200 Md. 107 | Md. | 1952
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a taxpayer’s suit to enjoin the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, and some of its officers, from spending $125,000, part of the proceeds of a loan, for street signs and block number plates. The defendants demurred, the Circuit Court of Baltimore City sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, and dismissed the bill. From this action, the complainant appealed.
By Chapter 132 of the Acts of 1951, the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore were authorized to issue certificates of indebtedness not exceeding $500,000, the proceeds thereof to be used “for the acquisition and installation of traffic control signals and signs and for
When the Ordinance of Estimates for the year 1952 was passed, it provided that the Department of Public Works should expend out of the proceeds of the sale of the certificates of indebtedness thus authorized, for traffic control signals $125,000, and “for street signs
The City contends that it should be allowed a broad discretion in determining what are traffic control signs. It suggests that there is a basis for including within those words street signs and block number plates, because they help the movement of traffic, both pedestrian and vehicular, by enabling travelers to see where they are on the street, and to locate their destinations more readily than would otherwise be the case. We find this interpretation too ingenious. Street signs and block number plates are not within the ordinary contemplation of anyone as traffic control signs. The mere fact that the City is growing, and that many new street signs and block number plates are needed, does not justify placing 'a strained construction upon words which we think the voters must not have placed upon them when they approved the ordinance. If it is necessary, on account of the number of these signs which have to be replaced or newly erected, to finance them otherwise than through the use of the proceeds of the tax rate, then the proper procedure for the City is to get an enabling act from the Legislature specifically
The City relies upon the case of Baltimore v. Williams, 129 Md. 290, 99 A. 362. In that case, the enabling act authorized the issuance of $50,000,000 of stock for the establishment of “a comprehensive system for the improvement of the water front of, adjacent to and along the Patapsco River and its tributaries, both within and without the limits of the City of Baltimore.” This loan was known as the Harbor Improvement Fund. A taxpayer’s suit was brought to enjoin the City from spending the proceeds of this loan for the purpose of opening and widening St. Paul Street in the city, which was the street leading directly from the northern part of the town to Light Street, which then continued to the harbor. The court said that the contemplated widening was of an artery communicating with the harbor for a distance between one-half and three-quarters of a mile from the actual water front. The chancellor held that this was too remote, but this court did not agree with that conclusion. It held that there was discretion in the City to widen St. Paul Street as a desirable means by which to promote the accessibility of the water front. The enabling act of the Harbor Improvement Fund said, in so many words, that the City was to adopt a comprehensive system, and those words were italicized in the court’s opinion, as showing the considerable discretion given to the City. This court held that it was obviously not intended that the money from the sale of the securities should be used only to take care of the immediate harbor, but that it was intended to do whatever was necessary to provide proper approaches to it, and, in so doing, the City had the authority to determine what
In other cases where no such general discretion was specifically given, this court has held that the City is bound to interpret strictly the authorization, and cannot deviate from.it. Thus, in Thom v. Baltimore, 154 Md. 273, 277-278, 141 A. 125, 127, the enabling act and the ordinance provided for the issuance of bonds at an interest rate of 5%. The City desired to issue bonds at a lower rate which would have been of benefit and advantage to the public. This court recognized that fact and said: “* * * such a privilege may indeed be essential in marketing its securities to the best advantage, but if that freedom is abridged by constitutional prohibitions the remedy is to amend and not to overrule the Constitution.” The court held that the City did not have the power to change the rate of interest. This case followed an earlier case, Stanley v. Baltimore, 146 Md. 277, 300, 126 A. 151, 159, 130 A. 181. In that case, the court said: “The power of the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore in this instance is a special and limited one, and must be ‘administered in the manner and according to the law creating it.’ ” We do not think that there is any discretion in the municipal officials to construe “traffic control signs” as meaning something which, in our opinion, the words could not have meant in the enabling act, and could not have meant in the minds of the voters.
Section 7 of Article XI had been adopted at a time when the people were much disturbed about the improper expenditure of the public money. The City had been quite reckless in this respect. See LXVI Political Science Quarterly 411, 431, issue of September, 1951. A provision limiting the State itself had been inserted in the Constitution of 1851, repeated in the Constitution of 1864, and again repeated as Sec. 34 of Article III of the Constitution of 1867. The Constitution of 1867 also included a somewhat similar limiting provision for the counties in Sec. 54 of Article III. These two last mentioned sections of the Constitution have each been
The order will be reversed and the case remanded for such further proceedings, if any, as may be necessary.
Order reversed with costs and case remanded.