50 Tenn. 468 | Tenn. | 1872
delivered tlie opinion of tbe Court.
Tbe prisoner was indicted in tbe Circuit Court of De-Kalb county, for the murder of Eacbel H. Billings. At
The first ground relied upon for a new trial, is: The bill of exceptions states, that, “In the selection of the jury, nine of those selected as jurors, stated upon their examination, that they had formed or expressed an opinion concerning the guilt or innocence of the prisoner, upon rumor, and flying reports, and that they had never heard any of the witnesses speak of the case, or heard any one detail the facts or evidence in the case, and had formed their opinion merely from general rumor.” The defendant’s counsel excepted to the competency of these jurors, but the court held them competent.
In the case of Alfred and Anthony v. The State, 2 Swan, it was held, that an opinion formed from rumor or report, does not disqualify the juror. The same doctrine is held in the case of Moses v. The State, 11 Hum., 232, and in the case of Payne v. The State, 3 Hum., 375. In the first named case, Judge Caruthers says: “That it is not the existence of an opinion either way, which constitutes the disqualification, but the grounds upon which it is formed; or it might be speaking more correctly to say, that the law does not regard it as an opinion at all, unless it is based upon a knowledge, or reliable information of the facts.”
We do not deem it necessary in this case to enquire into the correctness of these authorities quoted. The bill of exceptions does not show that the prisoner exhausted
The State proved by Sarah Eigsby and Lucinda Billings, statements made to them, shortly after the murder, by Inez Certain, the daughter of the deceased, some twelve or thirteen years old, as to the facts attending the murder, and as to who did the killing. This, it is admitted, was illegal evidence, but the bill of exceptions shows that no objection was made to the testimony, by the prisoner, at the time of its introduction, but afterwards his counsel moved the court to exclude the evidence, which his Honor the Circuit Judge, promptly did, remarking that had the objection been made sooner, the evidence would not have been heard.
We can not now hold this to be error. It is true that in'a case involving the life of a citizen, the court would not be disposed to hold the prisoner bound by his acts in the conduct of his trial with the same strictness that would apply in a civil case. We would not suffer
No further exception is taken to the action of the court below. The law was fully and correctly expounded to the jury. It but remains to see whether the facts in proof create such a doubt of the prisoner’s guilt as to authorize a new trial under the rules upon which this court acts in such cases. The prosecutor, James Billings, the husband of the deceased, proves that he left his house in DeKalb county, and went down the river on a raft, leaving his wife and three children at home, alone in a cabin. Inez, the oldest, was his step-daughter, the others were younger. He left home on Saturday; told the defendant, who lived about a quarter or half mile from him, that he was going down the river. He found his wife, when he returned, in her grave. He had her taken up and moved to another grave. She had been murdered in his absence. It appears fully in proof, that on the night of 29th January, 1871, after James Billings had left home, that his wife,
Upon these facts, is there any room to doubt? The father and two sisters of the prisoner are introduced to prove an alibi. They prove that about dark, the prisoner and his three sisters went to the house of Bigsby, near by, and stayed until nine or ten o’clock; that they returned home; prisoner at once went to bed — was complaining of headache; that they heard him during the night, complaining; that he could not have gotten out of the house without their knowledge.
The two sisters are contradicted in material particulars, and are shown to have made different statements before the Justice, upon the preliminary examination; and the force of their testimony is greatly impaired; but it is manifest from their statements that the prisoner might have left the house without their knowledge. It is shown that they endeavored to get other witnesses to swear to the same facts, and when asked if they had not done so, denied it.
No evidence is introduced throwing the slightest sus
Upon a careful and anxious review of all the testimony, we are forced to say that the prisoner’s guilt is established; that he committed this most atrocious murder most probably in the perpretation of, or attempt to perpetrate, another most brutal crime.
The judgment must be affirmed.