40 Mo. App. 40 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1890
delivered the opinion of the court.
The plaintiff brought this action to recover a balance in the hands of the defendant, admitted to be due. The only defense now sought to be sustained arises on the following part of the answer: “ Further answering-defendant says said company on the-day of-, 1888, sold and transferred to another corporation, the Quintette Mining Company, all its property and assets, including the present claim, and that plaintiff has, therefore, no right or interest in the same, and defendant further says that since the date of the aforesaid transfer this plaintiff, being insolvent, discontinued all business, and ceased to exist as a business or mining corporation, and defendant further states that this suit is brought without the authority of plaintiff as a corporation.”
Upon the trial the defendant gave evidence tending to show the following facts: The plaintiff was a Colorado corporation, organized for the purpose of mining and business incidental to it, and all its mining claims were sold out under a deed of trust prior to the institution of this suit. - The asset sued for was never transferred, but was, with some tangible property, presumably of some slight value, still the property of the
The defendant also offered in evidence part of the general corporation laws of the state of Colorado, providing that, “upon dissolution by expiration of its charter or otherwise” of any corporation, the directors shall become trustees for winding up the corporate affairs. The provision is substantially the same as contained in section 744 of our Revised Statutes of 1879, which was the law of this state when the cases hereinafter referred to were decided. Our statute merely uses the words, “upon the dissolution of any corporation,” and the Colorado statute adds, “by the expiration of its charter or otherwise.” As the term dissolution of a corporation necessarily includes its dissolution in any manner known to the law, there is no substantial difference between the Missouri and Colorado statute on the subject.
The trial court upon this evidence rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, and the errors assigned are that the court erred in ruling out the evidence above mentioned offered by the defendant, and further erred in rendering judgment for the plaintiff. There is no merit whatever in either of these complaints. It is the law of this state, and, as far as we are aware, of all jurisdictions, that the insolvency of a corporation, and its discontinuance of the business for which it was
Nor can we see any merit whatever in the proposition contended for, that no legal authority to prosecute this suit on behalf of the corporation is shown. The law in this state is settled by a course of uniform adjudications that no formal resolution o.f the board of directors is prerequisite for the employment of counsel for a corporation. Western Bank v. Gilstrap, 45 Mo. 419; Southgate v. Railroad, 61 Mo. 89; Thompson v. School District, 71 Mo. 495; Holmes v. Board of Trade, 81 Mo. 137. In the case last cited, Judge Hough says: “A contract for legal services may be made by the tacit or implied consent of the board of directors;” and, in Thompson v. School District, supra, Judge Sherwood says: “Of course, if we concede the power, without formal resolution, to employ an attorney, the usual results of such employment will follow as a necessary consequence.” The question in that case was whether the entry of the appearance of the corporation as a party defendant by attorney was duly authorized.' •