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Prezelski v. Christiansen
775 S.W.2d 764
Tex. App.
1989
Check Treatment

*1 ployee fired, ee, by employee being or an or because of employment.” his In injury cases, job the rule as stated in Williams incurred at site or while Trinity Universal Insurance Company, leaving job subsequent site to the ter- injury mination is not an in (Tex.Civ.App. Amarillo, sustained — 1958, writ) course of no employment, meaning within the is that where employee one solely hatred, assaults another Compensa- anger, of Article 8309 of the Workers’ Act, revenge vindictiveness, or growing tion not where the termination occurs in a of or employment, incident to the place safety employee injury is not is to be attributed to subject voluntary act of arising to the inherent hazards assailant, itself. Ellison v. and not as an employment incident of the from the Means, Trailite, Inc., Moore v. employment. See (Tex.Civ.App. 580 S.W.2d 614 (Tex.Civ.App. S.W.2d 417 1979, writ). —Houston An [14th Dist.] — Beaumont n.r.e.). By Cecil’s own admis exception to this rule occurs ref'd when em sion, angry began Claude became ployee required, believes him pock attack after he accused Claude of required, that he is to remain at or return eting support money. the child This was a employer’s premises for his final personal matter between the two brothers paycheck or to take care of some other having no employ connection with Cecil’s INA of duly incidental to the termination. ment, fact, according other than the Bryant, Texas v. S.W.2d 614 Cecil, support money the child 1985). been handed over to Claude after Cecil Texas, In Bryant v. INA weekly paycheck. cashed his (Tex.App. Waco, 1984, granted), — Accordingly, we conclude that not affirmed, Bryant, INA Texas v. thus, had Cecil been terminated and was no (Tex.1985), S.W.2d 614 the claimant had employee alleged at the time the off been laid and had returned to the em inflicted, injuries were also that such but ployer’s premises days pick fifteen later to injuries resulted from an altercation with paycheck, believing her that she was personal family brother over a matter required by to do so employer. While and, not connected employment with his premises, on the she injured. fell and was therefore, injuries in sustained Ellison, In employee resigned who had the course employment. of his The sum- or been employment fired from her mary judgment granted by the trial court waiting employer’s premises in Appellee favor of is affirmed. her paycheck, by severance was assaulted employee following disagreement another Ap

between the two. The Waco Court Bryant, distinguished Ellison peals

stating truly that “Ellison was not a work Elli compensation (in

er’s case. That suit son) grew alleged out of an assault and battery by Langston upon one Ellison....” Mr. Martin and Mrs. Gloria Ellison opinion, the Waco Court’s PREZELSKI, Appellants, injury case of an not sustained scope employment course and rather CHRISTIANSEN, Mr. Robert L. too, than a termination case. Here D.D.S., Appellee. injuries alleged arose out of an assault and No. 04-88-00089-CV. battery occurring after Cecil had been fired. Texas, Appeals Court “injury term sustained the course San Antonio. employment” is defined Article July 1989. Act, Compensation sec. Worker’s as not Rehearing Sept. Denied injury to include caused an act of “[a]n person injure a third intended to the em

ployee personal because of reasons to him against employ

and not directed him as an *2 Kil- Vickery, Elizabeth

Arnold Anderson Houston, appellants. bride, Jr., Reser, Groce, Crofts, Jo Thomas H. Antonio, Hebdon, appel- & San Locke lee. REEVES, CHAPA and

Before PEEPLES, JJ. During trial, appellee present

OPINION behalf, ed two medical on his Dr. CHAPA, Justice. Galveston, Carl Schow of Texas and Dr. Cleveland, Daniel Verne of Ohio. How Appellants Prezelski Gloria and Martin ever, terminating before the examination of appellee, sued Doctor Robert L. Christian- appellee, appellee’s per counsel moved for sen, alleging malpractice in rela- *3 present appellee’s mission to medical ex tion to services rendered which culminated perts Although out of appellants order. performed surgery upon in oral maxiofacial agreed arrangement, they requested appellant, Appellants ap- Prezelski. Gloria 30 minutes appellee prior to cross-examine peal judgment from a rendered in favor of to the out of order testimony. The court as a result verdict. obj request appellant’s denied the and over dispositive ection,1 permitted appellee’s issue is whether the ac- medical ex perts presented to be out order and to be judge require tions of the trial reversal excused.2 81(b)(1) ap- under TEX.R.APP.P. because right pellants fairly were denied the to clearly The record reveals that all the 90(a). present their case. TEX.R.APP.P. agreed cephalometric experts medical x-rays properly perform the We reverse. were critical to further, deny any appellant parties argued 1. The dissent would relief to After the each assert- adequate agreement, appellant because did not make "an their version of the the court specific objection” testify and the court was "obvi- allowed Dr. to out of order with- Verne ously enforcing agreement parties. allowing ap- to some of the out cross-examine doing, ignores pellee prior In so the dissent Tex.R.Civ.P. for 30 minutes to Dr. Verne’s testi- writing, requiring agreements mony. Appellant’s objection be in which and the reason for support preserve from the error. is not the case here. Without it was sufficient to transcript, engages record the dissent in im- suggests pur- 2. The dissent that the trial court concluding proper presumptions so portedly permit had unbridled discretion to wit- "agreement” called verbal was witnessed and authority nesses out under the of TEX. of order disagree- endorsed the court. The obvious However, 611(a). ig- R.CIV.EVID. the dissent "agreement" ment as to what the was is vivid in merely nores that the rule authorizes a reason- record, nothing this and we find from the court judge over the mode and able control of the trial any personal knowledge to indicate it had as to interrogating We order of witnesses. think it an agreement what the was. The need for Rule 11 prevents result unreasonable control when the here, ironically party’s is illustrated where one right party exercising from their to their agreement recollection of the was different why fairly. a trial case This case illustrates from the other. permitting very before court must be cautious ignores language the clear dissent testimony dependent experts, is so whose of the record: prior testimony party, of order of a to plain- MS. RESER: Your Honor I had told upon terminating testimony party of the bringing I was Dan Verne Mon- tiff’s counsel depend. testimony testimonies whose their morning my understanding day I and it was objection especially This is true in face of an him out of turn. And would be able to take up" permitted request “to clear some- to be proceed would I like to with him at this time. properly thing "to exam- with the adverse objection I have no MR. VICKERY: party’s experts, find here. as we ine” the adverse bringing I Dr. Verne out of turn in the case. judge not have known the The trial here could day object doing to her told her the other do testimony going change appellee ter, his la- finishing up prior Dr. Christiansen. it cross examination but the 30-minute horsey. The reason isn’t to be The reason is by appellants prior appellee requested to the out things up clear there is some that I need to appellee’s experts was a of order position that he has taken in based on request should have been reasonable properly Verne. court in order to examine Dr. granted. before lunch she had 2 And she had said dissent is also troubled that with him and she went the rest of the hours opinion might on fiiture have an adverse effect possibly have full afternoon. So she can’t judges. discretionary trial Certain- decisions of Dr. Christiansen. But I need much more with opinions appellate ly, purposes of one of the things my some to come back and clear instructive, judges. especially to trial to be own mind in order to— Nevertheless, as perceive issue before us long your we THE COURT: How redirect whether, is, being paramount; under more with him? minutes, circumstances, appellant received a these MR. VICKERY: 30 added) trial. fair right inquire appellee’s medi- of their surgery Appellee here contended involved. late-changed initial deposition experts appellee’s cal how cephalometric at that he had taken testimony, affected their medical critical lost. x-rays somehow were ap- opinion regarding the medical services who testified Appellee’s experts, Appel- pellee to Gloria Prezelski. rendered impres- under were also to “such a contend that amounted lants cephalometric x-rays had been sion that the rights appellants] as denial correctly appellee be- taken and viewed to cause and calculated surgery. Appellee’s experts how- fore the of an did cause rendition ever, prevented examining case.” x-rays they were cephalometric because 81(b)(1).3 supposedly according lost During clearly put appellants Therefore, appel- original testimony. since object- by properly on notice cephalometric lee’s considered the *4 ing prior appellee’s experts to medical be- critical, had x-rays appellee believed that requesting of presented out order and them, prevented were indeed taken and appellee 30 minutes examination of cross them, safely examining can as- we up” something “to clear associated with engaged in some they sume that have “proper” appellee’s the of examination ex- appellee in order presumptions favorable to Further, appellants pert reit- witnesses. per- surgery subsequent to conclude the in complaint their after a erated proper. formed on Prezelski was Gloria trial, proper timely and motion for a new Thereafter, appellee’s medical after which was likewise denied. excused, experts had testified and had been case, in that the actions We conclude appellee testimony changed his for the and refusing grant ap- in of the trial to first he time admitted had indeed not taken pellants 30 minutes of cephalometric x-rays appellant at cross-examination of the all. Thus, prior permitting appellee’s appellants they deprived appellee insist were to excused, change testimony deny appellant appellee dissent relief his would be- been partial had of facts filed admit the first time that he not cause a statement was and and for 5) appellants comply cephalometric x-rays appellant, the failed to of taken 53(d) cephalo- by point designating not in fact taken of error that whether had that critical, 6) upon x-rays appellants’ partied would be relied at the was that time metric However, trial, grounded complaint requested. of in the statement facts was motion for new denied, us, 7) appellants dissent concedes that the statement of facts be- and that before was volumes, plus ap- opportunity this court of five fore consists had the to cross-examine never ¿Eter arguments, testimony appellee’s and pellee expert final all the medical critical witnesses Most, rulings pertaining thereto. The dissent also if not all of these facts late admission. recognizes partial facts unchallenged, permits that statement of are this court to are encouraged 74(f). if there no real need for the accept them correct. TEX.R.APP.P. as appellee’s entire record. record shows that repeatedly attempted improperly to col- may presumption true While it in impeach appellants’ laterally lone medical ex- 53(d) favor of under TEX.R.APP.P. repeated pert violation of rul- witness in may failure available because a to ings. statutorily 53(d), comply with rule the record suppos- for The dissent chastises complaints before us sufficient to review the concluding erroneously speculating edly when made. in the of a was harmful absence that the error largely supported by It is uncontroverted However, complete at the 1) facts. prior that of order this record time, justification in en- dissent finds testimony appellee’s experts, ap- same two medical assuming speculation gaging pellee in its own and had so advised his medical contended experts appellee’s would not cephalometric x-rays experts that had he taken 2) they request been appellant, appellants’ confronted have been affected appellee pri- appellee's admissions. This record late critical 30 minutes of cross-examination unchallenged appel- made statements or the out of order examination of denied, 3) sufficiently expert brief establish lants in their medical witnesses deprived right objection, appellee’s appellants appellant’s medical ex- over case, permitted testify fairly present their and that under these pert out of witnesses were trial, excused, 4) new ap- were entitled to a after circumstances order and were denied. pellee's and had which was also witnesses had testified experts previously

medical This court has addressed in for new error issue Nix v. H.R. denying appellants’ in motion the harmless al, right S.W.2d 573 appellants Management their denied et fairly. requires this denial Antonio writ ref’d case Whether — San reversal, however, n.r.e.) depends stating: on whether it reasonably calculated to cause and recognized Supreme the im- Court rendition of an caused possibility prescribing specific test in the case. TEX.R.APP.P. determining any error was 81(b)(1). prob- to cause and reasonably calculated improp- ably did cause the rendition of an malpractice All cases rest almost medical judgment. er v. Members Mu- [Lorusso expert medi- entirely upon Co., 603 tual Insurance Presumably, these medical cal witnesses. mind, (Tex.1980).] With that in medically qualified experts impartial, given, Court has on at least two occa- provide guide lay for a experts who will sions, example useful which we think Thus, findings. it is ur- jury to make its Supreme in the instant case. The Court defending gent prosecuting has stated that a case which impeach cases to be able to discredit complaining party prove failed to opinions opposing who defense, action of an error could lay heavily upon by jury. relied are so resulted in a material- not be said have However, accomplished with- this should be hand, ly the other when unfair trial. On of evidence and in the bounds of the rules *5 and the evidence the trial is contested certainly rulings of the court. the in conflicting, error results a sharply the Appellants presented one medical showing trial without materially unfair witness, Dr. Helfrick’s Dr. John Helfrick. 821; Lorusso, 603 at Pat- more. considerably by was undermined Dunn, 592 S.W.2d terson Dental Co. repeated efforts of the (Tex.1979). in those cases While impeach him in collaterally violation strikes, speaking juror the Court was rulings. The trial court correct the court’s in it made clear Lorusso that Court appellant’s repeated objections ly sustained by errors of law the speaking was all jury and counsel accord and instructed Lorusso, 821. 603 S.W.2d at trial court. ingly. While these actions cannot form Nix, supra, at 576.4 point error since the for a valid basis Co., In Members Mut. Ins. Lorusso v. objection, judge properly trial sustained Supreme of Texas stated: supra, the Court appel jury, and never denied instructed rule is clear and language The requested, can be con lant relief [5]recognizes a liti that direct. The rule application in the of TEX.R.APP.P. sidered for, perfect trial gant to a 81(b)(1). is not entitled 4. Lorusso, supra Although at 820. the dissent has concluded there wets here, necessary auAority nevertheless finds it which sets one no error it We of no know holding in Nix v. improperly be critical of this court’s allocat- harmless error standard Co., Management 733 S.W.2d 573 H.R. standard for jury and anoAer ed strike errors Nix, n.r.e.). su Antonio writ ref'd —San Texas Su- types Ae oAer of errors. support Mutu pra, in Lorusso v. Members found stan- preme Aat Ae same Court has declared Insurance al Lorusso, types all of errors. dard exists as to Lorusso, supra The dissent contends supra. Nix, supra misapplied by in applied us in the case before should not Procedure Referring Rule of Civil to Texas 5. only applies to Lorusso decision because the Appellate predecessor Rule of Texas Ae improperly allocated cases which involve 184(b) error which is Ae harmless Procedure ignores doing, dissent Ae In so Ae strikes. Supreme applicable Court. TEX.R. to Ae rule Supreme language Court: of Ae Texas 81(b)(1) appli- error rule is the harmless APP.P. by very terms its error] The rule [harmless Appeals. BoA rules for Courts of cable to the no dis- applies all errors in that it Aaws apply practical purposes Ae same standard. all type involved in its as to Ae of errors tinction requirement for reversal. expert present- Moreover, only medical indeed, recog In perfect. few trials are considerably fact, appellants was of this the harmless error ed nition attempts common at collat- repeated establishes a sound and rule weakened reversing policy judgment in of the court impeachment sense violation eral error rulings. unless the or errors can be said to terms

tions have contributed in a substantial bring errors involved reversal. draws no distinction as [*] about omitted] applies [*] to all errors adverse [*] in its rule [*] judgment, requirement [*] in its type way to [cita [*] very it unfair trial which foregoing dition of an We therefore remanded errors improper judgment in this for a new trial. 81(b)(1). is reversed and the must resulted in a probably caused conclude, materially the ren- case. recognized .... expressly [W]e Justice, PEEPLES, dissenting. com requirement Tamburello6 has respectfully dissent. The party plaining show that ruling reversed on basis trial judgment against in the him resulted discretion, court’s even was within the “materially considering unfair.” how partial though only a we have met, this is we said: facts, any error was harmless. any such error resulted in [W]hether permit Discretion witnesses materially however, unfair order. The trial within was well decided from an examination allowing her the defense discretion of the entire record. For exam- Tri order. call two witnesses out of ple, complaining in a case in which the judges given in determin al discretion prove failed his cause of ac- testify. ing the order which witnesses defense, allocating tion or an error Co., Ochoa v. Motor Sales Winerich equalizing strikes could not be said Baker (1936); Tex. to have resulted in a unfair (Tex.Civ. Sturgeon, hand, trial. On the other when the *6 Travelers 1962, writ); App. no contested and the evidence is — Texarkana Hurst, 883, v. the error results in Insurance Co. sharply conflicting, 1962, (Tex.Civ.App. unfair trial without 886 show- — Texarkana Summers, Hemsell n.r.e.); more.... ref’d 153 (Tex.Civ.App. S.W.2d Lorusso, supra at 819, 820, — Amarillo Simmons, Plunkett v. writ); no contested, vigorously This case was and (Tex.Civ.App. S.W.2d — Waco sharply conflicting involved evidence. Fur- 611(a) (tri dism’d); TEX.R.CIV.EVID. ther, prevented unwittingly control al court shall exercise reasonable exercising appellants right from their to interrogating order of wit over mode and crucial from elicit the late admission nesses). Under TEX.R.CIV.P. prior to the out of order explicitly her rea court should have stated experts. appellee’s prevented This deviating sons for usual se fairly appellants opportunity ques- to to quence. plaintiffs did not ask her But experts appellee’s equipped tion medical complain do so in this court that and do not appellees pertinent with late admission good not explicitly cause stated. changed very which could have well or at im- experts’ amply support court’s least weakened facts exer- opinions. plied finding good failed cor- and her the court to had by granting Although rect the situation a new trial. cise of discretion.1 the case Welch, specific objection, court com- 6. Tamburello 1965). error, following during mitted reversible sequence It is that the court of events. obvious judges lawyers surprised 1. Trial bewill agreement simply enforcing felt that she was plaintiffs adequate learn that counsel made Moreover, plaintiffs’ specially (by agreement, set six from out of town. been already called defendant as an earlier) counsel had Monday, months October party, examined him for several adverse sought given plaintiffs and were hours, passed and then the witness. Wednesday. until Defendant’s continuance words, other at the time of the court’s out-of-town had been scheduled at ruling asking in- plaintiff’s counsel was Monday certain times reliance on the terrupt defense counsel’s examination special setting. plaintiffs’ When the attor- her own client for further cross-examina- continuance, ney sought two-day he tion. Dr. had testified for one Christiansen expressly agreed to let the defendant day. full witnesses out of days they originally had been sched- judges might if other have ruled Even doubt, obviously uled. The court was concerned I it is differently, which inconceiva- accommodating expert ruling that her was an abuse of discre- about witnesses ble plaintiffs presence prefer just proceed I had made in her when MS. RESER: would why seeking two-day I see with Dr. Christiansen don’t [sic]. continuance. opportunity he’s taken —he’s had an to take MS. RESER: Your [defendant’s counsel] deposition. Dr. Verne’s Mrs. Kilbride [co- plaintiffs I was Honor I had told bringing plaintiffs] counsel for for an hour on the Monday morning Dan Verne and it phone him. I see reason talked to don’t understanding my I would be able to take why they do a recross Dr. should be able to proceed him out turn. And I would like to my I Christiansen in the middle before finish with him at this time. my cross-examination own client. mean I [plaintiffs’counsel]: MR. I have VICKERY: just put want to on Dr. Verne out turn and objection bringing Dr. Verne out turn agreed begin- that was what we had to at the day object in the case. I told her the other I do going ning your this Honor. I was doing finishing up prior Dr. to her it to— Christiansen. take, long would he Dr. THE COURT: How horsey. The reason isn’t to be The reason is Verne? things up there are some that I need to clear MS. RESER: I think he will take this morn- position based on the that he has taken in ing. properly court in order to examine Dr. Verne. Okay. you THE COURT: I’ll allow to call And she said before lunch she had 2 him out of order. horn's with him and she the rest of the went added). Okay, MS. RESER: possibly full afternoon. So she can’t have point At the discussion shifted to other much more with Dr. Christiansen. But I need (1) subjects: lawyers to have the court told things my to come back and clear some louder, (2) exhibits their witnesses talk were own mind in order to— admitted, marked, discussed, (3) the law- long your THE COURT: How redirect posi- yers established where each would be with him? Next, tioned the use of a television. MR. VICKERY: 30 minutes. in; jurors brought the court welcomed THE COURT: Or recross. them and then made this statement: Honor, going MS. RESER: Your I’m agreed plaintiffs The Court: The have have much with Dr. Christiansen. It’s may call a she witness [defense counsel] *7 they’ve going to take because voir turn, calling so the defendant is a witness time, practically every piece evi- dired us on added). (emphasis at this out turn complaining about dence. And I’m not that. reading A fair of this record convinces me that right. original made, our That’s their But that was objection certainly counsel no agreement. objection, ground any not state a They’re going bring Dr. Helfrick obviously thought carrying she again just through lawyer’s agreement turn and I would ask the court’s to allow permission put busy Dr. Verne on. He is a Verne be called out of order. I cannot under- my arrangement surgeon any judicial and this was can be stand how of this action course, had made with him to come this morn- called an abuse of discretion. Of partial ing. plaintiffs of facts filed does agreement suggest not everyone terms of the MR. VICKERY: Let me this. If include the got saying admits was she’s to the court that she’s a lot made. Christiansen, Concerning expert, go why Dr. Dr. don’t I the second defense more to with Schow, way plaintiffs object any on the matters she’s crossed on now? did not recross my the stand. As Dr. Schow I’ll minutes there so I’m clear and when he was called to take 30 stand, objection proceed either And took the no was voiced then she can with Dr. Verne. said, my put after the court "It’s under- if she needs to him back for more before or then later, know, calling standing you [Dr. it. the defendant is a witness have at turn, agreeable? is that correct?" Schow] THE COURT: Is that

771 comply- of facts tion, partial statement without concept as that has been defined. See 53(d) [formerly Hosp., ing TEX.R.APP.P. Northwest Memorial with Babcock v. view, 706, (Tex.1989) (test my the ma- is TEX.R.CIV.P. 767 7096r S.W.2d 377]. faithfully applied rule or jority has not court “acted without reference whether 50(d), says, “The TEX.R.APP.P. bur- any guiding principles rules and or whether unreasonable”); appellant, or other arbitrary and den is on the the act was 297, review, H.E.B., Inc., seeking see that a sufficient Morrow v. S.W.2d (test requiring (Tex.1986) presented to show error the court record is “whether guiding acted without reference to reversal.” principles”); rules and Johnson v. Fourth undisputed that we have a It is 916, Appeals, 700 S.W.2d Court of The court re- partial statement of facts. (Tex.1986) (test is “the facts and porter’s says amended certificate permit[ted] law the trial court to make but statement of facts “contains a true decision”). Nothing one in the record or transcription parts correct plaintiffs’

the briefs indicates that proceedings requested to be ever asked the court to have either witness added). Two transcribed....” questions. return for further volumes of the statement of facts conclude majority says agreement “Whereupon, this con- did not with these words: comply course, testimony requested with rule 11. Of we do not cludes to be tran- agreement “Whereupon, know whether the on on 11-4-87” and this was made scribed only partial transcription requested the record because we have concludes the added). testimony.” (emphasis statement of facts. For the reasons stated dissent, part two this that should end undisputed plaintiff It did not is also clearly gener- the matter. But there was points relying state the she on. would agreement al experts testify to let defense so, presume that Had she done we would expressly out of order. Plaintiffs’ counsel bearing the omitted has no on Obviously, admits that there was. appeal. Producer’s Constr. Co. v. attorneys court was when the (Tex.1984); Muegge, 669 S.W.2d agreed post- because was when she 53(d). appellant An poned days the trial two to accommodate 53(d) comply either with rule or file a com- plaintiffs’ anticipa- counsel. Even if no one facts; plete statement of it will otherwise events, ted precisely the ultimate turn of presumed portions sup- that the omitted appellate how can this court hold that the port judgment. Englander v. Ken Co. abused her discretion in follow- (Tex.1968); nedy, 428 Prather S.W.2d agreement pres- made her McNally, 125-26 ence and her consent? 1988, writ); App. Ball v. Farm — Dallas Ass’n, especially message I am Savings troubled & Home judges, this sends to trial de decision who 425 Worth — Fort struggle daily push nied); Group, City cases to trial while Texas Inc. v. Constr. being Pasadena, at the same time flexible and reason- (Tex.App.—Houston 1983, dism’d). accommodating able in the schedules of [14th Dist.] lawyers Devco, Ltd., Murray and witnesses. Intimidated also See decision, may rigidly deny 557-58 some courts now plaintiff’s request postpone- for a short bringing An has burden of *8 ground ment on the they appellate prove court a record “to meaningful have to let witnesses discretion error and that it was harmful.” Escontri order, testify .plain- out of even when the 697, Apodaca, as v. 699 attorney tiff’s he did in initially agrees, as 50(d). 1982); appellate An Tex.R.App.P. this case. error is court cannot determine whether complete 2. Partial statement The ma- harmless or reversible without a offacts. 308, Hulse, jority has found record. 362 S.W.2d reversible error even Dennis v. (Tex.1962); though plaintiff brought Casualty only forward a 310 Gordon v. Aetna Co., 602, mony approach, ap- Surety 603-604 we need. Under that & 1961, ref’d); (Tex.Civ.App. pellate apparently courts would decide ad — Eastland Co., 53(d) DeLeon v. Otis Elevator 610 S.W.2d hoc when to enforce rule and when 179, (Tex.Civ.App. 181-82 Antonio not to. — San n.r.e.). ref 'd This rule has been consequences failing to follow applied when a court allowed a rebuttal 53(d) presume rule are clear. We must only out of and witness parts support that the omitted of the trial partial of facts filed. Flora ruling, plaintiffs the court’s and that have Scott, (Tex.Civ.App. not shown reversible error. n.r.e.). —Dallas writ ref’d Improper 3. reversible error standard. suggest I do not that we have a short The majority’s analysis reversible error facts; statement of it consists five vol- incorrect, perpetuating began error plus arguments. umes the final But we do Co., Management in Nix. v. H.R. eight- testified in not know who else (Tex.App. Antonio S.W.2d 573 — San they about, day issues testified n.r.e.). majority on writ ref'd relies The statement or what said. of facts language says appellant from Nix that entirely testimony consists of the of four showing error establishes reversible (plain- Doctors Helfrick witnesses: “materially that the trial was unfair.... (defen- expert), tiffs’ Schow Verne the trial is contested and the evi [W]hen (defen- experts), dant’s and Christiansen sharply conflicting, dence is the error re dant). days testimony (Thursday Two sults in a unfair trial without 6) Friday, November 5 and miss- (emphasis add showing more.” Id. at 576 ing completely. The record does not even ed). adopted Not one Texas court has plaintiff, contain the If reinterpretation Nix of harmless error. Three Mrs. Prezelski. other witnesses— law, majority’s analysis any were sound Morales, Kinsey, Ms. Mrs. and Dr. John- Texaco, trial errors in Pennzoil v. 2—which mentioned name in the final son—were qualifies surely as a “contested” trial arguments, but their is not be- “sharply which the evidence was conflict fore us. We cannot be sure that we are ing” have been reversible “without —would privy everything that bears on the harm- showing more.” testifying fulness of the witnesses’ speculate order. We can about wheth- in- cite two cases Nix er, 81(b)(1), under TEX.R.APP.P. this se- volving strikes. erroneous allocation quence of “reasonably Co., events was calculat- Ins. See Lorusso v. Members Mut. probably ed to cause and did rendi- (Tex.1980); cause S.W.2d 818 Patterson Dental improper judgment.” tion of an Dunn, 592 S.W.2d 914 Co. But the Lorusso court itself examined the should, does, encourage The law at- conscientiously record for harm. Lorusso torneys anything to omit from the record principles, adhered to settled as revealed bearing appeal. that has no But following passage: 53(d) provides a sensible pre- recognize impossibility We doing method for this. When scribing specific determining test for points error, ap- notifies of his error, be it the pellee if can then decide the omitted testi- evidence, im- admission or exclusion of mony pertains points If those of error. proper argument, giving depriv- or so, 53(d) he designate under rule proper of a number portions “additional to be evidence peremptory challenges, “was included the statement of facts.” I can- accept ignore calculated view that we can rule 53(d) improper judg- when we think cause the rendition of an we have all the testi- Texaco, (special issue sub Inc. v. court found various errors Pennzoil evidence) harmless writ refd mission and admission [1st Dist.] — Houston — U.S. —, n.r.e.), dismissed, 729 S.W.2d at cert. S.Ct. under the traditional standard. 810-12, 815, (1988). Pennzoil, 99 L.Ed.2d 686 841-42. *9 that to the notion reference necessarily record without ment.” Such a determination proclaim that reviewing only court need call entrusted judgment is a and the evidence the trial was contested good discretion and senses sound conflicting. Boothe v. Haus sharply See however, clear, reviewing court. It (Tex.1989); ler, Gee v. deter- judgment such a call that Co., Ins. Liberty Mut. Fire from an the whole mined evaluation of Boothe, (Tex.1989). I follow 396-97 would Fire Insurance Co. case. Standard involving Gee, in cases and Skinner Reese, S.W.2d oth of evidence and or exclusion admission added). After at 821 rulings. er partial statement reviewing the record—a of the record shows A review facts, present in the case—the Lorus- as statement, plaintiffs’ counsel opening court held the error was harmless. so had not that the defendant stated his belief afterward, in Ins. Shortly Employees First tes- x-ray. Defendant cephalmetric taken a Skinner, 646 Co. v. S.W.2d cephalo- thought he had taken a tified he 1983), court cited Lorusso a unanimous it to a doctor x-ray, metric but had sent following principle: well-settled cephalometric x- A Houston review. error is decision whether reversible [The patient’s from stan- ray depicts the head is a call entrusted harmless] distance, making measurement and dard good the sound discretion and sense of x-rays precise. more comparison with other reviewing court from an evaluation that such Doctors Yerne and Schow said Members of the whole case. Lorusso v. taken, they could x-rays should and that Co., supra Ins. at 821. Mutual in defendant’s records find no evidence But, said, they respectfully I them. submit Nix he had taken proper and surgery itself was event have misread Lo- Later in the after Verne successful. russo. testified, con- the defendant Schow agree jury I that when the error involves did not show that he ceded that his records strikes, it is indeed difficult to harm show x-ray, an cephalometric but had taken probing jurors the minds of the without cop- x-ray. Everyone had ordinary lateral those sat if who sat and who would have in advance of trial. ies of these records well properly the strikes had been distributed. Obviously the heart of Verne’s and For this reason the error stan- reversible that defendant Schow’s was per- properly dard has been relaxed when non-negligent re- achieved a successful and emptory challenges improperly have been not have Surely opinions sult. those would allocated. See Garcia v. Central Power & changed explicitly if told had been (Tex.1986) Light ordinary x-ray lateral was (where peremptory challenges improp- words, Doctors Verne taken. other allocated, erly test trial was x-ray Schow said in essence whatever “sharply “hotly contested” and evidence taken, surgery was successful and conflicting,” resulting “materially un- competence. performed On more”). showing fair” trial “without record, showing the court’s there is no But when error involves evidence ruling I believe was within her dis- —which strikes, standard of traditional reasonably calculated to cretion—was 81(b)(1) apply. The should probably cause and error must denial of the amount to “such a judgment.

rights as was reasons, respectfully dis- For all these calculated to cause and did cause majority’s opinion judg- sent from the improper judgment.” rendition of an That reversing ment for a new trial. requires faithfully standard us to assess record, the entire onerous and time-con-

suming may as that task be.

Recently supreme applied court has 81(b)(1)

rule and evaluated the entire

Case Details

Case Name: Prezelski v. Christiansen
Court Name: Court of Appeals of Texas
Date Published: Jul 26, 1989
Citation: 775 S.W.2d 764
Docket Number: 04-88-00089-CV
Court Abbreviation: Tex. App.
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