42 U.S. 134 | SCOTUS | 1843
THE PRESIDENT, DIRECTORS, AND COMPANY OF THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES, AND THE UNITED STATES,
v.
JAMES B. BEVERLY AND JANE HIS WIFE, WILLIAM RAMSAY AND ELIZABETH HIS WIFE, HAMILTON AND JAMES PETER, HEIRS OF DAVID PETER, DECEASED, AND GEORGE PETER, SURVIVING EXECUTOR OF DAVID PETER, DECEASED.
Supreme Court of United States.
*143 Jones and Sergeant, for the appellants.
Cox and Reverdy Johnson, for the appellees.
Coxe, contra.
*147 Mr. Justice BALDWIN delivered the opinion of the court.
A summary of the points decided, and principles settled in the former case between these parties, will save much time in the investigation of those which are involved in this.
After taking a condensed view of the will of David Peter, the court declare, that he had unquestionable right, so far as respected his children, to charge the payment of his debts upon any part of his estate he might think proper, and that none but a creditor could control his will in that respect; that he had constituted his widow the trustee of the proceeds of all his estate, for the maintenance and education of his children; and invested her with unlimited discretion in this respect, so far as the proceeds of his estate would go. Whereby the surviving executor is not accountable for any thing so applied by her, even if she would be chargeable with a devastavit, and that the proceeds of all his estate being thus vested in the widow, would render it necessary, independent of any express direction in the will, that recourse be had to the real estate for the payment of the debts. 10 Peters, 562, 563. The court then decide, that the surviving executor had power to sell, and that it was impossible to draw any other conclusion, than that it was the intention of the testator that the sale should be so made. 10 Peters, 566. On the inquiry whether there is any subsisting debt due from the estate of David Peter to the banks, the court say, there is no pretence that they have been paid in fact, and if not, the trust remains unexecuted, and the land still remains charged with it. If the executors have paid the banks, or the banks have accepted their notes in payment of the notes of the testator, the only effect is, that the executors became the creditors instead of the banks, and may resort to the trust fund to satisfy the debt. But the court also say, that under the circumstances of the case, there is no ground for considering the debt of the banks to be extinguished, and they then proceed to state the result of their consideration to be this.
*148 That the will created a power coupled with an interest that survives; that the surviving executor is the person authorized to execute that power and fulfil that trust; that the debt due the banks has not been extinguished, or the estate in any way discharged from the payment. That the executors are not chargeable with negligence or such misapplication of the personal estate as to make them responsible for the payment of these debts; and that from the auditor's report on the accounts of the executors, exhibited to, and allowed by him, there has at all times been, and now is, a considerable balance in favour of the executors against the estate. The court, then, refer to the exceptions taken to the auditor's report, and declare them to have been properly overruled by the court below, and proceed to render their decree as before referred to. 10 Peters, 569, 570.
So far, then, as related to the construction of the will, the disposition of the personal property, the charge of existing debts on the real estate, the power of the executor, the existence of a trust, and their duty to execute it by a sale of the property charged by the will, the decision of the court has settled the rules and principles on which the present controversy must be determined if they are applicable; it was made on great consideration, founded on authority, and nothing which has been urged in the argument of this case has caused us to entertain the least doubt of its entire conformity to the well established law of equity. So far as the evidence and facts of that case were considered and adjudicated, the decree of this court is final and conclusive; the parties and the subjects of controversy between them were the same as are now before us; negligence and misapplication of assets were charged on the executors, the existence of debts to them or the banks was denied by the then complainants, and now defendants, and both facts adjudged and decided adversely to them; and the auditor's report was confirmed, whereby every fact it contained became established and binding on the parties in any future controversy, as to any matter thus adjudicated.
In Hopkins v. Lee, this court state the settled law of all courts to be, that, as a general rule, a fact which has been directly tried and decided by a court of competent jurisdiction, cannot be contested again between the same parties, in the same or any other court. Hence a verdict and judgment of a court of record, or a *149 decree in chancery, although not binding on strangers, puts an end to all further controversy concerning the points thus decided between the parties to such suit. In this, there is, and ought to be, no difference between a verdict and judgment in a court of common law and a decree of a court of equity. They both stand on the same footing. 6 Wheat. 113, 114; S.P. 1 Wheat. 355; 12 Peters, 492. Whatever, therefore, our opinion might now be as to the facts adjudicated in the former case, the judicial power is incompetent to revise the evidence on which the decree was rendered, on any ground now set up in the answer of the defendants, or apparent on the present record, and they must be taken to be beyond all controvery in this or any future case between the parties. Before proceeding to consider the questions appropriate to this cause, a reference to the case of Fenwick v. Chapman, 9 Peters, 466, will be useful, in order to ascertain what principles were there laid down and are applicable to the present controversy. Adopting the general rule that the personal estate of a testator shall in all cases be primarily applied to the discharge of his personal debts or general legacies, unless he by express words or manifest intention exempt it, the court thus qualify the rule; where the testator's intention clearly appears that a legacy shall be paid at all events, the real estate is made liable on a deficiency of personal assets. So where without any assistance from the will, the nature of the thing to be done may clearly show the intention to charge the real estate with a debt; as, where the thing to be done cannot be partially performed by the executor, without defeating the instruction which directs it, and the thing itself. On this principle the court holds, that the manumission of slaves pursuant to the directions of a will under the law of Maryland (which is the law of the eastern part of this district) operates as a specific legacy to the slaves, and to charge the real estate with the payment of the debts of the testator, even though he may have, at the time of his death, no other personal property than slaves. 9 Peters, 471, 473. That the creditor may be carried into a court of equity, or voluntarily resort to it to obtain his debt, either from the lands or the personalty, when the testator leaves it doubtful from what fund his debts are to be paid; that lands devised for the payment of debts, or which have become chargeable by implication, constitute *150 a fund for the payment of debts, and an ample and plain remedy is admitted to exist in the law of Maryland, so to apply them.
"The will is the executor's law, and he is no more than the testator's representative in all things lawful in the will. A special legacy of all the personal property is a law to him;" if there is an insufficiency of "personal assets to pay debts, it is the executor's duty to file a bill against the creditors and all interested in the estate;" "praying that the lands may be made liable to the payment of debts, that equity may be done to all concerned, according to the law of equity." 9 Peters, 474, 475. When he is charged with the sale of the testator's lands for the payment of debts, it is his duty to execute the whole of the testator's will, and in such a case the creditors have as good a right to look to the land through him for the payment of their debts, as they have to look to the goods and chattels through him, 9 Peters, 477; and they must pursue their claims in equity, or according to the statutes of Maryland subjecting real estate to the payment of debts, to make their debts out of the land. 9 Peters, 481, 482. These statutes are the 4 Geo. 2, adopted in Maryland, and the act of 1785, c. 72, sect. 5, which is recited in the Bank of the United States v. Ritchie, 8 Peters, 143, and which this court there declare has been construed in that state to be an enlargement of jurisdiction, and that decrees for selling the lands of minors and lunatics, in the cases prescribed by it, have been treated by the Court of Appeals, as the exercise of other equity powers. That these opinions of this court are in accordance as well with the statutes of Maryland, and the established rules of equity in cases of this description, we have no doubt; nor of their application to the present. It must therefore be taken to be a settled point, that a disposition by a testator of his personal property to purposes other than the payment of his debts, with the assent of creditors, is in itself a charge on the real estate, subjecting it to the payment of the debts of the estate, though no such charge is created by the words of the will. A trust is thereby raised which devolves on the executor, who may execute it by his own authority, or be compelled to do it by a bill filed by the creditors, either under the statute of 1785, or in virtue of the powers of a court of equity in relation to the execution of trusts, as the case may be; in this case there was such a trust fastened on the property *151 in controversy by implication of law, and the presumed intention of the testator, which can be enforced by these complainants, unless some valid objection has been made out by the respondents.
It has been contended that the frame of the bill is too defective to justify any action upon it, for the want of necessary averments, but when we take it in connection with the former cause to which it refers, the agreement of the parties on file, and the answer of the defendants, we think that a satisfactory answer is at hand. The object of the bill is clearly stated, such averments are set forth as on its fact shows some equity which requires an answer; informal as they may be, they would stand the test of a demurrer, especially with the aid of the agreement, by which it appears that the defendants fully understood the nature of the plaintiff's case, the object sought, and the evidence on which they would rely. The answer is full to every matter of fact or law which could be averred in the best drawn bill; there has been no allegation of surprise, or any want of notice of the grounds on which the plaintiff rested his case, and the parties went to the hearing on the bill as it stood, fully prepared to contest their respective claims, as they had done in the first case, of which this was well known to be the consequence. Under such circumstances the objection is entitled to no favour, and is not sustainable as an obstacle to our action upon the merits of the cause.
The answer sets up the dismission of a bill filed by the complainants in 1827, against the defendants, for the same relief as is prayed for in the present bill, as a bar thereto; but no record of such case is set out or exhibited, so that, however true the answer may be in fact, it cannot avail in law. In this respect it is not responsive to the bill; it sets up distinct affirmative matter of defence and bar, which the defendants must prove, or it can have no effect for either purpose.
The statute of limitations, and the loss of time from the death of David Peter to the filing of the bill, are also plead and relied on as a bar, but we think that neither can apply to this case, which is an unexecuted trust for the payment of debts adjudged by this court in 1836, to be unpaid in point of fact, and then existing in favour of the banks and executor, and the present bill was filed soon after the decision was made. The confirmation of the auditor's *152 report, made in that case, is conclusive to show the amount of such debts at that time; so is his report in this case as to their present amount: we cannot look through these reports for the evidence on which they were made; they have passed to judgment, and have the sanctity of records.
The remaining objections to the relief prayed for by the bill, which are founded on the principles of the law or the rules of equity, are covered by the former decisions of this court; those which arise from the evidence in the cause as to matters of fact material to our decision, are no longer open to controversy, and we are clearly of opinion that the complainants have made out their case in point of law and fact.
The decree of the Circuit Court must consequently be reversed. The cause is remanded with directions to make a decree in conformity with this opinion, by ordering a sale of the property in controversy, and consistently with the agreement of the parties filed of record, and the rules of equity as to the time of disposing of the several parts thereof, specifically devised by the will of David Peter. It is also directed; that the Circuit Court decree on the report of an auditor, or as they may think proper, to what part or items of the account of George Peter, a preference ought to be given in payment over the other creditors of the estate of the testator, and make a final order thereon according to law and equity.
ORDER.
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Columbia, holden in and for the county of Washington, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered and decreed by this court, that the decree of the said Circuit Court in this cause be and the same is hereby reversed, with costs, and that this cause be and the same is hereby remanded to the said Circuit Court, with directions to proceed therein according to the opinion of this court, and in conformity to the principles of law and justice.
