52 Md. 647 | Md. | 1879
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The appellee. sued the appellant in an action of trespass, quare clausum fregit. The narr. contained several counts, but the gravamen of the action was alleged illegal distresses levied by the appellant on the appellee, whereby the appellee was made to pay certain sums of money unjustly. The appellant replied not guilty, and that he was the owner of the fee, and that he did what he did do in the exercise of his lawful rights as landlord. We learn from the record that Edward Pell, who was the owner in fee of certain real estate in Baltimore City, devised a part thereof to his son William, and gave to his wife, who was his executrix, the power of leasing the estate so devised, for the benefit of the son. Anne Pell accordingly, on the fifth day of July, 1169, by lease in due form demised the locus in quo to Alexander McMechen, for ninety-nine years, with the usual covenant for renewal for
The appellee paid the reserved rents till (1877) eighteen hundred and seventy-seven, when the appellant’s term was found to have long expired, and the reversionary title and rights were discovered. The appellee then paid the reversioner the sum of three hundred and seventy-three dollars and twenty cents for arrearages of rent; and in consideration thereof, and of the additional sum of two hundred and fifty-two dollars and fifty cents, the fee was conveyed to Silljacks on the first day of February, eighteen hundred and seventy-seven.
Silljacks, afterward, having refused to pay the rents reserved in Presstman’s lease, the appellant levied distresses. Silljacks replevied the property distrained, in each case, before a justice of the peace. One justice decided in favor of Silljacks, and the other in favor of
First. That he had a fee in the property of which Sill-jacks was tenant.
Secondly. That the appellee could not deny his title, nor his right to levy the distresses.
Thirdly. That the whole matter was res adjudicates, by reason of the replevin suits, the appeals to the City Court, and the judgments therein in favor of the appellant.
It is very certain there is no evidence in the record by which Presstman takes a fee. His deed from Charles F. Mayer, trustee, in its recitals, does speak of it as real estate; but that does not make it so. The description of the property is such as to identify, it perfectly as the leasehold property which Steele had bought from James Sterrett by deed duly recorded. The whole title was of record, and all the parties in interest were affected with notice; so that however ignorant the appellant was at the time he made the lease to Straus and others, of the exact nature of his estate, his lease to Straus and others did, in fact, operate no further, than as an assignment of the residue of his term.
As to the second point that the appellee could not dispute Presstman’s title, because Presstman was his landlord, and therefore could not maintain his action of trespass, there is a material distinction to be observed. The general rule is, without doubt, that a tenant cannot dispute his landlord’s title—that he is estopped by having accepted a lease. That estoppel has been long, if not always, held to he restricted to the denial of the landlord’s
This being so, the justices of the peace, nor the City Court could in those proceedings, give the appellee the benefit of his defence against the appellant, that the appellant’s title had expired, and with it his right to demand rent.
It does not make any difference so far as this question is concerned, that it does not appear in the record of -those proceedings which have been offered in evidence, that this question was raised before the justice or in the City Court. It is enough for the purposes of this decision, that the law of which we must take judicial cognizance, limited the jurisdiction of those tribunals, and prevented inquiry into the title of land, however it might arise. Testing the instructions granted, and the prayers refused, to the granting and refusal of which respectively exception was taken, by the principles of law we have found applicable, we find no error in the rulings of the Superior Court. The objections to the plaintiff’s first prayer, made in this Court, that it assumes as a matter of fact, that Presstman had no other title than that which he obtained by deed from Charles F. Mayer, and also put to the jury the determination of a question of law, that is, required the jury to find whether the defendant held a leasehold estate, and that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the prayer, cannot he considered in this Court under its rules, as it does not appear by the record that such infirmities were complained of in the Court below, and excepted to for that reason.
The second instruction for the plaintiff simply states the legal effect of certain title papers offered in evidence, if the jury should find the same, and was properly granted.
In the rejection of the first six prayers of the defendant below, the Court committed no error. Under the law as
Judgment affirmed
with costs.