Mass. 400, by some members of that court; but this construction never prevailed to much extent. The judgment in that case was held not personally binding, mainly
The decisions of the supreme court of the United States do not conflict with these adjudications of the state courts. In Mills v.
This conclusion is arrived at upon the supposition that the judgment declared on was rendered agreeably to the laws of Massachusetts, and that by those laws the judgment would be binding on the person of the defendant in Massachusetts, as counsel have argued the case mainly upon that hypothesis. But regularly this should have been replied. No such judgment could be recovered at common law, and therefore the regularity and binding effect of the judgment in Massachusetts can not be presumed. But this is immaterial, as we hold that no action can lie upon the judgment here, assuming that the law of Massachusetts in terms makes it binding on the defendant personally in Massachusetts, • Even if jurisdiction of the defendant’s attached property, situate in Massachusetts, would draw after it jurisdiction of the person of. the defendant, it would present a question whether the allegation in some of the pleas, that the defendant had no interest in the property and that that was known to the plaintiff when the suit was commenced, would not defeat the jurisdiction and avoid the judgment. .But the decision of the other question renders it unnecessary to decide this.
Judgment reversed and new trial granted.