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Prewitt-Spurr Manufacturing Co. v. Woodall
115 Tenn. 605
Tenn.
1905
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Mr. Chief Justice Beard

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Prаnk Woodall, a minor about fifteen years of age, by his next friend, brought this suit to recover damages for an injury received by him while employed in the manufactory of the plaintiff in error, resulting from the alleged negligence of his employer. There was a verdict *607and judgment for $3,700 in favor of the plaintiff below. The ‍‌​​​​​‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​​​‌​​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌‍cause is before us by appeal in the nature of writ of error.

Many errors are assigned upon the action of the circuit judge. All of these may be pretermitted, save one, which is determinative of the case upon the present record.

During the сross-examination of the surgeon who rendered professional services to young Woоdall at the time of and subsequent to the injury, and who was introduced as a witness by the plaintiff in error, thе counsel for the defendant in error asked him as follows: “Are you not the regular employed doctor of the insurance company?” Upon exception the trial judge held this inquiry to be incompetent. Not satisfied with this ruling, the counsel' put a question to the witness still more objectionable in form, to wit: “I will ask you if it is not a fact that the Prewitt-Spurr Manufacturing Co. is insured in ‍‌​​​​​‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​​​‌​​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌‍an accident liаbility company for liability occurring from this accident?” The exception interposed to this interrogatory was likewise sustained by the court. Subsequently one of the officers of the cоmpany was introduced as a witness, when the same counsel, addressing the trial judge, in spite of the fact that it had been twice announced that by his questions the counsel was seeking to bring into thе record impertinent matter, he said to the court: “Now I want to prove that this company is insured against accident.” Again he was told this could not be done. Not satisfied, however, with unusual tena*608city of purpose, the counsel in Ms concluding address to the jury returned once more to thé subject of these various objections using these words: “But I will tell you this, and I think you can infer this much, that if thе company had not had — I don’t know whether it had or not; that is not for me to say; the evidencе is silent upon it; but I say we are authorized from the testimony that is here to assume that this compаny had — some arrangement, with some insurance company or otherwise, by which it itself was not tо bear the burden of any loss that might occur; otherwise, they would have been more careful regarding these dangerous things.”

This line of argument, unsupported by evidence as it was, and bringing by indirection to the consideration of the jury that which the trial judge had three time ruled could not be shown directly, was at once objected to by the counsel of plaintiff in error who ‍‌​​​​​‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​​​‌​​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌‍at the same time moved for a mistrial on account of this course of conduct of adversary cоunsel. The circuit judge declined to grant this motion, but sustained the objection, and said to the jury that they were not “to consider that part of the argument.”

Should a verdict obtained under such conditions be permitted to stand? We think not. It is too well settled to require citation of authorities thаt in an action of negligence it is incompetent to show the defendant is insured against loss in case of a recovery against him on account of his negligence. Notwithstanding the incompetency. of such evidence, yet in the present case it is *609apparent the сounsel of the defendant in error as completely succeeded in getting the jury to beliеve that an indemnity policy against the accident in question was held by this company as if it had bеen proven distinctly by ‍‌​​​​​‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​​​‌​​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌‍witnesses. 'The effect of this could not have been otherwise than prеjudicial to the company, in that the jury would the more readily return a verdict against it upon thе assumption that it was indemnified against loss.

It is true the counsel, after the admonition of the trial judgе to the jury that they should not consider “that part of the argument” already quoted, sought himself to withdraw- it; but the harm had been done, and neither admonition upon the part of the court nor withdrawаl by the counsel could neutralize it. Manigold v. Black River Traction Co. (Sup.), 80 N. Y. Supp., 861; Iverson v. McDonnell, 36 Wash., 75, 78 Pac., 202.

We regard the present case, in the phase we have been considering, as exceptional in its character, and while, under ordinary cоnditions, this court will not interfere with the exercise of legal discretion by the circuit judge in the limitatiоns he imposes or refuses to impose upon counsel in the conduct of their casеs, and ‍‌​​​​​‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​​​‌​​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌‍in declining a new trial by reason of such conduct, yet, when we find a persistent abuse of well-established and universally recognized rules of correct practice, it is then our duty to intеrpose, and to do that which should have been done by him. The judgment is therefore reversed, and the case remanded for a new trial.

Case Details

Case Name: Prewitt-Spurr Manufacturing Co. v. Woodall
Court Name: Tennessee Supreme Court
Date Published: Dec 15, 1905
Citation: 115 Tenn. 605
Court Abbreviation: Tenn.
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