In an action for a permanent injunction barring the defendants from soliciting the plaintiffs’ clients, the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Goldstein, J.), dated March 1, 1990, which granted the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, inter alia, barring the defendants from canvassing, soliciting, accepting business from, or performing services for any of the plaintiffs’ customers.
Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and the motion for a preliminary injunction is denied.
The defendant-appellant Robert John Miller is an independent contractor formerly associated with the plaintiff-respondent Price Paper and Twine Company (hereinafter Price), a company which sells paper products to customers in the food service industry. Upon leaving Price, Miller became associated with the defendant-appellant, Wachs Brothers Paper Co., Inc. (hereinafter Wachs), a competitor of Price.
On or about February 23, 1990, the plaintiffs commenced the instant action for a permanent injunction against Miller and Wachs (collectively the defendants) to (1) enjoin the defendants from disclosing or using any of Price’s secrets and confidential information, (2) direct Miller to divest himself of, and deliver, all memoranda, books, papers, notebooks, and computer printouts relating to the business and affairs of Price, (3) enjoin the defendants from canvassing, soliciting, accepting business from, or performing services for any of Price’s customers who were customers as of February 22, 1990, (4) enjoin the defendants from using or disclosing to any person, firm, association, or other organization, any business information, methods, trade secrets, lists of customers, former customers, prospective customers, or any other confidential information or data obtained or developed by Miller while in Price’s employ as either a salaried employee or independent contractor, and (5) enjoin the defendants from endeavoring to take away, directly or indirectly, any customer business from Price and from interfering with Price’s business in any way. By order to show cause dated February 23, 1990, Price moved for a preliminary injunction and sought a temporary restraining order pending determination of the motion. The temporary restraining order was granted on February 23, 1990, and, by order dated March 1, 1990, the Supreme Court issued a preliminary injunction granting the aforementioned relief. By order dated March 5, 1990, this court vacated the temporary
On appeal, the defendants argue that the Supreme Court erred in granting Price’s motion for a preliminary injunction. We agree.
In order to prevail upon a motion for a preliminary injunction, the moving party has the burden of demonstrating, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the movant will succeed on the merits of the action, (2) the movant will suffer irreparable injury absent the issuance of a preliminary injunction, and (3) the balance of equities is in favor of the movant (see, CPLR 6301; Grant Co. v Srogi,
Regardless of the existence of a restrictive covenant between an employee and a former employer, courts disfavor any action which sanctions the loss of a person’s livelihood (see, Reed, Roberts Assocs. v Strauman,
Insofar as the information sought to be protected consists of customer lists, it is well established that a court will not enjoin a former employee’s use of an employer’s customer list where, as here, the customers are all openly engaged in business and where their names and addresses can be found by those engaged in the trade merely by reviewing public documents including telephone directories (see, Reed, Roberts Assocs. v Strauman, supra; Walter Karl, Inc. v Wood, supra; Zurich Depository Corp. v Gilenson,
In any event, we note that Price has failed to meet its additional burden of proving that it will suffer irreparable injury or that the balance of equities rests with it. Where, as here, a litigant can fully be recompensed by a monetary award, a preliminary injunction will not issue. Further, where it is demonstrated, as here, that the defendants would be likely to suffer more damage than the plaintiffs, a preliminary injunction should not be issued (see, Poling Transp. Corp. v A&P Tanker Corp.,
